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**Advocacy and interest group influence
in EU foreign policy**

by

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis has been entirely my own work and follows the guidelines provided in the Guide to Examinations for Higher Degrees by Research of the University of Warwick. The dissertation has not been submitted for a degree at another university and any errors within are entirely my own.

Abstract

This thesis explores the advocacy strategies and influence of interest groups in EU foreign policy. It examines in particular the impact of institutional factors on the strategies and lobbying outcomes. Conceptually, it contributes to the literature on interest groups and lobbying in the EU and to the study of non-state actor participation in international organisations.

Conceptualising EU foreign policy as multi-level and multi-pillar, the study inquires into the relationship between policy regime (ranging from the Community method to the intergovernmental method, as these predominate in different areas of EU external relations) and the degree and type of interest group influence. To this end the thesis compares three examples of EU foreign policy: visa liberalisation towards the Eastern neighbours; sanctions towards Belarus; and CSDP missions in Georgia and Palestine.

The research reveals that interest groups engage in multi-level lobbying even in those policy areas that are ruled by the intergovernmental method. Intergovernmentalism limits formal access to policymakers, but groups and policymakers build channels for informal access. To some extent contrary to the predications of established theories, this allows interest groups to exert some degree of influence even on policy dossiers in which intergovernmental arrangements prevail. In such policy domains, groups opposing change do not always succeed, despite the veto opportunities that intergovernmentalism provides.

While this is a significant finding, the thesis also notes how interest group influence is most commonly exerted upon relatively technical issues and at later stages of the policy cycle. Moreover, the study emphasises that institutional structures are not the only

relevant factor in explaining group influence. Group-level characteristics, including material resources, condition groups' ability to adapt to complex decision-making in EU foreign policy. The thesis concludes that a combination of factors is required to capture the influence of interest groups over EU foreign policy.

List of Abbreviations

ABL Administrative Boundary Line

AFET European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs

ALDE The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIVCOM Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

CoE Council of Europe

COEST Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia

COHOM Human Rights Working Group

CONOPS Concept of Operations (of a CSDP mission or operation)

COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives

CMPD Crisis Management and Planning Directorate

CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

CSOs Civil society organisations

DROI European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights

FO Field Office

ECR The European Conservatives and Reformists Group in the European Parliament

EEAS European External Action Service

EaP Eastern Partnership

ENP European Neighbourhood Policy

EP European Parliament

EPP European People's Party

EUBAM Rafah EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point

EUCJ Court of Justice of the European Union

EUMC European Union Military Committee

EUMM European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia

EPLO European Peacebuilding Liaison Office

EU COPPS European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support

EUPOL COPPS European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories

EUSR European Union Special Representative

Greens/EFA The Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament

HoM Head(s) of Mission

HQ Headquarters

HR High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

ICG International Crisis Group

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

IPRM Incident Prevention and Reaction Mechanism

LGBTI Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex

MaMa Mashreq/Maghreb Working Party

MEP Member of the European Parliament

MEPP Middle East Peace Process

NGOs Non-governmental organisations

NSA Non-state actors

OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

OPLAN Operation Plan (of a CSDP mission or operation)

OPTs The Occupied Palestinian Territories

QMV Qualified majority voting

PCP Palestinian Civilian Police

PSC Political and Security Committee

QCEA Quakers Council for European Affairs

RELEX Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Group

S&D Group of the Progress Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European
Parliament

SEDE European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence

SSR Security Sector Reform

TEU Treaty on the European Union

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

VLAP Visa Liberalisation Action Plan

VFA Visa Facilitation Agreement

UN United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Introduction

International relations and foreign policy conduct have long been seen as dominated by states. Even in the world of interdependencies and interconnections, a multiplicity of actors and heterarchy, foreign policy, border control, security and defence have been described as the last outposts of state sovereignty. Since the late 1990s the realist and neorealist visions of state dominance in international politics have been increasingly challenged. Non-state actors ranging from transnational organised crime groups and terrorist organisations to NGOs, churches and solidarity movements, as well as multinational corporations have emerged breaking the state monopoly on the exercise of power in international relations.

Similar processes have taken place in Europe, where European integration has created a web of interdependencies between economies and societies and opened the door to non-state actors to move from the domestic political scene to the supranational level. Driving integration or trying to deal with its consequences, all kinds of organised interests have lobbied EU policymaking in the areas of the common market, international trade, agriculture, regional policy and other spheres of European integration. Multi-level governance, which emerged in Europe, is seen as especially conducive to interest group involvement in politics at the EU level as in addition to lobbying their governments they can also shift their focus to supranational venues.

The proliferation of interest groups at the European level followed the adoption of the Single European Act (1986), which expanded the powers of the European Community to new policy areas and decreased the influence of national governments in Community decision-making (Mazey & Richardson 1993). Business groups of all sorts – European


and national industry associations and individual firms – were first to organise themselves in Brussels. Labour and citizens groups came later, but their presence has been growing as more policymaking is done at the EU level and the European Commission has sought to boost participatory democracy in the EU by increasingly consulting with, and providing funding to, civil society actors. Citizens interest associations are the second largest group in EU politics, after EU trade and professionals associations, counting for one third of all associations constituted at the EU level (Greenwood 2007). The key question about participation of interest groups in EU politics is “who wins and who loses”. Media observers and researchers argue whether business interests are more successful in lobbying than citizens interests. The research results from larger-N studies do not provide evidence for the systematic win of corporate interest in EU legislation-making battles (Dür et al. 2015; Klüver 2013b). However, the EU interest mediation system is seen as biased towards resourceful actors, despite the fact that it provides access to different types of actors, with the labels elite pluralism (Eising 2007b) and chameleon pluralism (Coen & Katsaitis 2013), reflecting its constantly changing nature.

Unlike in many other policy domains, the EU member states have been reluctant to give up their powers and genuinely integrate foreign policies. Despite multiple treaty changes in which more and more policy areas have been communitarised – meaning that the Community/Union has acquired more powers – EU foreign policy remains largely intergovernmental and with little involvement of the supranational institutions. However, this does not mean that this area of European integration remains entirely outside of the interests of non-state actors. Whereas there are less lobby groups with interest in EU foreign, security and defence policy than in the areas of internal market,

trade or regional policy (see Figure 1), in which the EU produces legally binding regulation and distributes funds, this policy area is not immune to interest group involvement.

The EU develops and constantly reviews its foreign policies in the areas of visas and migration, development aid, promotion of human rights, crisis management and conflict resolution. These policies are important for organised interests in the EU and they also affect non-state actors outside the Union, especially in those countries with which the EU relates and aims to assist or enable change. Participation of interest organisations in EU policymaking is crucial for the input and output legitimacy of EU foreign policy. On the one hand, the EU promotes participatory governance by trying to be more accessible and understandable to EU citizens. On the other hand, the Union seeks information about the current and potential impacts of its policies in order to improve its external performance and EU policymakers reach out to experts and interest groups for ideas and expertise. While EU participatory governance has become ‘business as usual’ in EU internal policies such as environment, energy or common market, the question is whether there are channels of access to policymakers for organised interests in EU foreign policy. It is assumed that there is not much space for interest group involvement in intergovernmental policymaking in which the Commission and the European Parliament traditionally open to societal interests have limited powers. Is this assumption correct?

Figure 1. Transparency Register: registrants in fields of interest¹




The statistical data from the EU Transparency Register – a voluntary register for lobby groups in Brussels – shows that all kinds of groups seem to take an interest in EU foreign, security and defence policies and, more broadly, defined EU external relations (see Figure 2).² Furthermore, media coverage also shows how the links between foreign and domestic policies in the EU and the member states are reflected in the mobilisation and lobbying of different types of interests on such issues as international sanctions, arms exports and military interventions. By influencing the public debate or inside lobbying, publicly or covertly, different groups mobilise to protect their interests and advance their causes; and the more external policies are made at the EU level, the more often EU institutions become targets of non-state actor advocacy. But who wins and who loses in EU foreign policy battles?

¹ The data in Figure 1 and Figure 2 come from EU Transparency Register, <http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/search.do>. Retrieved on 27 May 2015.

² The data of EU Transparency Register should be seen as a tentative indicator of the number of interest groups with interest in EU foreign policy issues and these figures should be treated with cautiousness for a number of reasons (see Greenwood & Dreger 2013).

Figure 2. Transparency register: fields of interest by group type



Students of the EU know very little about lobbying and the influence of interest groups in policy areas dominated by intergovernmental arrangements with the leading role of the Council of the EU and the European Council. Traditionally the most lobbied and accessible EU institutions – the Commission and the Parliament – had limited or no powers in EU foreign policy. Given that there has been minimal integration in the foreign policy area, and following intergovernmentalist accounts (Moravcsik 1999), one may expect that interest groups would rather act according to ‘the two-level games’ logic, lobbying their national governments and then expecting the governments to negotiate in line with their position at the intergovernmental level. However, these expectations no longer seem to reflect the reality in Brussels. Moreover, the growing presence and involvement of non-state actors in Brussels-based foreign policymaking is in line with a theoretical shift in the analysis of EU foreign policy, which has moved from intergovernmentalism towards governance approaches that argue that powers are increasingly shared both vertically between sub-state, state, European and even global

levels, and horizontally between state and non-state actors. However, while governance approaches envisage interest group mobilisation at the EU level, they do not say how their mobilisation translates into influence on EU policy.

In this thesis, I aim to examine non-state advocacy in EU foreign policy which, on the one hand, is seen as one of the last bastions of nation-state sovereignty, and, on the other, is one of the most rapidly developing areas of European integration. The central research question of my study is *how and to what extent interest groups influence EU foreign policy*.

By studying lobbying and interest group influence on EU foreign policy, I aim to contribute to two sets of literatures. Firstly, this study will be a novelty in the literature on interests groups in the EU by focusing on a policy area that has received very little scholarly attention. Following the curve of interest group mobilisation at the EU level, researchers have focused mostly on lobbying in those policy areas where the Community/Union has powers and produces legislation. Thus, the research has centred mainly on the Commission and the European Parliament as lobbying targets, whereas these institutions are largely excluded from intergovernmental policymaking. Is the existing knowledge about lobbying and interest group influence in the EU valid for EU foreign policy? This thesis aims to make an empirical contribution through exploring what advocacy strategies groups use in EU foreign policy lobbying, on what kinds of issues they engage, whom they target among policymakers, with whom they ally, to what extent they succeed in achieving their goals and what factors it depends on.

Secondly, this thesis will be a unique and valuable contribution to EU foreign policy studies by focusing on the role of interest groups in the policymaking process. EU foreign policy scholars have mainly focused on the role of state actors – national

governments and parliaments – and supranational institutions, the EU bureaucracy and nascent diplomacy. Despite some recent exceptions (Joachim & Dembinski 2011; Dembinski & Joachim 2014; Voltolini 2013; Voltolini forthcoming) interest group participation and influence remains a largely unexplored agenda of the literature on EU foreign policymaking, while studying non-state actor involvement helps us to better understand how EU foreign policy is made (see K. E. Smith 2010). The empirical findings of a study on interest groups will also be helpful to those trying to theorise EU foreign policy in terms of governance approaches and the mechanisms pushing European integration in this area. Participation of interest groups and the success of their advocacy can serve as an indicator of heterarchy and the inclusion of non-state actors, which are important in governance approaches. Finally, though this work does not try to address normative issues such as to what extent interest group involvement contributes to the democratic legitimacy of the EU (for intergovernmental decision-making in the EU see, for example, Dembinski & Joachim 2014), it can shed light on the issue of whether the intergovernmental institutional framework which still characterises a number of EU policy areas (e.g. foreign policy, monetary and fiscal policy) works to disadvantage the participatory governance which the EU tries to promote.

On a theoretical level, by looking at the case of EU foreign policy the thesis will contribute to the literature on interest groups in the EU through examining institutional determinants on lobbying and influence. Another major question which this thesis attempts to answer is *whether institutional design(s) of the EU determine(s) interest group lobbying patterns and influence over policy outcome*. Does intergovernmentalism matter in the sense that it limits space for interest group involvement at the EU level? Or

have advocacy groups found ways to (successfully) represent their interests at the EU level despite the absence of a genuine multi-level governance framework in areas of EU foreign policy in which intergovernmentalism prevails such as the CFSP/CSDP?


Given that interest group scholars have focused on Community policy areas and the legislation making process, they have lacked the necessary variation to examine the relationship between institutional factors and interest group influence in the EU. From comparative studies of lobbying in the EU and the US (Mahoney 2008) and in the EU and the UN (Joachim & Locher 2009c), we know that the institutional context seems to impact the choice of lobbying tactics and group influence. Moreover, the literature on non-state actor participation in international organisations shows that institutional arrangements may favour or severely constrain the access of outsiders and that institutional access may vary across but also within international organisations as well as stages of the policymaking process. By conceptualising EU foreign policy as multi-level and multi-pillar (Stephan Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 29-32) that includes not only CFSP/CSDP, but also former first and third pillar issues, I will explore the relationship between institutional conditions and interest group influence and examine whether and how interest groups adapt their lobbying strategies to different decision-making modes in EU foreign policy. In such a conceptualisation, EU foreign policy offers a mix of institutional arrangements which differ in terms of the involvement of supranational institutions, decision-making rules in the Council, and participatory mechanisms for non-state actors' involvement. Studies show that certainty of access affects how interest groups frame their issues or the resources they choose to rely on; in other words, the advocacy strategies they adopt (Joachim & Locher 2009a). Moreover, access is seen as an important, though not always sufficient, pre-condition of influence

(Tallberg et al. 2014).

Methodologically I also want to tackle the difficult question of measuring interest group influence. Although many studies on interest group politics in the EU have been conducted during the two last decades, the influence and power of interest groups in the EU remains an underexplored area (Bunea & Baumgartner 2014; Dür 2008a). This seems to be a result of how difficult it is ‘to operationalise the concepts of ‘influence’ and ‘power’, to construct reliable indicators, and to measure them empirically’ (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007: 2). Whereas interest group scholars have opted for the pragmatic approach of measuring interest group influence conceptualised as control over policy outcome, focusing on its visible manifestations and advancing significantly in measurement methods, many difficulties in measuring, collecting and validating data remain. Being conscious of these difficulties, I do not want to avoid the issue of influence given that the question of who wins and who loses remains central to our understanding of politics in the EU and further afield. In approaching the issue of influence, I will not attempt to reinvent the wheel, but instead apply tested methods in order to explore the benefits of methodological triangulation in a new case. The difficulty in measuring influence in EU foreign policy is that in the absence of a legislation-making process, with a more secretive policy environment and the confidentiality clause on many policy documents, an inquiry into influence has to rely on observations made by policy participants and stakeholders. Whereas this may impede an ‘objective’ measurement of influence (Bernhagen et al. 2014), such an exercise may also tell us more about how advocacy success and interest group influence are perceived by group representatives and policymakers. Thus, it will add to our understanding of the nature of lobbying and influence.

In order to study advocacy and the influence of interest groups in EU foreign policy, I will look at the issue areas most prominent in EU foreign policy such as democracy and human rights promotion and peace and state building. By doing so, I will focus on the EU policy towards neighbourhood regions and countries. The EU policy towards its neighbourhood is central to EU foreign policy: the EU's neighbourhood has been set as one of the three key priorities of EU external relations (Ashton 2010). There is also a web of relations between the EU and neighbouring countries at the member state and sub-state levels, as well as between different actors, including non-state actors such as business companies, NGOs, political parties, citizens groups, and solidarity movements. To examine institutional determinants of lobbying and influence, I will conduct a comparative case study analysis. Focusing on three cases which represent different policy regimes (independent variable), I will examine whether and how lobbying strategies (dependent variable) and group influence (dependent variable) change as policy dossiers or issues move on the axis from the Community method to the intergovernmental method of policymaking. The cases have been selected to vary upon the key independent variable – the type of policy regime – and be most similar on other variables which may account for the variation of influence. However, some control variables (e.g. group-level characteristics) are unknown, thus, in addition to a cross-case analysis, a within-case analysis is applied to add to our understanding of the effect of the cause and explore how the institutional design affects lobbying outcome, if at all. The selected cases are visually presented in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Case study analysis



Given the above aims and context, the thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 1, I discuss the main literature on which this study draws and to which it aims to contribute. I start by reviewing the role prescribed to interest groups in the main theories of European integration. I then examine how the issue of influence and its determinants has been tackled in the study of interest groups. Whereas the interest group literature in the EU offers some insights into the relationship between institutional factors and lobbying, I will also turn to the literature on non-state actors' participation in international governance, which devotes significant attention to the issue of institutional arrangements. Finally, I discuss lobbying in the case of EU foreign policy and insights on interest group strategies, influence and its determinants provided by the limited existing studies.

In Chapter 2, I present the theoretical framework and research design of this study. I introduce the main concepts used in this thesis such as interest groups, lobbying/advocacy, interest group influence, and EU foreign policy. I also present the institutional context of lobbying in the Union and introduce the concept of policy modes

in the EU which will be further used to study the link between institutional conditions and interest group influence in EU foreign policy. I also outline the case study research design and methodology and discuss the difficulties of measuring influence and how I will try to overcome them in this study.

In Chapters 3-5, I present the research findings of each of the case studies. In each chapter, I will describe lobbying strategies (answering the question *how* interest groups influence EU foreign policy) by analysing their advocacy objectives, levels and targets of lobbying, coalition building patterns, and choice of tactics. I will also discuss the results of measuring (the degree of) their influence (answering the question *what* influence they have) and what kind of issues and the factors upon which the influence is dependent. In Chapter 3, I show how groups lobbying on EU visa liberalisation policy towards the Eastern neighbours have been successful in keeping the issue of visa-free travel on the EU agenda, even though their influence is mostly visible on technical issues during the implementation and evaluation policy stages. In Chapter 4, CFSP sanctions policy towards Belarus emerges as a battlefield of divergent organised interests in which business groups exploit the veto powers of EU member states in the Council, whereas public interest groups struggle to overcome internal divisions and build broader advocacy coalitions for policy change involving the European Parliament and the Commission. Their influence is mostly visible in the recalibration of EU sanctions. In Chapter 5, interest groups are shielded from access to crisis management structures in Brussels. They therefore aim to increase space for their involvement through building channels of informal communication with policymakers. Groups also engage with the CSDP missions on the ground, but achieve influence on rather minor issues related to implementation of the mission mandate.

In the Concluding chapter, I review the overall findings of this thesis and offer empirical, theoretical and methodological reflections. In particular, I discuss how institutional factors affect interest groups' strategies and influence. Finally, I point out future areas for research based on the central findings of the thesis.

Chapter 1. Literature review

Introduction

The main theoretical approaches to European integration view the role of interest groups in this process differently. Liberal intergovernmentalism views European integration as primarily driven by economic interests; more precisely, the commercial interests of domestic producer groups who influence their governments, with the main focus of the theory on state behaviour. National governments are seen to have ultimate power over the integration process. The role of non-state actors is limited to domestic politics. Domestic groups are engaged in the process of national preference formation, while a national government may use supranational institutions to reduce opposition from unsupportive domestic groups (Moravcsik 1999: 73, 473; Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009). This approach is guided by the logic of two-level games, in which only national politicians participate at both domestic and international levels, whereas domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring their governments (Putnam 1988).

In contrast, neofunctionalism puts an emphasis on the role of non-state actors – interest associations and social movements formed at the European level. According to this theory, once member states initially decide to cooperate within the regional organisation, supranational institutions and interest groups become the main drivers of European integration. Neofunctionalists hypothesised that integration would lead to the formation of regional interest groups that would be active at the regional and/or national levels (Haas 1968: 354, 388; Schmitter 1970: 856) and that an increase of regional interest groups would be instrumental in overcoming national resistance to expand the scale and the level of integration (Schmitter 1970: 858). Regional groups would

enhance the reform-promoting role of supranational institutions in the process of integration. A change would also occur on the domestic level: national actors would appear differentiated in classes, status groups, subregions, etc., and these sub-national actors would form transnational coalitions of opposition and support (Schmitter 1970: 864).

Whereas liberal intergovernmentalism is criticised for its failure to recognize the role of interest groups both at the domestic and European level in EU integration and day-to-day policymaking (Cowles 2003), neofunctionalism is accused of going too far in its estimations of interest group power in the integration process and assumptions of excessive homogeneity in the pressures that would be brought by interest groups upon national governments (Niemann & Schmitter 2009). Nonetheless, neofunctionalism has inspired such conceptual approaches as multi-level governance (see George 2004).

Governance approaches to European integration share a common understanding that power does not form the monopoly of state and is shared between different actors and levels. As Pierre (2000: 3-4) notes, “[In] much of the public and political debate, governance refers to sustaining co-ordination and coherence among variety of actors with different purposes and objectives such as political actors and institutions, corporate interests, civil society, and transnational organisations. What previously were indisputable roles of government are now increasingly seen as more common, generic, societal problems which can be resolved by political institutions but also by other actors. The main point here that political institutions no longer exercise a monopoly of the orchestration of governance” (Pierre 2000: 3-4).

The concept of EU governance focuses on distinct features of EU polity and policymaking. Some scholars underline its regulatory character, while others focus on

its multi-level nature, and on segmentation and differentiation. There is also debate as to the level of democratic deficit in the EU (for an overview, see Kohler-Koch & Rittberger 2006; B. G. Peters & Pierre 2009). A common thread in these concepts is an emphasis on the role of non-state actors in the EU.

According to the multi-level governance (MLG) perspective, decision-making competences are no longer monopolised by state authorities, but are instead shared by various actors at different levels – subnational, national and supranational. The MLG approach implies that political arenas at different levels are interconnected rather than nested as state-centric approaches argue. This means that subnational actors, including interest groups, operate at both a domestic and European level, creating transnational coalitions (Marks et al. 1996; Hooghe & Marks 2001; Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch 2004). Multi-level governance scholars describe EU decision-making as less technocratic and more “politicized-participatory” where the stakes of political conflict are higher, the scope of authoritative decision-making broader, and there are more avenues for interest group influence and political mobilization (Hooghe & Marks 2001: 126).

Whereas MLG has been criticised on many accounts, including for lacking a causal motor of integration and set of testable hypotheses (Jordan 2001), with regard to non-state actors, this theoretical approach is thin in explaining how and why substate actors mobilise (Warleigh 2006) and the difference between mobilisation of substate actors and their power to shape policy outcomes (Jordan 2001). To address the participation vs. power issue, some scholars distinguish between multi-level governance and multi-level participation, where the latter notion would mean greater involvement without effective influence for at least some types of new actors (Bache & Flinders 2004). Others

suggest the use of the MLG approach in combination with policy networks analysis in order to explore the extent to which participation equals influence and multi-level governance is present in a policy area (Warleigh 2006: 93-94). Rhodes defines policy networks as “sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policymaking and implementation. These actors are interdependent and policy emerges from the interactions between them” (Rhodes 2008: 426). Analysing EU governance through policy networks analysis can explain EU policy outcomes in a particular sector through the influence of different actors, including non-state actors (Peterson 2009).

Whereas the key theoretical approaches explaining European integration have something to say about the role of non-state actors in this process, there is no unity among them as to when and at what level interest groups mobilise to lobby and what influence they have on EU policymaking. Instead, a growing literature on lobbying and interest groups in the EU has taken a closer look at interest group mobilisation and the maintenance, density and diversity of the interest group population as well as issues of lobbying strategies and influence on policy outcomes.

This literature has come out of the MLG assumption viewing European integration among the “main causes for the changing nature, and growing importance of interest group politics in Europe” (Beyers et al. 2008: 1111). Thus, the bulk of studies on interest groups in the EU focus on those policy areas in which European integration has advanced most, and the supranational institutions have significant competencies, for example, EU trade policy, internal market, common agricultural policy or environmental policy. In contrast, few studies examine interest group involvement in

those areas in which intergovernmentalism is a dominant method for policymaking such as EU foreign policy. Equally, the literature on EU foreign policymaking also largely omits the issue of participation and the influence of non-state actors (K. E. Smith 2010). Nevertheless, there is a growing number of interest groups in the EU foreign policy arena, as the EU Transparency Register and their public activity in Brussels reveal.

This thesis aims to explore non-state actor advocacy in EU foreign policymaking and, in particular, examine the relationship between institutional factors on the one hand, and interest group strategies and influence on the other. Therefore, in the following sections, I provide an overview of the main literature to which it aims to contribute and on which it draws. First, I turn to the literature on interest groups in the EU focusing on the issues of influence and factors determining it. Given that the literature on lobbying in the EU has largely avoided areas of intergovernmental politics, I then explore the literature on participation of non-state actors in international intergovernmental organisations which provide some insight on why intergovernmental organisations open or restrict access to non-state actors. Finally, I present the literature theorising EU foreign policy, in particular those studies that signal that EU foreign policy may be conducive to the involvement of non-state actors. I also review what the few existing studies on non-state actors' involvement in EU foreign policymaking reveal about advocacy strategies and influence. I conclude by outlining my main contribution to the literatures reviewed.

1. Lobbying and influence of interest groups in the EU

Whereas the EU interest group literature accounts for slightly over two decades, many theoretical assumptions, research questions and hypotheses have been borrowed from a

century-old corpus of US literature on interest groups directly or via European national studies on interest groups (for example, from UK literature on British interest groups). The US literature has focused on interest mobilisation, organisational maintenance, lobbying strategies and, of particular significance to this study, the influence of interest groups (for an overview of the US interest groups literature see Hojnacki et al. 2012; Lowery & Gray 2004; Baumgartner & Leech 1998). One of the key debates that has been also brought to the EU interest groups literature concerns the power of money in politics and whether resource-rich interests tend to define outcomes of public policy. Whereas an overview of the literature on EU interest groups has been done elsewhere (see Bunea & Baumgartner 2014; Beyers et al. 2008; Eising 2008b; Coen 2007), in this section I focus on the bulk of studies which examine the issue of influence.

The influence and power of interest groups in the EU still remains a comparatively under-researched area (Bunea & Baumgartner 2014; Dür 2008a; Dür 2008b; Dür & De Bièvre 2007b). Reviewing the EU interest groups literature, Bunea and Baumgartner (2014:1422) calculate that merely 11% of studies focus on influence. The reason given for this is the difficulty “to operationalise the concepts of ‘influence’ and ‘power’, to construct reliable indicators, and to measure them empirically” (Dür & De Bièvre 2007b: 2).

Most studies of interest groups in the EU have been conducted in the case study mode testing hypotheses stemming from the literature on interest groups in the US, Great Britain and other Western countries. These studies have generated many insights on lobbying and influence in the EU, however, they have also reached contradictory conclusions as to what types of groups are influential in the EU and what factors determine their influence (Dür 2008a; Eising 2008). Quantitative studies of lobbying

and influence have started to appear recently. In her book, Klüver studied key conditions of lobbying success by looking at 56 policy issues and over 2500 interest groups participating in the European Commission's online consultations (Klüver 2013c). Other examples of ongoing large-N research projects are 'Intereuro'³ conducted by nine European universities that examines interest groups lobbying strategies, their impact on policy outcomes and their networks by focusing on 100 legislative proposals in the EU; and 'Interarena' that analyses group influence towards the bureaucracy, parliament and the media in three EU countries (Denmark,⁴ UK and Germany) (see also the special issue of *Journal of European Public Policy* "Legislative lobbying in context: the policy and polity determinants of interest group politics in the European Union" 2015, 22:4).

However, the scholarship of interest group influence centres on policy areas or issues that belong to the former first pillar, in which the Community method applies. In respect to a policy area, case studies focus on EU trade policy (Cowles 1995; Dür 2008a; Dür & De Bièvre 2007a; De Bièvre & Eckhardt 2011), environmental policy (Bugdahn 2008; Zito & Jacobs 2009; Bunea 2013), common agricultural policy (Grant 1978; Egdell & Thompson 1999), competition policy (García & Meier 2012), and services (e.g. information technologies, telecommunications, transport) (Michalowicz 2007; Woll 2007). Studies on interest groups influencing intergovernmental decision making in the EU are rare (Voltolini 2013; Dembinski 2009; Joachim & Dembinski 2011 on the CFSP; Friedrich 2008 and Uçarer 2009 on the former third pillar).

The focus of the literature is predominantly on the legislation making process (see Klüver et al. 2015), which is not only the most productive and socially important area

3 See the project website <http://www.intereuro.eu/>.

4 For Interarena in Denmark see the project website <http://interarena.dk>.

of EU policymaking, but also has clear decision-making procedures and timeframes and, in most cases, results in tangible policy outcomes – legislative acts. Moreover, the studies tend to focus on the agenda setting and policy formulation stage and groups influencing the Commission (Bunea & Baumgartner 2014), with some of them looking specifically at interest group participation in the consultations run by the Commission (Klüver 2013; Bunea 2013). Such a focus is justified as agenda-setting is the first phase of the policy cycle and groups try to influence policy as early as possible. Moreover, the availability of initial consultation documents and final legislative proposals as well as published positions of interest groups enable the collection of data necessary for a more ‘objective’ measurement of influence. However, stronger research designs that look at specific modes of influence and produce robust findings limit the scope of our inference about influence (Lowery 2013: 19). While studies looking at influence on decision-making in the European Parliament (EP) have become more frequent (Wessels 1999; Bouwen 2004b; Marshall 2010; Marshall 2012; Marshall 2015; Rasmussen 2015), this is not the case for the Council of the EU and other EU institutions and bodies. Research looking at participation of lobbying groups in decision-making, implementation and evaluation of EU policies is equally scarce (Bunea & Baumgartner 2014).

The research debate in the EU (and the US) focuses on exploring the relationship between influence and various factors that determine it, or, in other words, the focus of the research is on the lobbying context. Following the appeal of Baumgartner and Leech (1998: 134), instead of only focusing on the question of “whether interest groups are ever influential” or not, researchers also try to find out “when, why, and to what extent they are powerful on what types of issues”.

The lobbying context is a wide term to describe different kinds of factors that affect the

choice of lobbying strategies and influence. Three types of context that attract major attention of researchers studying what determines lobbying success or failure are group characteristics, policy issue characteristics and institutional environment in which the groups lobby (Hojnacki et al. 2012; Dür & De Bièvre 2007b). In addition to the three main types of influence determinants, Dür includes the fourth cluster – interest group strategies – which is the most unexplored in the study of interest groups’ influence (Dür 2008b: 1213). Empirical studies on interest group influence determinants have produced some insightful and valuable but also often contradictory results, partly due to the fact that they examine influence across different policy areas and focus on different sets of variables operationalising them differently (Dür & De Bièvre 2007b; Dür 2008a).

One of the most frequently posed research questions concerns the impact of resources in interest groups lobbying and influence in the EU. Following the US interest groups literature, students of the EU repeatedly ask the question of who wins and who loses in EU politics. Control over resources which Dahl defined as “anything that can be used to sway the specific choices or the strategies of another individual” (Dahl 1961: 225) has been one of the most common conceptualisations of power, which can be indirectly represented by resources (Simon 1953; Hart 1976). Consequently, more resourceful groups are seen more influential.

Taking into account the technocratic character of EU decision-making, information is seen as the most important resource which interest groups exchange for access and influence, whereas lobbying in the EU is often conceptualised as information exchange drawing on resource dependence theories (Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2004a; Chalmers 2011; Klüver 2013b). According to Bouwen’s theory of access which has become extremely widespread in EU lobbying studies, private actors require access to the EU

institutions, while the EU institutions demand certain ‘access goods’ in return (Bouwen 2002). Most common ‘access goods’ are different types of information which a group can provide. Each EU institution favours a certain type of ‘access good’ that certain types of interest groups are more likely to provide, therefore, different institutions provide access to different interest groups depending on their specific resource needs (Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2004). However, other types of resources such as financial and membership resources, group size, reputation also matter.

The central discussion in the literature has been whether the EU system is biased towards resource-rich business interests to the detriment of citizens interests. Larger-N studies reveal that business groups are “overall, less successful than citizen groups” in the legislative decision-making process in the EU or at least no single type of interest dominates policy outcomes in the EU (Dür et al. 2015). Different types of interests – citizens groups, foundations, trade and business associations – are likely to achieve influence in the EU (Mahoney 2008; Chalmers 2011; Klüver 2013a).

However, the EU interest mediation system still seems to be based toward resource-rich groups. A larger-N research reveals that business groups, especially resource-rich associations, active in policy areas with high competence of the EU are more involved in EU-level lobbying (‘Europeanised’) than other types of groups (Dür & Mateo 2014b). This conforms with previous findings showing that there is the business group bias in representation in Commission’s consultations (Klüver 2013a), that well-endowed corporate actors, large firms are more likely to become multi-level players than national business associations (Cowles 2001; Eising 2004), that well-resourced and professionalised NGOs are more likely to directly lobby in Brussels than smaller groups (Fairbass & Jordan 2002; Joachim & Locher 2009a), and that social movements are

much less Europeanised than organised interests (Imig & Tarrow 2001).

Issue characteristics have also received significant attention in the literature on interest groups in the EU (as well as in the US). Scholars argue that issue characteristics, such as policy type, degree of technicality, degree of conflict, salience of the issue affect interest group influence and choice of strategies (Dür 2008a; Dür & De Bièvre 2007b; Beyers 2008; Mahoney 2008). Studying lobbying across a larger number of policy issues in the EU and the US, Mahoney argues that the larger an issue is in scope and salience and the higher the level of conflict, the less likely lobbyists are to achieve their aims (Mahoney 2007; Mahoney 2008). Klüver contests this finding arguing that the effect of salience is not constant and that there is a relation between salience and the size of lobbying coalition: if interest groups belong to the relatively larger coalition, salience has a positive effect on lobbying success, whereas if interest groups belong to the relatively smaller coalition, then salience has a negative effect (Klüver 2011). A recent research shows that groups representing diffuse interests are more likely than business interests to share views with Commission officials of what is at stake in EU legislation when many interest groups are involved in lobbying and when the degree of media publicity is low (Boräng & Naurin 2015). The conflict expansion filters out narrow self-regarding frames benefiting civil society groups, whereas media dominated by resourceful business actors has the opposite effect (ibidem).

The studies examining how *institutional environment* conditions lobbying and interest group influence in the EU are less common. This may be explained by the lack of variation across institutional set-ups given the scholarly attention to the legislation-making under the Community method. At the same time, it is argued that institutions may empower certain types of groups directly (e.g. by providing funding or a

privileged access) or indirectly (by having demand in a certain type of resources that groups possess – money for re-election, information or expertise necessary in policymaking process) (Dür & De Bièvre 2007b; Dür 2008a).

Borrowed from the literature on social movements and political protests, the concept of ‘political opportunity structure’ is frequently used in the interest group literature. Broadly defined, political opportunity structure is “the set of characteristics of a given institution that determines the relative ability of (outside) groups influence decision making within that institution” (Princen & Kerremans 2008: 1130). Thus, political opportunity structure includes formal elements, such as voting or participation rules, and informal elements, such as norms, common practices and institutional culture (Joachim & Locher 2009b:9). In a narrower sense, political opportunity structure refers to access for political actors and the receptivity of the political system (Princen & Kerremans 2008: 1131). “Opportunity structures” are mainly studied from a perspective that views them as a fixed external constraint on interest groups behaviour. The other perspective considers “opportunity structures” as the defined and formed as part of the political process in which political actors identify and construct opportunity structures (for overview see Princen & Kerremans 2008).

Research that highlights the role of institutional determinants of lobbying and influence is conducted through comparative studies of the EU with other political systems such as the United States (Mahoney 2008; Woll 2012) and the United Nations (Joachim & Locher 2009c). Comparing lobbying in the EU and the US, Mahoney (2008: 193) concludes that “institutional design emerges as a factor in understanding lobbying success”. First, she reveals that the EU system, though less electorally accountable, appears to be more responsive to interest groups’ views: a larger share of groups achieve

some level of influence than in the US. Second, given that in the EU a policy change is more likely once the Commission makes a proposal for legislation than in the US, more lobbyists are more likely to achieve some degree of success in the EU than in the US, where the system produces clear winners and losers. This may explain, as Mahoney argues, the fact that the EU system is less biased to any type of interests than the US system is in which business interests are clearly more likely to win than to lose. Finally, given that there is no pan-European media system, advocates in the EU deploy outside lobbying tactics to a lesser degree than advocates in the US do (Mahoney 2008).

Lastly, the influence of interest groups depends on *strategies* they employ to use their resources, existing political opportunity structures and issue characteristics effectively (Dür 2008b: 1218). Yet, little research exists on the relationship between interest groups strategies and influence.

What is evident from the literature is that the choice of strategies also seems to depend upon the political institutions which groups target. Beyers demonstrates that in the EU actors with access to the European Parliament combine it with voice strategies more often than actors seeking access to the Commission, whereas, while lobbying the Commission, groups with access to the political cabinets of the Commissioners tend to use voice more often than those with access to the Commission General Directorates, purely technocratic units (Beyers 2004: 234-235). However, in addition to institutional factors, group characteristics and issue characteristics also affect how interest groups lobby (Mahoney 2008). For instance, civil society groups are more inclined to use outside lobbying than business groups (Kollman 1998: 41; Mahoney 2008: 163).

Chalmers argues that “the medium is more important than the message” showing that lobbying tactics are even more important than the content of information provided by the

groups in exchange for access to EU policymakers (Chalmers 2013). Moreover, his study shows that despite the fact that inside tactics are more spread in the EU, as they are seen by lobbyists as “less costly” and “more expedient”, outside tactics are “not inherently less effective” and applied by groups “disadvantaged at the policy process” as the previous studies argued (see Beyers 2004: 216). As Chalmers (2013: 54) explains, “standing out from the crowd” by adopting tactics which are “not thoroughly institutionalized” such as media campaigns and public events creates “very important paths of access to the EU”.

There are few more recent studies focusing on framing as an important element of lobbying strategies (see Klüver, Mahoney, et al. 2015; Eising et al. 2015). Framing involves selecting and emphasizing some aspects of an issue while deliberately ignoring others in order to shape policy debates in favour of a group’s interest. While frames tend to be dependent upon a group type (public interest groups tend to rely on public frames such as environment, human rights and consumer protection, while sectional groups are more likely to use economic frames), institutional context such as which European Commission DG a group lobbies also seems to play a role in the choice of frames (Klüver, Mahoney, et al. 2015).

Finally, the literature points out that choice of lobbying strategy and tactics may relate not only to intended influence on policy outcome, but also be based on other needs of interest groups, such as their organisational survival (see Lowery & Gray 2004: 170). Use of particular lobbying tactics can influence the life chances of lobby organisations, thereby influencing the structure and size of interest communities (Lowery 2007:42). As Lowery notes, lobbying on one issue that is less than central to an organisation may be vital to secure support from political elites or coalition allies on issues the organisation

cares about, or alternatively an organization with a poor reputation may choose in favour of outside lobbying to create a more favourable public opinion environment. Berkhout (2013) argues for studying exchange relationships of interest groups not only with public officials, but also with interest group supporters and media in order to add the ‘logic of support’ and the ‘logic of reputation’ to the ‘logic of influence’ to our explanations of interest group behaviour.

To conclude, there is a growing body of literature focusing on lobbying and influence in the EU. Researchers are keen to learn not only whether interest groups are influential in the EU, but also what types of groups systematically win or lose in the EU policymaking and under what contextual conditions. The literature has developed a mix of variables that may account for the choice of lobbying strategies and lobbying success and some of them have been examined empirically, including in the larger-N studies. Whereas the research has focused on group-level and issue-level characteristics, studies on the institutional determinants of influence have been less frequent. This is partly due to the fact that the literature looks at legislative policymaking and, in particular, agenda setting and policy formulation stage led by the Commission. However, there are EU policy domains which lie outside legislation making and in which participation of supranational institutions is limited and intergovernmental politics prevails. Given that the foreign policy of the EU is one such policy area, institutional characteristics may be the most distinctive conditions which impact upon lobbying patterns and influence in comparison with other policy areas.

2. Institutional determinants of participation of non-state actors in international organisations

Before turning to the overview of the few studies that examine lobbying in EU foreign policy, I will briefly overview the insights from the studies of participation and influence of non-state actors (NSA) in international intergovernmental organisations which have a particular focus on the role of institutions.

This literature examines participation of the NSA in global governance. In particular, it focuses on the issue of broadly defined access which international intergovernmental organisations provide for the NSA, examining formal rules and informal practices (Steffek et al. 2008; Joachim & Locher 2009c; Jönsson & Tallberg 2010; Irrera 2013; Tallberg et al. 2014). The research focus is more on the demand side of lobbying: it explores how opportunity structures of international organisations benefit or restrain participation of NSA in their policies.

This literature has addressed the issue from different theoretical perspectives (for an overview see Tallberg 2010). Some scholars argue on sociological institutionalist and constructivist grounds that access is increasingly provided to the NSA due to the spread of participatory governance norms (Saurugger 2010). Drawing on rationalist assumptions, other scholars maintain that functional logic and resource exchange models better explain why access is provided to the NSA (Mayer 2008; Steffek 2010; Tallberg et al. 2014).

What is important for this study is that having a variety of institutional arrangements, the literature has examined what factors accounts for differences in NSA access across

and within international organisations (Steffek et al. 2008; Tallberg et al. 2014). In the study of the institutional mechanisms through which non-state actors may take part in the policy process across 298 organisational bodies from fifty international organisations between 1950 and 2010, Tallberg and his collaborators argue that three causal factors – demand for resources and services of transnational non-state actors, domestic democratic standards in the member states of international organisations and state concerns with national sovereignty explain the variation of access within and across international organisations (Tallberg et al. 2014). The functional advantages of NSA participation account for the expansion of access over time and for variation across and within international organisations with democratic membership being another source of additional openness toward NSA. Sovereignty costs associated with NSA involvement have been a principal constraint on access and contributed to variation across issue areas and policy functions (ibidem). They find only limited empirical support for the constructivist argument about the spread of participatory norms of global governance, according to which policy-makers have been either socialised into believing in the appropriateness of NSA participation or have strategically adapted the institutional arrangements to boost organisational legitimacy.

Moreover, there are also variations of levels of access across policy fields (Steffek et al. 2008; Steffek 2010; Tallberg et al. 2014). Human rights, development and environmental policies are more open to NSA, whereas security is more closed (Tallberg et al. 2014). The research points out that issue areas and policy functions which are associated with high sovereignty costs are likely to be closed to the NSA participation. Furthermore, it is argued that there is also a significant variation across stages of the policymaking process: implementation, evaluation and policy formulation

stages are more open to NSA, whereas the decision-making stage is more closed (ibidem).

Even within the security realm, variation in terms of access and transparency exists between different international organisations. A comparative study shows that NATO is closed to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), whereas the OSCE has been open and supportive of civil society since its foundation (Mayer 2008). As Mayer argues, rationalist and functional logics helps to explain the difference. If one adopts the lens of resource exchange, one can see that differences in the tasks and capabilities of the two international organisations translate into “an unequal demand for resources” provided by the NSA such as knowledge, legitimacy and personnel (ibidem: 119). Mayer argues that the OSCE’s focus on the civilian side of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, extension of security provision towards human rights and democratisation and more limited resources account for more favourable conditions for NSA participation compared to those granted by NATO.

This literature also examines the relationship between opportunity structures of international organisations and NSA strategies. Comparing formal and informal elements of access provided to NGOs at the UN and the EU, researchers conclude that despite institutional differences between these organisations and variation of access across organisational bodies, issues at stake and the policy cycle, the EU and the UN are also “worlds together” in how they shape NGO strategies understood as mobilising resources and frames (Joachim & Locher 2009c). Both organisations favour certain type of NGOs – more professionalised and resourceful actors – which rely on “institutional as opposed to voice and protest strategies preferring conventional lobbying over contentious action” (Joachim & Locher 2009a: 176). At both organisations, NGOs also

frame issues in an easy-to-comprehend manner which appeals to diverse constituencies. The more NGOs are unsure about access, the more they rely on more consensual issue framing (ibidem). Furthermore, Joachim and Locher argue that international organisations not only impact the choice of strategies employed by NGOs, but they shape their constitution – “their organizational features by encouraging the formation of networks and platforms” and “professionalization and bureaucratization of NGOs by asking for and privileging scientific expertise and information over other forms of knowledge on specific issues” (ibidem: 178).

In sum, the literature on non-state actors’ participation in global governance suggests that different institutional arrangements translate into different participation patterns of NSA, and that rationalist accounts, and in particular resource exchange models, are potent tools to explain the variation. The literature, however, has not examined the question of influence conceptualised as a control over policy outcome. Whereas Tallberg and his collaborators (2014) argue that access may serve as an institutional precondition for NSA influence, they do not assume a linear relationship between access and influence and leave the issue of influence for future research.

3. The case of EU foreign policymaking

Whereas the participation and influence of non-state actors in world politics and international governance has been increasingly recognized and researched (Keck & Sikkink 1998; della Porta et al. 1999; Josselin & Wallace 2001; Jönsson & Tallberg 2010; Vasconcelos 2011; Scholte 2011), focus on interest groups is less prevalent in the literature on EU foreign policy. Early studies naturally focused on such actors as the

Member States and the Commission (Hill 1996). With a flourishing debate on democratic legitimacy in the EU, scholars have started to look at the role of representative bodies such as the European Parliament and national parliaments in EU foreign policy (Barbé & Herranz 2005; Barbé & Herranz 2007; Diedrichs 2004; Zanon 2010; Caballero-Bourdout 2011; Peters et al. 2010; Huff 2015). More recent inquiries have been made into the roles of EU bureaucratic and diplomatic actors (Dijkstra 2008; Dijkstra 2009; Duke 2012; Grevi 2007; Vanhoonacker et al. 2010; Carta 2012; Vanhoonacker & Pomorska 2013) and public opinion (Dumoulin & Manigart 2010). Few have recognised a role of interest groups as constituencies of EU foreign policy (Hill 2003) and the existence of a variety of non-state actors in agenda setting and participation in policy implementation of EU foreign policy (Keukeleire 2003; Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008). Meanwhile, reviews of the state of art in EU foreign policy studies have pointed to the need to pay attention to the roles of interest groups with regards to research into the formation of EU foreign policy (Smith 2010) and the democratic legitimacy of EU foreign policy (Smith 2008). Moreover, the departure from intergovernmentalism and application of governance approaches in theorising the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) implies that EU foreign policy should not be devoid of non-state actor involvement.

Norheim-Martinsen argues that such phenomena as “the impact of ‘Brusselization’ on CSDP, the role of individual entrepreneurship in the ‘Solana era’, the socializing effects of institutions and the presence of a European security identity or culture [...] all fit intriguingly well with the five features of security governance (Norheim-Martinsen 2010: 1352). Identified earlier by a team of scholars (Webber et al. 2004), these features

are: (1) heterarchy, or the existence of multiple centres of power; (2) the interaction of multiple actors, both public and private; (3) formal and informal institutionalization; (4) relations between actors that are ideational in character; and (5) a collective purpose. Mérand and his collaborators (2011) go further in applying the governance approach in conjunction with social network analysis as a method to analyse the CSDP. They find that CSDP governance is more heterarchical and two-level than intergovernmentalists acknowledge, yet state power is not diluted but reconstituted at the European level (Mérand et al. 2011: 140).

Michael Smith argues that MLG is applicable to the realm of the CFSP, even though supranational institutions have been marginalized in this policy area. In his view, this approach can explain “how *common general interests* are defined, prioritized, and translated into *concrete policy actions* through institutionalized behaviours at the EU and domestic levels” (M. Smith 2004b: 743, italics in original). According to Smith, the applicability of the MLG approach varies depending on an issue within the CFSP. Factors that define the degree of MLG approach to the CFSP are inherent characteristics of the policy problem/issue; stages of the policymaking sequence; novelty of the policy decision; and domestic factors. Smith hypothesizes that “the multi-level governance of the CFSP will be most optimal in situations where: the issue conforms to a European Council mandate; the decision is reached by QMV (or no insistence on a consensus), has a long time horizon, and does not involve violence; the policy involves explicit delegation to EU organizations or a pre-existing framework; funding is provided by the EU budget; and the European Parliament provides input as required by the policy decision. In addition, governance will be improved in cases of follow-on policies (or where there is enough time for deliberation on more complex problems, especially

where a mandate and/or consensus are lacking) and where the issue is covered by an existing CFSP group” (M. Smith 2004b: 753). Conversely, he argues that multi-level governance is most difficult where there is no European Council mandate for a given issue, whether in geographical or functional terms; little consensus/use of veto in case of QMV; a probability of violence and a short term horizon; national implementation and funding; and a lack of mechanisms for democratic oversight (*ibidem*).

Indeed, few studies focusing on non-state actors in EU foreign policy show that non-state actors mobilise to lobby on EU foreign policy, including on the CFSP issues. A study on NGO involvement in the development of the European Code of Conduct/Common Position on Arms Export shows that NGOs engage and exert influence at the EU level on EU foreign and security policy under the CFSP, whereas the Europeanization of arms export regulations increased the voice opportunities of NGOs (Joachim & Dembinski 2011). Joachim and Dembinski find that NGOs contributed to the adoption of a legally binding framework for arms export control at the EU level in 2008 which substituted the legally non-binding Code of Conduct of 1998: “[a]lthough weapons sales have not yet declined significantly, NGOs have used the Code to change the rules of the game through which they are approved” (Joachim & Dembinski 2011: 1152). These findings are in line with an earlier assumption put forward by the literature that expanding scope of areas of EU governance stimulates the mobilisation of more diverse sets of interests (Beyers et al. 2008: 1116).

This case study reveals that institutional conditions did play a role in the lobbying success, along with particular characteristics of interest groups’ movement (the degree of their multi-level cooperation and professionalisation). In an earlier work, Dembinski argues that the CFSP decision-making system is less favourable to NGOs than the first

pillar, mainly due to the lack of an equivalent of the Commission's supportive role in the second pillar (Dembinski 2009). Whereas the powers of the Commission and the Parliament are weaker, the Commission is also less inclined to accept NGOs as partners in CFSP. It does not consider NGOs as proper stakeholders, but as "the self-declared advocates of the common good" (Dembinski 2009: 165). The consultation culture with NGOs was less developed and institutionalized in DG External Relations than in other DGs. Contrary to a shared belief, the Council and its members interact with NGOs. However, it does not substitute the support of the Commission in the first pillar (ibidem).

The institutional constraints did not prevent NGOs from engaging in EU action on the issue of arms export control from the early 1990s. However, until the Code of Conduct, a first political document regulating arms exports at the EU level, was adopted in 1998, their impact was limited (Joachim & Dembinski 2011: 1156). Tracing the process of NGOs' activities on the issue across almost two decades, Joachim and Dembinski argued that Europeanisation, access points and norms facilitated NGO involvement and contributed to their success.

First, the EU-level governance of arms export control established by the 1998 Code of Conduct reinforced the Europeanisation of NGOs coalition (Joachim & Dembinski 2011: 1163). Whereas initially it had been dominated by British NGOs, groups from other member states became involved over time. The UK-based organisations launched a Europe-wide campaign and managed to attract over 600 NGOs across Europe to support a Code of Conduct on arms exports (ibidem: 1158). Although many of these groups were rooted at the domestic level, they coordinated their efforts at the European level and informed their national audiences about developments in the EU. As Joachim

and Dembinski state, “[t]hese cross-level interdependencies added to the strength and leverage of NGOs vis-a-vis governments”(ibidem).

Second, access points have multiplied as the role of the Commission has turned from an observer into an active participant of the CFSP, with NGOs allied with the EP using its democratic oversight power. Formal and informal rules encouraging cooperation with NGOs have appeared at the Council’s level. The changes in the positions of key governments – the UK (due to the victory of the Labour party in the elections) and France (due to scandals connected to arms trade with repressive regimes and strategic calculations to keep US influence at bay on the arms export policies of its allies) – were critical (ibidem: 1159).

Third, NGOs benefited from the gradual expansion of norms established by the EU in the defence policy area, allowing them to scrutinise further the behaviour of member states with regards to weapons sales. NGOs used normative arguments and called for a greater degree of responsibility to be placed upon arms exporters while also providing advice to policymakers on how to improve current European regulation.

The strategies adopted by NGOs did not differ significantly from those of the first pillar. NGOs mainly relied on insider strategies providing information and expertise. They successfully engaged at both domestic and European levels at all stages of the policy process. Besides supranational actors such as the EP and the Commission, NGOs also lobbied the Council, its Secretariat and EU presidencies. As the case of Spanish NGOs demonstrates, the organisations put pressure on a national representative in the COARM (Council’s Working Party of Conventional Arms Exports) to become a spokesperson for increased transparency rules at the EU level and used the 1998 Code of Conduct together with what they perceived as best practice in other EU states as a lobbying tool

to exact from the national government far-reaching transparency and reporting rules (Joachim & Dembinski 2011: 1163).

Despite these insights into NGO participation in CFSP policymaking, the case study lacks an analysis of the involvement of a second possible group of actors, namely arms industry representatives. It remains unknown the degree of influence NGOs had in comparison to this second group. We do not know whether the counter-lobbying efforts of the European defence industry, or lack thereof, affected NGOs' success during the two stages of the policy process (prior to and post the adoption of the 1998 Code of Conduct). With just a single case study it is impossible to establish to what extent interest group influence is determined by institutional factors as opposed to, for instance, issue characteristics (e.g. novelty of issue). A comparative case study analysis could shed more light on the relationship between political institutions and influence.

A recent book-length study of lobbying in EU foreign policy focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stands apart from the interest group literature as it approaches the issue of lobbying from a different theoretical perspective exploring how constructivist insights help to understand lobbying in the EU (Voltolini 2013; Voltolini forthcoming).

While interest group scholars have argued for a more pragmatic approach toward measuring influence and thus, assuming that interest groups have clear and stable preferences which do not change in interaction with other actors and focusing on more "visible" faces of power (Dür 2008b; Dür 2008a) and viewing lobbying as exchange relationship based on resource dependencies between groups and policymakers (Bouwen 2002; Chalmers 2011; Klüver 2013b), Voltolini takes a "thin" constructivist line arguing that influence is not unidirectional and that identities and preferences of both non-state actors and EU institutions are shaped in the process of interaction

between them, putting emphasis on knowledge and its social construction rather than on information. In this view, groups are not expected to adapt their lobbying tactics and strategies to the venues they lobby, but their behaviour is seen as an effect of socialisation with other actors. Thus, at the theoretical level, assuming in line with the constructivist view that lobbying is embedded in social interactions between the non-state actors and policymakers, Voltolini examines what roles non-state advocates play in EU foreign policy, what frames they use and at what levels.

First of all, Voltolini refutes “the ‘null hypothesis’ of no or limited lobbying activities in EU foreign policy” and EU foreign policy as a domain “predominantly in the hands of EU member states (and EU institutions), which are more autonomous in taking their decisions” (Voltolini 2013: 101). She maps nearly 300 groups active in EU foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and three cases which present heavily lobbied arenas attracting different types of organised interests.

Second, Voltolini’s findings show that the majority of non-state advocates play a ‘consensual and median’ rather than ‘adversarial’ role which allows them to “establish cooperative interactions with EU officials and policymakers and develop a dialogue that can lead to the achievement of a shared understanding of the situation at stake” (Voltolini 2013: 251). The advocates also rely on ‘technical/legal frames’ when lobbying the EU, rather than on ‘political frames’ which are more recurrent in the EU member state lobbying along with more confrontational forms of social interaction (ibidem: 253). Additionally, analysing national level lobbying in the UK, France and Germany on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Voltolini finds a partial Europeanisation of lobbying by groups from the member states, though the EU and national level lobbying are seen as disentangled arenas in terms of roles and frames applied by the advocates which she

explains by differences between political systems in the EU and the member states.

Whereas Voltolini's constructivist approach sees influence as a circular process in which both the EU institutions and non-state actors are "reciprocally affected by the social interactions they develop" (ibidem: 40), her findings add some fuel to the debate on who wins and loses in the sphere of EU lobbying. Voltolini shows that the most influential actors are those deeply embedded in the EU political system, who understand and adopt EU rules and norms and recognise EU legitimacy. What seems to matter is not the material resources which groups possess, but their readiness to learn and adapt to the EU rules and not challenge them. Furthermore, it appears from her study that interest group influence lays within the domain of providing technical and legal information to the EU rather than confronting EU strategic approaches towards foreign policy issues.

However, Voltolini does not examine the institutional determinants of lobbying. Her study says little about lobbying under the CFSP institutional set-up. Following the constructivist assumptions, Voltolini argues that interest groups do not adapt their advocacy strategies to venues which they lobby, but that their behaviour is a result of social interaction with policymakers (Voltolini 2013; Voltolini forthcoming). Thus, the choice of her cases studies is not driven by the variation of institutional contexts of lobbying. Instead, conceptualising the EU foreign policy after Hill (2003: 4) "as the sum of what the EU and its members states do in international relations", Voltolini focuses on the most lobbied issues in EU policy towards the conflict. Two of these relate to EU trade policy towards Israel in which the Community method is applied and the groups studied in her research focus their lobbying on the Commission and the Parliament. The third case studies lobbying on the EU stance on the UN Report following the war in

Gaza of 2008-2009 which is an example of weakly institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation in the EU. It lies outside EU foreign policy as it has been defined for the purpose of the present study: there is no single EU seat at the UN and while member states do coordinate their positions at the UN, they are not obliged to vote as a block. Unsurprisingly, Voltolini does not say much about the lobbying of member states in the Council and devotes more attention to groups lobbying in the European Parliament and national governments via capitals. Though the EP does not have any powers on the issue, being open to different kinds of interests, it seems to serve as a locus for EU-level public debate. Lobbying at the EP in an intergovernmental setting is an interesting insight to develop through this thesis and uncover interest groups' logic when lobbying less powerful venues which nevertheless give groups access and visibility. Given that Voltolini focuses on few groups in each case, mostly restricted to those based in Brussels or the EU member states, there is no insight into how non-state actors interact with EU institutions on the ground where EU policies are implemented.

Still, the findings generated by Voltolini on the dominance of non-confrontational roles and technical and legal frames in interest groups' interactions with EU policymakers, especially the Commission and the Parliament speak to the findings of this research, as we will see further. They underline the dominance of inside lobbying and information on technical and legal issues provided by the groups to the EU institutions. The choice of the current thesis, nonetheless, is to apply rationalist assumptions and functional explanations of logic of access and influence, on which the main bulk of literature on interest groups and non-state actors participation in intergovernmental organisations has been developed. To this end I would like to contribute to the mainstream literature on interest groups in the EU and show that this theoretical approach can explain interest

groups' involvement in EU foreign policymaking too, despite the little interest paid to the policy area in which intergovernmental politics prevails. The constructivist-driven explanations provided by Voltolini affirm that groups do not adapt strategically to advocacy venues, but that their lobbying strategies are a result of socialisation. Without questioning the validity of these findings on theoretical grounds, I argue that strategic adaptation plays a significant role in group lobbying strategies and can explain the variation of participation patterns. As we will see further, in the process of lobbying the EU groups can adapt how they formulate their preferences and choose lobbying tactics, but they do it strategically exploiting different opportunity structures, rather than changing their preferences and identities, as Voltolini has argued. Whereas socialisation and learning indeed play an important role in non-state actor lobbying and influence, I emphasise the instrumental and strategic character of lobbying both for groups and policymakers. In sum, by applying the rationalist lens, a more complete story of lobbying and influence in EU foreign policy can be narrated.

Conclusion

Interest groups have different roles to play in European integration depending on the theoretical lenses applied. Whereas intergovernmentalists limit the role of interest groups to the domestic level, neofunctionalists see interest groups as forming transnational coalitions and pushing together with supranational institutions for European integration to spill over new policy areas. The multi-level governance concept views interest groups as participating in decision-making at both national and European levels. However, the grand theories say little about interest group influence and how it is

exercised in the EU, unlike the interest group literature which attempts to tackle a challenging task of operationalising and measuring influence and examining its determinants. Students of influence focus mostly on Community policymaking (legislative policymaking on the former 'first pillar' issues), specific institutions (the European Commission and the European Parliament) and earlier stages of policymaking process. Few studies explore influence on intergovernmental policymaking, which still dominates certain areas of European integration such as foreign policy. This also partially explains why the focus of the literature on institutional determinants of influence remains limited to the lobbying of particular EU institutions, adaptation of lobbying strategies to the EU level of governance and comparison of the EU with other political systems. This study will try to add further material to fill this gap.

The underlying research question to be answered in this study is how and to what extent interest groups influence EU foreign policy. In carrying out this project, I hope to contribute to the two sets of literature in EU studies. First, this study intends to enrich the literature on interest groups in the EU. It will be a novelty in the research on interest group politics in the EU by focusing on a policy area in which member states still preserve strong and sometimes nearly exclusive competences and veto power. There is scarce research on how interest groups engage in intergovernmental decision-making in the EU such as the CFSP/CSDP.

This study will also add to the literature on interest group influence by attempting to measure it and explore the role of institutional determinants. By conceptualising EU foreign policy as multi-level and multi-pillar (Stephan Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 29-32) that includes not only CFSP, but also former first and third pillar issues (see also K. E. Smith 2003: 67), I will be able to examine the power of institutional

factors on interest group influence and how interest groups strategies are trying to adapt to different policy regimes in EU foreign policy.

Second, the study will be a valuable contribution to EU foreign policy studies, in which the role of interest groups remains largely an unexplored area. Most studies on EU foreign policy look at such actors as the Commission, member state governments, the European Parliament and national parliaments and the role of EU bureaucracy and diplomacy. Studying interest groups' participation and influence is helpful in understanding how EU foreign policy is made. It is also important for addressing the issue of democratic legitimacy as the departure from intergovernmentalism breaks the link with national procedures for accountability and authorization (Sjursen 2011). Though it is not a central task of my study, its findings will hopefully add a brick into this debate.

My point of departure asserts that intergovernmentalist theories cannot explain the increasing number of interest groups active in foreign policy area at the EU level. I argue that governance approaches to EU foreign policy better describe the nature of integration and policymaking in this area and interest group mobilization at the EU level. Multiplication of decision-making centres and actors (including non-state) involved, Europeanisation of national foreign policies, the role of informal arrangements, the role of norms and values and the constitution of identity of the EU as an actor in the international arena – these all go beyond the intergovernmentalist logic. However, while governance approaches, such as the multi-level governance concept, predict that interest groups mobilize at the EU level, they have nothing to say about how mobilisation translates into influence.

In turn, the interest group literature has developed a number of hypotheses on how

interest group influence is conditioned by a set of factors, including institutions which groups interact with. Bridging the assumptions about the degree of (multi-level) governance in EU foreign policy and the hypothesised relationship between interest group influence and political institutions, I will develop a set of hypotheses on interest groups influence in different areas across the multi-pillar and multi-level structure of widely defined EU foreign policy. In particular, by looking at three cases that represent different institutional set ups and decision-making modes (corresponding to the Community competences, the CFSP and the CSDP), I will examine how opportunity structures of a given policy case, in which interest groups involve, determine their success and how interest groups develop their strategies in order to minimise threats and maximise opportunities. Thus, this study does not only look into policy area of the EU which has received little scholar attention, but also adds to the debate on the institutional context of lobbying and influence in the EU.

Theoretically my research draws on the growing body of interest group literature in the EU adopting its theoretical assumptions and developing and testing hypotheses relevant to the major scholarly debates. Thus, I accept the theoretical grounds upon which this literature has been built and which are presented in a greater detail in the next chapter.

Chapter 2. Theoretical framework and research design

Introduction

Interest group scholarship in the EU has mostly focused on groups' involvement in the Community policy areas. In these areas, supranational institutions such as the Commission and the European Parliament appear the most lobbied targets in EU policymaking machinery due to their agenda-setting and decision-making powers and relative openness to interest groups (Coen & Richardson 2009; Greenwood 2007; Joachim & Locher 2009a). Furthermore, one can find patterns of pro-integration alliances between transnational interest groups and supranational institutions, as theorised by neofunctionalists (Haas 1968).

We know very little about the extent to which these patterns of interaction and group influence are present in other policy domains in which European integration has been less developed and the EU system of multi-level governance has arguably not yet emerged (Eising & Kohler-Koch 1999). EU foreign policy is one of such domains in which the dominance of the nation state and state actors has been largely resistant to the logic of neofunctionalist spillover. In this policy area in which intergovernmental arrangements have been left largely intact, one may expect that interest groups would rather act according to the 'two-level games' logic, lobbying their national governments and leaving them to represent their positions at the intergovernmental level. However, existing studies as well as the reality in Brussels show that interest groups do actively lobby EU foreign policy. This is in line with a shift in theorising EU foreign policy from intergovernmentalism towards the application of governance frameworks (M. Smith 2004b; Norheim-Martinsen 2010; Mérand et al. 2011; Cross 2011; Howorth 2012;

Kaunert & Leonard 2012) which expect interactions between public and private actors.

In addition to answering the underlying research question of this study “How and to what extent do interest groups influence EU foreign policy?” I also aim to contribute to scholarly debate on the determinants of influence by asking the question: “Do the institutional designs of the EU determine advocacy strategies and influence?”. The multi-level governance which has emerged in many areas of European integration is seen as conducive to interest groups’ involvement in policymaking, but what about policy areas in which European integration has not yet advanced so far? Is intergovernmentalism an insurmountable obstacle to interest group engagement? Or have groups found ways to (successfully) represent their interests at the EU level even in the areas ruled by the intergovernmental method of policymaking? Is our knowledge about lobbying and interest groups influence in the EU, which stems from the studies of communitarised policy areas, valid for EU foreign policy too?

Armed with these questions, this chapter outlines the main theoretical framework of this study which draws on the literature on interest groups in the EU and, more specifically, on the studies of influence. This study will aim to explore the relationship between institutional factors on the one hand, and interest group strategies and influence on the other. As was shown in Chapter 1, lobbying strategies and influence are seen to depend on the political institutions with which interest groups interact (Dür 2008a; Dür & De Bièvre 2007b; Mahoney 2008). However, studies trying to examine the role of institutional determinants in the EU are scarce and chiefly focus on the impact of the institutional context on groups influence on the Commission in the process of drafting legislative proposals (Bernhagen et al. 2015). Focusing on Community policymaking, interest groups scholars suffer from a single-case problem as the EU’s political system

is treated as a 'sui generis'. By including intergovernmental policymaking in the study of lobbying and interest group influence, we add a variation on the institutional design which allows us comparing the EU with itself. Therefore, such a study is of added value to the bulk of interest groups literature, which has thus far focused on determinants of group influence.

EU foreign policy represents a useful case for studying the role of institutional factors as it provides a variety of institutional set-ups depending on a policy issue. I use the concept of EU foreign policy as multi-pillar and multi-level, which is not confined to the EU activities under the CFSP but encompasses the foreign policy developed across all former three pillars (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 29-32; K. E. Smith 2003: 67). Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008) situate EU foreign policymaking between two regimes the 'Community method' and the 'intergovernmental method'. The 'Community method' is a policy mode which dominates the vast majority of EU policies on which interest groups lobby, including trade and development cooperation. The 'intergovernmental method' is best represented by the CSFP/CSDP. In practice, there is a whole range of methods on the continuum between the two extremes, as foreign policy dossiers often involve both policy regimes (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 67).

I use the type of policy regime as a key explanatory variable for interest group influence. The prime utility of Keukeleire's and MacNaughtan's typology is that it incorporates institutional characteristics such as access points, institutional receptivity to interest group involvement and decision-making procedures which have been identified by the literature to be factors determining interest group influence (Princen 2007; Princen & Kerremans 2008; Joachim & Locher 2009c; Dür & De Bièvre 2007b;

Mahoney 2008). It is hypothesised that the position of a policy issue on which interest groups lobby on the continuum between two policy regimes determines the degree of influence which they are likely to achieve. It is thus expected that the closer an issue lies to the intergovernmental extreme, the lower the degree of influence they are likely to achieve and that this policy regime will largely favour the groups defending the status quo rather than promoting policy change.

However, it may be the case that interest groups engage in multi-level lobbying on intergovernmental issues too and that their influence does not depend on the type of policy regime. First, groups make use of multiple venues that the EU system offers, including those which are more receptive to them. Second, rather than fixed institutional characteristics such as the type of policy method, more dynamic characteristics of political opportunity structures determine lobbying success or failure. The literature on social movements argues that the presence or absence of elite allies facilitates or constrains collective action (McAdam 1998). The literature on NSA participation in intergovernmental organisations indicates that demand for the resources and services of non-state actors opens up their institutions to outside groups. Thus, alliances with key policymakers may serve as an alternative explanation for interest group influence.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, I introduce key concepts used in this study such as interest groups, lobbying/advocacy, advocacy strategies and interest group influence. Second, I present the key findings regarding interactions between the EU institutions and interest groups which stem from studies on lobbying in the Community policy areas. I furthermore discuss how the institutional mosaic of EU foreign policy differs from that of Community policymaking and what specific EU foreign policy institutions are. Finally, I present the research design of this study. I set out the main

hypotheses which are tested in this study, key variables and their operationalisation, the choice of cases for a comparative analysis, methodology and data collection methods employed in this study.

1. Key concepts

1.1. Interest groups

One of the first problems encountered by students of interest groups is that of definition. As Jordan, Halpin and Maloney point out, the study of interest groups requires a disambiguation of the concept (Jordan et al. 2004). The interest group literature uses various labels (e.g. interest organisations, special interest organisations, non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations etc.) to mark different bodies representing societal interests. As a result, it is very difficult to draw general conclusions concerning the organisational structures, the functions, or the influence of interest groups (Beyers et al. 2008). To avoid this definition confusion, Beyers, Eising and Maloney introduce three key features to define an actor as an interest group: organisation, political interests and informality (2008: 1106). Based on these criteria, interest groups are aggregated individuals and/or organised forms of political behaviour aiming to influence policy outcomes, but normally not seeking public office or competing in elections. This definition is used in this thesis, and along with this term, I also use organised interests, advocacy groups, lobby groups, advocates as synonyms.

In popular perceptions, the word ‘advocacy’ appears to take precedence when one wants to speak of citizens’ participation in policymaking, whereas the term ‘lobbying’ suggests a narrower sense of influencing policymaking from inside (a lobby!) and is arguably not

free of negative connotations associated with the lack of transparency and power of moneyed groups in politics. Such a differentiation seems to be borrowed from the US practice in which lobbying is regulated by the state and, in its legal definition, consists of a communication to legislators intended to influence specific legislation which means either a proposed or pending law or bill (Manzo 2001). In this context, advocacy is indeed used to refer to a broader phenomenon. Instead of addressing “specific legislation”, advocates focus on a broad policy issue and target non-legislative bodies too (executive, bureaucracy, courts) (ibidem). The California-based Center for Nonprofit Management concludes that most advocacy would not legally-speaking be considered lobbying. In legal terms, such a distinction is important as under the US Internal Revenue Service regulation most non-profit organisations are prohibited from lobbying, except to an “insubstantial degree”, otherwise, they endanger their tax exempt status for contributions made to them. As one US consultant for the non-profit sector summarised, “[a]dvocacy is more of a generic term, while lobbying has a legal definition and legal and/or tax consequences” (Hessenius 2007:5). As a result, ‘lobbying’ in the US barely refers to non-profit groups and rather refers to associations and consultancies representing the profit sector. Despite the fact that European practices of lobbying regulation differ from those of the US (Holman & Luneburg 2012), public perceptions appear to associate lobbying with for-profit associations and consultancy firms and to a lesser extent with the non-profit sector.⁵

In the academic literature, the terms ‘advocacy’ and ‘lobbying’, as well as ‘lobbyists’

5 According to the survey of European policy elites carried out by Penn, Schoen & Berland (PSB) in 2009, the word ‘lobbyist’ is first of all associated with trade associations (61%) and public affairs agencies (57%), while NGOs, trade unions and companies are less frequently mentioned as lobbyists (50%, 46% and 43% respectively). See Burson Marsteller, “A Guide to Effective Lobbying in Europe”, 2009. Accessed 17 July 2015 at http://www.oursocialmedia.com/wp-content/uploads/effective-lobbying_light_07102009.pdf.

and ‘advocates’, are frequently used as synonyms. For example, in her book Mahoney (an American herself) uses advocacy and lobbying interchangeably: she speaks of the advocacy process ending up with a lobbying success (or lack of it), though she has chosen the word ‘advocacy’ for the title of her book (Mahoney 2008). I also use the terms synonymously.

This study covers interest groups based in the EU and non-EU countries, as well as international non-state actors. There is as yet little known about how foreign actors perceive and try to influence the EU (for an overview see Rasmussen & Alexandrova 2012: 615). A large-N study about foreign interest groups participating in the Commission’s consultations show that bias is in favour of actors from economically well-connected markets with high levels of resources (ibidem: 629). Nevertheless, we may expect that a broad variety of foreign interest groups try to engage with EU decision-makers on foreign policy issues. First, EU policies on a certain issue or towards a certain country affect the interests of foreign non-state actors too. Given the role of the EU on the global stage, many international non-state actors have an interest influencing EU foreign policy. Second, the EU policymakers are interested in expertise non-EU actors can potentially provide regarding their countries and regions of origin. Moreover, during recent years the EU has been involved in a structured dialogue with foreign interest groups on a number of issues such as foreign commercial policy, human rights, EU development and democracy aid policies.

1.2. Lobbying and advocacy strategies

Most definitions of lobbying underline influence on public policy as an ultimate goal. To this end one of the most quoted definitions in the literature views lobbying as “the informal exchange of information with public authorities, as a minimal conception on

the one hand, and as trying informally to influence public authorities, as a maximal description on the other hand” (Van Schendelen 1994: 3). In his later work, Van Schendelen defines lobbying even more broadly as “all sorts of *unorthodox actions of interest groups intended to bring desired outcomes from government*” (Van Schendelen 2007: 230, italic original).

Mahoney defines advocacy as a process that aims to influence public policy (Mahoney 2008):

The process is initiated with an advocate’s decision to mobilize for a political debate, at which point the advocate determines his or her position on the issue. Once the advocate choose to engage on an issue, a series of additional decisions need to be made about the advocacy strategy, including what arguments to use, what targets to approach, what direct or inside lobbying tactics to employ, what public education or outside lobbying tactics to engage in, and which allies to work with. The process concludes when the policy debates ends, and this determines the advocate’s lobbying success (many times leading to a new advocacy process because issues carry on through time).

Mahoney underlines the many decisions interest groups have to make, which collectively compose an advocacy strategy as it is viewed in this study. Advocacy strategies are essentially approaches to seeking influence (Binderkrantz & Krøyer 2012: 124). The interest group literature distinguishes between inside and outside lobbying (Kollman 1998; Mahoney 2008), or access and voice strategies, in other typology (Beyers 2004).

Inside lobbying, or access strategies, targets the venues where political bargaining takes place, for example, advisory bodies, technical committees, agencies and, to certain

extent, parliamentary committees (Beyers 2004: 213). Access strategies are better suited to the transmission of operational and technical information (ibidem). Inside lobbying tactics include participating in hearings, consultations; drafting legislation and amendments; sending position papers, letters and faxes; personal meetings with policymakers and their staff; presenting research to government; serving on public advisory boards; participating in litigation over policy; organizing cocktail parties, seminars and conferences, and other similar activities (Kollman 1998: 35; Mahoney 2008: 127).

Voice strategies, or outside lobbying, such as media campaigns or protests, relate to activities taking place in various public spheres, where the communication among societal interests, policymakers and citizens becomes visible to a broader audience (Beyers 2004: 213). Outside lobbying organized by interest groups aims at “mobiliz[ing] citizens outside the policymaking community to contact or pressure public officials inside the policymaking community” (Kollman 1998: 3). So the message an interest group wants to convey is not channelled to policymakers directly, unlike in the case of inside lobbying. Voice strategies are less effective for the transmission of technical and detailed information and, if access is gained, it is less costly to communicate information directly to policymakers (Beyers 2004: 2014). Outside lobbying tactics range from public advertisement and talking with the press, holding press conferences, organizing letter-writing campaigns, publicizing voting records of elected officials, to grass roots meetings to demonstrations and protests. Some scholars also make a further distinction between media (information politics) and protest strategies (Beyers 2004; Binderkrantz & Krøyer 2012), indicating their different uses within outside lobbying.

Another distinction concerns the number of levels to be targeted by interest groups. Lobbying strategies may focus on one, two or more levels (domestic, which may include local, regional and national; EU level and international level to include international organisations such as the UN or international negotiations). With regards to EU foreign policy this distinction is important, as interest groups may play the logic of two-level games in international politics (Putnam 1988), lobbying their national governments and leaving them to represent their positions at the intergovernmental level. However, a growing number of students of EU foreign policy point out that even security and defence policy that has long been a *domaine réservé* of the member states moves beyond intergovernmentalism (Norheim-Martinsen 2010; Sijursen 2011) towards (multi-level/supranational) governance (Mérand et al. 2011; Kaunert & Leonard 2012; Howorth 2012). Thus, we expect interest groups to be increasingly involved in multi-level advocacy at both member state and EU level. In the interest group literature such advocacy is termed multi-level venue shopping (Beyers & Kerremans 2012).

Birkland defines venue shopping as “the efforts groups undertake to gain a hearing for their ideas and grievances against existing policy” and a venue as “a level of government or institution in which the group is likely to gain the most favourable hearing” (Birkland 2007: 69). Venues can be seen horizontally as different institutions at the same level (legislature, executive or judiciary, or different institutions or bodies within the EU system) or vertically, as levels of governance (international, EU, national, subnational, local).

Multi-level (vertical) venue shopping depends on many factors, such as domestic political context, group characteristics and collective beliefs and values, as the literature points out. As far as institutional characteristics are concerned, groups, first of all, lobby

more receptive venues (Guiraudon 2000; Princen 2007) and those more proximate to them (Beyers & Kerremans 2012).

Venue shopping is mostly applied in agenda-setting studies (Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Pralle 2003; Princen 2009; Stephenson 2012) and closely linked to the concept of issue framing: “[d]ifferent issues may be assigned to one venue rather than another because of how they are framed” and “different venues reinforce different ways of considering the issue” (Baumgartner 2007: 484). Baumgartner and Jones (1993) theorise that policy change occur when actors shift debates and decision-making on a policy issue to new venues which are more susceptible to alternative definition of issue than ‘old’ venues (Princen 2009: 27). Venue shifting often requires issue redefinition, as “changes in image are used purposefully, in an effort to attract the attention of the members of a particular venue” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 36, quoted in Pralle 2003: 242). Issue framing is about highlighting some dimensions of an issue and downplaying others (Princen 2009: 34).

Venue shopping and issue framing are important components of advocacy strategies, at least at the initial stages of policymaking, though issues are constantly redefined and policies are reviewed and modified which means these elements are continuously present in the advocacy process. In the context of EU foreign policy it implies that national groups, if they are unsuccessful in advocating their cause at home or for normative reasons, may seek venues at the EU level and frame their issues in a way to demand European policy action.

1.3. Interest group influence

Studies on interest group influence in the EU most often conceptualise influence as an actor’s ability to reach desired policy outcomes. For example, in a special issue of the

Journal of Public Policy (2007, 27:1) dedicated to interest group influence, the authors conceptualise ‘influence’ as control over policy outcomes, following Jeffrey Hart’s suggestion, as opposed to influence as control over resources and control over actors (Hart 1976). As a political outcome can come in the form of the official position taken by public authorities or the actual implementation of that policy (Dür & De Bièvre 2007b: 3), this approach assumes that actors have clear preferences over outcomes that do not change in the course of interaction with other actors. Though this limits possible research outcomes, the “influence as control over outcomes” approach is argued to be “the epistemologically most sound and empirically most pragmatic route towards assessing interest groups influence” (ibidem). Such conceptualisation of influence is adopted for the purpose of this study. Below, I briefly discuss its benefits and limitations as well as other ways of seeing influence and power in the policymaking process.

Hart (1976) argued that the conceptualisation of power as a control over events and outcomes is superior to two other approaches for the measurement of power in international politics, namely power as a control over resources and power as a control over actors. According to Hart, power as a control over resources has a number of limitations. It is not clear whether actors will be able to use their resources and what types of resources are crucial to affect the outcomes of a conflict. Furthermore, some types of resources are difficult to measure. Lastly, such a conceptualization of power does not allow us to deal with interdependence, coalitions, and collective action (Hart 1976: 290). Adopting Hart’s argument, interest group influence cannot be conceptualised as access or institutionalised participation in the decision making process or structural power of business actors. Indeed, empirical studies on lobbying in the EU show that access does not necessarily lead to the achievement of interest groups’

objectives (Dür & De Bièvre 2007a; Bugdahn 2008), whilst business groups do not always define policy outcomes, and the context specific conditions matter (Woll 2007; Michalowitz 2007; Dür & Mateo 2014a; Dür et al. 2015; Rasmussen 2015). Dür argues that access or structural power are pathways to influence rather than actual influence, calling on researchers to make cautious claims about group influence or lack of thereof, unless possible pathways to influence have been taken into account (Dür 2008: 1223).

Power conceptualised as control over actors is based on Robert Dahl's (1961) definition of power as the ability of A to get B to do something which he would otherwise not do (behavioural approach). Hart argues that the main problem with this definition of power is that it is difficult to obtain information to measure power given the highly psychological nature of power relations (Hart 1976: 293). Thus, control over outcomes is seen as the preferable form of conceptualisation given the measurement issues.

Another benefit of conceptualising interest group influence as control over policy outcomes is that researchers have developed and tested methods of measuring it. Process-tracing, assessing attributed influence and gauging the degree of preference attainment have been most frequently applied in the literature (Dür 2008a; Dür 2008b). I have been able to use the accumulated knowledge on the methodology of measuring influence in this research (see Section 3.3).

When measuring interest group influence, I focus primarily on the 'first', a more observable, face of power while being aware of other rather invisible manifestations of it. Criticising Dahl's approach to the observation of power by establishing who wins and who loses on a certain issue, Bachrach and Baratz point to the 'second face of power', namely a power to keep unwanted issues off the agenda (Bachrach & Baratz 1962). In his three-dimensional view of power, Lukes goes further, speaking of power as an

actor's capacity to prevent other actors from recognising their real interests (Lukes 1974; Lukes 2005). However, the difficulty Lukes himself recognised is that of empirically ascribing real interests to social actors, especially given that these interests are not "unitary or dual, but multiple and conflicting" (Lukes 2005: 145). As a result the study of the second and the third dimensions of power is seen as extremely difficult (Dür 2008a), for the former takes into account non-decisionmaking and the latter also focuses on latent (unobservable) conflict "which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the *real interests* of those they exclude" (Lukes 2005: 28, italics in original). A potential solution suggested by Dür is to "consciously focus on specific aspects of the concept, therefore making it amenable to empirical research", rather than to "conced[e] defeat" in the face of the difficulties of conceptualisation (Dür 2008: 1221).

Conceptualisation of influence as control over policy outcomes stands closest to relational power in the typology of power in policymaking developed by Arts & Van Tatenhove (2004). Relational power "concerns the capacity of agents to 'name' and 'frame' societal problems as political and policy problems, and to mobilise resources to formulate and realise the most desirable solutions. In doing so, policy agents may decide to 'do things otherwise', and renew policymaking, either by overruling 'conservative forces' that defend the status quo (transitive power), or by collectively changing rules of the game and/or policy discourses (intransitive power)" (ibidem: 351). Thus, it does not account for dispositional power which reflects positions of agents in organisations mediated by rules and resources and "these positions co-determine what agents may achieve in terms of relational power" (ibidem: 350). It is also different from structural power which is "the way macro-societal structures shape the nature and

conduct of agents, being both individuals and collectivities (organisations)” (ibidem). Arts and Verschuren also make an explicit distinction between “power as the general ability to influence” and “influence as the realisation of a single effect” (Arts & Verschuren 1999: 413), while other use two concepts as synonyms (Dür 2008a). In this thesis, I adopt the latter approach.

2. Institutional context of lobbying and influence in the EU

2.1. Lobbying EU institutions

Comparative studies of lobbying in different political systems demonstrate that the particular characteristics of institutions with which groups interact affect both lobbying strategies and influence (Mahoney 2008; Joachim & Locher 2009c). However, these studies say little about how lobbying and influence vary within the EU depending on the institutional framework in which groups try to influence policymaking. The focus of prevailing research on lobbying on issues that belong to the former first (Community) pillar does not allow for this kind of analysis.

We know from the literature that the Commission and the European Parliament are the most lobbied EU institutions due to their relative openness to interest groups, whereas the Council remains more closed to outside interests (Coen & Richardson 2009; Greenwood 2007; Joachim & Locher 2009a).

Unsurprisingly, the Commission is the most popular research focus for scholars studying lobbying in the EU (see Bunea & Baumgartner 2014), with the emerging studies focusing on the European Parliament reflecting the gradual empowerment of this

institution by the subsequent treaties.

Given the Commission's right of legislative initiative, this institution has always been a target for interest groups. Its organisational ideology has pushed the Commission to develop an EU level interest group system (Mazey & Richardson 2006: 279). The Commission's symbiotic relationship with interest groups is driven by its need for technical information and advice and the support of cross-national advocacy coalitions for the introduction of the Commission's proposals (ibidem: 280). As Mazey and Richardson point out, by demonstrating openness to societal interests the Commission enhances its own legitimacy. Given the Commission's role as a legal guardian, early involvement of interest groups is also instrumental for smooth implementation of the Commission's proposals once they become legislative acts (Tanasescu 2009: 56). Moreover, consultations with interest groups is a legal obligation for the Commission stated in the Protocol No. 7 to the Amsterdam Treaty and, recently, the Lisbon Treaty. The latter stresses that "the Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent" (quoted in Tanasescu 2009: 58). The Commission has gradually institutionalized its consultative practices outlining the main principles and norms in a number of documents (e.g. White Paper on European Governance of 2001, General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission of 2002). The Commission and European Parliament took steps to increase the transparency of lobbying in the EU by establishing a joint *Transparency Register* in 2011, in which voluntary registration of interest representatives is incentivised by a promise of greater inclusion in consultation schemes and 12 months accreditation for a 1-day access pass to the EP (Greenwood & Dreger 2013: 142). Moreover, organised groups can submit

proposals for legislation to the European Commission in the sphere of its competences via the European Citizens Initiative – “the world’s first transnational participatory mechanism” (Bouza Garcia & Greenwood 2014: 247) .

The Commission shapes EU-level interest representation by funding the activities of certain groups (favouring diffuse interests, organised at the EU level and promoting European identity, democracy and civic engagement, see Mahoney & Beckstrand 2011) and by institutionalizing consultation practices (see Tanasescu 2009) and extensively relying on committee governance (Bouwen 2009). This goes in line with the neofunctionalist prediction that supranational institutions and transnational interest groups will ally to promote further integration.

With a gradual expansion of its budgetary and legislative powers since the early 1990s, the European Parliament (EP) has become a popular target for lobbyists (Kohler-Koch 1997; Lehmann 2009). As directly elected representatives, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are more open to these groups that “either represent a broad constituency such as trade unions, social movements, or political parties, or those that can provide them with an aggregate view on the most efficient ways to deal with the problems and economic consequences” (Lehmann 2009: 58). Interest groups play an important role in transmitting and translating “often complex and technical information into accessible data for busy elected representatives” (Earnshaw & Judge 2002: 63).

The EP appears as both a national and European route of interest representation as MEPs have contacts with national interest groups from their countries and European level groups (Wessels 1999; Bouwen 2004b). The EP is the only institution attentive to outside strategies that are more often deployed by civil society organisations (Eising 2007a).

The alignment of parties and interest groups in the EP reflects a left-right cleavage familiar at the national level. Business tends to side with Christian democrats, conservatives and liberals, whereas NGOs are strongly aligned with Social democrats, the left parties and the Greens (Beyers et al. 2015). Still, groups lobby non-natural allies if they hold influential positions: if they are members of the largest political groups, members of policy relevant committees and active legislators (Marshall 2015). Interest groups also lobby EP Secretariat officials as another pathway to influence rapporteurs (Marshall 2012) and influential committee members during the open amendments phase (Marshall 2010).

The lobbying of MEPs may not be a goal in itself but a way to reach other institutions, the Commission and the Council (Kohler-Koch 1997). This can be especially the case for EU foreign policy in which interest organisations and the EP form a “coalition of the weak”, as Kohler-Koch puts it.

The Council of the EU and European Council are considered the “least accessible” institutions, though “not inaccessible” (Hayes-Renshaw 2009) and less lobbied (Greenwood 2007). First, the Council’s role is crucial at the later stages of the legislation-making process when there is less possibility to shape the EU acquis (see Klüver 2013). Second, the Council primarily deals with ‘high-politics’ issues that involve inter-state bargaining, thus making it extremely difficult to influence decision-making processes. It is also clear that interest representation in the Council’s machinery remains largely unresearched (Greenwood 2007: 28).

The difficulty in approaching the Council is due to several features that distinguish this institution from the other two. Despite the efforts to improve transparency, the atmosphere of secrecy remains deeply embedded in the Council’s work (Hayes-

Renshaw 2009: 73; Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace 2006: 67). The Lisbon Treaty requires the Council to “meet in public when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative act” (TEU Art. 16(8)). This constitutes a change compared to the pre-Lisbon situation where only the discussion of the legislation under co-decision was subjected to public meeting, whereas Council’s transparency in this regard was regulated through its Rules of Procedure which could be amended by simple majority voting (Peers 2008). Since the Lisbon Treaty “[t]he opening to the public of Council meetings relating to the ‘Legislative deliberations’ part of its agenda shall be made through public transmission by audiovisual means, notably in an overflow room and through broadcasting in all official languages of the institutions of the European Union using video-streaming” (Council 2009, Art. 7(2)).

However, this transparency provision does not extend to non-legislative acts, which constitute the majority of EU foreign policy decisions (e.g. CFSP decisions, Council declarations). The Council’s Rules of Procedure merely envisage that the results of votes related to external action and the CFSP shall be made public by a unanimous Council or the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) decision taken at the request of one of their members, which in practice may appear as difficult to achieve as an adoption of the decision itself. In general, the Council decided that its deliberations “shall be covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, except in so far as the Council decides otherwise” (ibidem, Art. 6 (1)). There is no such a thing as a transparency register regulating access to the Council or institutionalised consultation practices.

This body is governed by many informal rules for the sake of efficiency and consensus building; and, for example, when voting does not take place it is more difficult for

lobbyists to know the parties' positions and the extent to which promises given to interest groups have been kept (Hayes-Renshaw 2009: 75). The Council is a multi-layered institution that includes not only ministers from twenty eight member states that gather in different configurations, but a network of preparatory bodies such as committees and working groups also consisting of national representatives of all member states. As Hayes-Renshaw points out, even for a resource-rich interest organization it is costly to monitor "the detailed work of hundreds of actors and multiple layers" (ibidem: 74). Frequent rotation and the fact that many national representatives in the Council and its bodies are not based in Brussels is another obstacle to the building of the long-term personal relationships necessary for effective lobbying (ibidem: 75). Finally, EU level groups find it difficult to gain access to the Council because, essentially, it is a part of a national route of interest representation (Greenwood 2007: 27). Indeed, empirical studies of business lobbying show that national business associations and important national firms have better access to the Council than EU-wide associations (Bouwen 2004a: 357).

These obstacles do not mean that interest groups do not approach the Council and its bureaucracy. There are various ways in which the Council can be accessed: there are some practices of giving access to the Council to selected groups (e.g. dinners with environmental NGOs within the margins of Environmental Council's meetings, Tripartite Social Summit preceding the European Council meetings dedicated to the Lisbon agenda); through the national governments, including permanent representations in Brussels; through the Council's presidency which play an important role in setting the Council's agenda; through the Secretariat bureaucracy that assists the Council work; and through the Council's preparatory bodies in which real work takes place (Hayes-

Renshaw 2009).

The Court of Justice of the European Union (EUCJ) is seen as “a highly successful venue in which to seek policy change and many organized interest have long cultivated strategies for targeting it, albeit with varied success” (McCown 2009: 89). While there are hardly any studies concerning choices of combination of lobbying or/and litigation strategies by interest groups in the EU, it is hypothesized that litigation strategies are likely to be pursued by narrowly focused and well resource-endowed interest groups in a situation when the EU fails to produce legislation (Bouwen & McCown 2007). Litigation may empower individuals and groups who are often disadvantaged in their own systems (Cichowski 2007: 6). On the one hand, judicial rulings “may create new rights for individuals or groups that can enable direct access or be utilized by movement activists to make subsequent claims through litigation”; on the other, the EUCJ decisions “may change the rules and procedures in a way that makes the policy process a more open to a particular group” (Cichowski 2007: 11). The EUCJ in its turn benefits from litigation as the clarification and construction of new EU rules is instrumental in strengthening the Court’s position in EU rulemaking (Cichowski 2007). Organised interests use the EUCJ preliminary reference mechanism to challenge national legislation and practices with which they do not agree (McCown 2009: 93). Litigation strategies are often reinforced by lobbying efforts in which groups provide technical expertise to rule-makers, frame policy issues and raise the awareness among new potential litigants (McCown 2009; Cichowski 2007; Bouwen & McCown 2007).

2.2. Institutional mosaic of EU foreign policy

Lobbying patterns described in the previous section take place in the institutional design of EU legislation making, whereas a large part of EU foreign policy is conducted

outside this framework. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan situate EU foreign policymaking roughly between two regimes: the ‘Community method’ and the ‘intergovernmental method’. The Community method is “operationalized through a system designed to maintain institutional equilibrium between a supranational Commission which has a key role in defining and defending common interests; a Council of Ministers with representatives of the member states which decides by majority voting on a wide range of decisions; a directly elected EP; and a supranational ECJ. The Community method applies to trade, development cooperation, humanitarian aid and other competences that fall under the EC” (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 67).

Under the intergovernmental method “governments retain control over policymaking” which may take the form of intergovernmental cooperation or intergovernmental integration (*ibidem*). The former implies cooperation and coordination of national foreign policy within the EU framework. The latter means that member states have transferred competences to the EU but still control policymaking through the dominant position of the Council and the rule of unanimity in its decision-making. CFSP/CSDP is an example of the intergovernmental method (*ibidem*). However, in practice, there is a range of methods on the continuum between these two, as foreign policy dossiers often involve both policymaking regimes (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 67).

These two regimes correspond to what Helen Wallace (2010) distinguishes as the regulatory mode and intensive transgovernmentalism, according to her typology of five policy modes in the EU. Wallace asserts that the regulatory mode is the most widespread policy mode in the EU, in which the Commission is the principle agenda-setter, while the Council and the Parliament are involved as co-legislators and the role of EUCJ is significant, in addition to that of regulatory agencies at European and

national levels. The regulatory mode offers an “extensive opportunity for stakeholders, especially economic actors, but sometimes other societal actors, to be consulted about, and to influence, the shape and content of European market rules” (Wallace 2010: 96). In Wallace’s classification, this policy mode applies to competition, single market, environment, new aspects of trade and the common agriculture policy (CAP), and aspects of social and employment policies. At the other extreme, there is intergovernmental policy cooperation between national policymakers with little involvement by the EU institutions. Wallace terms it ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ as it better corresponds to “the greater intensity and denser structuring [...], where member states governments have been prepared cumulatively to commit themselves to rather extensive engagement and disciplines, but have judged the full institutional framework to be inappropriate or unacceptable, or not yet ripe for adoption” (Wallace 2010: 101). The policy process is dominated by the Council of Ministers, with the active involvement of the European Council in setting the policy direction. The Commission’s involvement is limited, while the Parliament and ECJ are excluded. The policy process is not transparent to national parliaments and citizens. CFSP/CDSP is an illustration of this policy mode. Wallace visualises the two policy modes (see Table 1) describing the roles played by the EU institutions, member state governments and other actors in each of them.

Table 1. Policy modes in the EU

	Regulatory Mode	Intensive transgovernmentalism
<i>Degree of centralization</i>	Varies	Low
<i>Role of European Council</i>	Rare (overcoming log jams)	Sets direction
<i>Role of Commission</i>	Agenda-setting and policing	Marginal
<i>Role of Council of Ministers</i>	Co-legislator(QMV)	Predominant (agenda-setting and decision-making)
<i>Role of European Parliament</i>	Co-legislator	Excluded
<i>Impact of ECJ</i>	Significant	Excluded
<i>Member governments</i>	Implementation and enforcement (regulatory networks)	Key players
<i>Engagement of other actors</i>	Policy networks and some self-regulation	Excluded
<i>Resources</i>	No budgetary costs	Increasing importance of funding for ‘public goods’
<i>Prime Examples</i>	competition, single market, environment, aspects of social and employment policies, new aspects of trade and CAP	CFSP, JHA

Source: Wallace (2010: 92-93).

Wallace underlines that these policy modes are ideal types, whereas “individual policy areas do not fall neatly within a single policy mode and there is strong variation over time, both within policy sectors and in response to events and contexts” (Wallace 2010: 91). Studying EU foreign policy through the prism of policy modes allow us to understand how policy is made, what kind of actors participate in it and, to a certain degree, what kind of policy outcomes one may expect. This approach also helps us to look beyond state actors in the policymaking process and to examine the participation of non-state actors in EU foreign policy.

I build on the assumption derived from the existing literature that the Community method is relatively open to interest group involvement and influence (Eising & Kohler-Koch 1999), while the intergovernmental mode is least favourable to them (Mérand et

al. 2011 on CSDP; Uçarer 2009 on JHA). Thus, as we will see further in this chapter, this research is designed to explore whether involvement and influence of interest groups varies, increasing the closer a policy dossier is to the Community method, and decreasing the stronger intergovernmental arrangements are.

2.3. EU foreign policy machinery

In EU foreign policy, in order to bring their issues onto the agenda or influence decision-making, interest groups have to deal with a different institutional environment which may be less conducive to their involvement. Still, the dynamic institutional changes in EU foreign policy offer multiple venues which groups can approach. This section overviews EU foreign policy machinery which forms part of the institutional context in which groups lobby.

The Commission's role in EU foreign policy varies significantly according to the issue at hand. It has an exclusive right to set the EU's trade agenda policy, negotiate international trade and other agreements, and manage EU foreign aid and preparation of EU aspiring countries to the accession. Before the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission's role in CFSP was limited to the non-exclusive right of initiative, which since the Lisbon Treaty is tied to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR): the Commission may support the HR initiatives on CFSP or submit joint proposals (Piris 2010: 263). Furthermore, the Commission is involved in implementation of CFSP decisions, given that they require Union (formerly Community) measures (e.g. some types of sanctions), or EU funding. The External Relations family within the Commission (Commissioners and their respective Directorates General (DGs) dealing with international cooperation and development; humanitarian aid and civil protection; neighbourhood and enlargement; and trade) is the

main venue for groups with interest in EU foreign policy.

The EP's involvement in EU foreign policy is largely consultative, with real powers limited to a budget veto, consent for international agreements covering fields to which the ordinary legislative procedure applies and the holding to account of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in the capacity of a Vice-President of the Commission. The Parliament has a number of institutional venues on EU foreign affairs potentially attractive for interest groups, which include the Committees on Foreign Affairs, on Development, on International Trade, Subcommittees on Human Rights and Security and Defence as well as Committees on Budgets and on Budgetary Control. The EP develops its international contacts with counterparts in third countries through dozens of delegations to parliamentary assemblies and joint parliamentary committees. The EP takes an active position on a wide range of foreign policy issues adopting non-binding resolutions, publishing reports and studies, organising public hearings and other events, and posing parliamentary questions to other institutions.

Whereas the Council is regarded by some scholars as a part of a national route of interest representation (Greenwood 2007), it is argued that its working bodies and bureaucracy with a permanent presence in Brussels have through 'normative socialization processes' developed 'a trans-European strategic culture', 'a supranational culture' emerging from an intergovernmental process (see Howorth 2011 on the Political and Security Committee; see also Cross 2011 on transnational epistemic communities of COREPER and CSDP bodies). Thus, it is to be expected that EU-level interest groups will also approach the Council bodies, though relying primarily on normative arguments and bringing forward European values, as opposed to national interest groups which

mainly transmit information limited to one member state.

The Lisbon Treaty created new institutions to represent the EU abroad and manage its external relations. The Permanent President of the European Council chairs the summit of heads of state and governments which became an EU institution in the Lisbon Treaty with a strategic role in EU foreign policy. The Permanent President ensures external representation of the EU on CFSP issues, “without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative” (for an overview see Piris 2010). In practice, the first Permanent President Herman Van Rompuy took an active stance on foreign policy issues (e.g. launching the EU’s strategic partnership debate), though he was seldom involved in the CSDP (Helwig et al. 2013: 19).

The High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has become ‘triple-hatted’ carrying out tasks formerly attributed to the High Representative for CFSP/Secretary General of the Council, the Commissioner for External Affairs and the President of the External Relations Council. As Vice-President of the Commission, the HR ensures consistency and coordination regarding all aspects of the Union’s external action (Piris 2010: 244). The new representative also acquired new tasks involving agenda-setting, implementation and coordination of foreign policy issues as well external representation of the Union, which transforms her “from an assistant to a manager for the whole range of European external action” (Rüger 2012: 155).

The HR exercises authority over the European External Action Service (EEAS), EU Special Representatives and Delegations abroad. The EEAS is a functionally autonomous body of the EU, separate from the General Secretariat of the Council and from the Commission, with its own budget. It has been composed of officials previously working in the Council Secretariat (former Policy Unit, CSDP and crisis

management structures, Directorate-General E) and the Commission (DG External Relations) and seconded from the Member States foreign ministries (see Laursen 2012: 189-190). Thus, at least two different organizational cultures are expected in the EEAS: the Commission's culture imbued with 'supranational ethos' and interpretation of 'common interest' (more integrated institutional culture) and an institutional culture of the Council Secretariat and diplomats of the member states with practices of intergovernmental negotiation and mediation spirit (more negotiated culture) (Carta 2012: 152). This implies that openness to non-state actors will depend on a policy issue: in such areas as crisis management the prevalence of the Council Secretariat routines is anticipated (Duke 2012: 58-59), making the work of advocates more difficult.

In the post-Lisbon EU, the Commission's delegations abroad were upgraded to represent the Union, which boosts their political role. The delegations have also strengthened their political sections and attempted to coordinate the actions of the member states' embassies in the third countries (Helwig et al. 2013).

The EEAS is tasked to support the HR, the Council and the Commission, as well as to serve the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission in exercising their external representation functions. This boosts the EEAS's political role in the EU's external policies as the service appears as "a bridge-builder between the institutions, sharing information and acting as a common source of expertise" and has the potential to become "a true inter-institutional 'decision-shaping body', working towards greater coherence in EU external action" (Blockmans & Laatsit 2012: 157). The EEAS functions are multiple: it plays a role of "a Presidency, diplomatic service, ministry of development and defence, as well as coordinating overall coherence of external action" (Helwig et al. 2013: 7). We may expect that the EEAS becomes a

central lobbying target for foreign policy advocates at the EU level.

To conclude, EU foreign policy machinery differs from other areas of EU policymaking. First, the Lisbon Treaty did not overcome the dichotomy between the former first and second pillars. The CFSP remains largely intergovernmental with no revolutionary changes made. As one scholar put it, “[t]he role of the Member States in definition and decision-making process of CFSP still is huge and clear; in the area of implementation and representation, however, supranational level becomes more influential” (Radtke 2012: 52). The key EU institutions – the Commission, the Parliament and the Council of Ministers – have different decision-making roles in EU foreign policy, depending on whether a policy issue is dealt with through the Community or intergovernmental method. This is expected to impact upon interest group engagement with these institutions. Second, there are a number of institutions specific to EU foreign policy established or reformed by the Lisbon Treaty. They include the institutionalised European Council and its Permanent President, the ‘new’ High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to overcome the first/second pillar dichotomy, the EEAS which is to support not only the HR, but other institutions on the issues related to foreign policy and representation. We might assume that these new institutions are targets to advocates on EU foreign policy, though to varying degrees given their respective roles and receptivity.

3. Research design

3.1. Hypotheses and key variables

As we know from the few studies on EU foreign policy lobbying, interest groups seem

to advocate the EU across a variety of issues ranging from the ‘communitarised’ area of international trade to the intergovernmental security and defence. The EU Transparency Register provides additional evidence of groups with interest in the latter domain. However, the question remains of the extent to which limited communitarisation and the intergovernmental character of a major part of EU foreign policy decision-making restricts interest groups involvement and influence.

We know from the interest group literature that political opportunity structure defined as “the set of characteristics of a given institution that determines the relative ability of (outside) groups influence decision making within that institution” (Princen & Kerremans 2008: 1130) determines both interest group strategies and the likelihood of influence. One of the key institutional characteristics affecting influence, though not determinant, is access granted by policymakers to interest groups (Dür & De Bièvre 2007b; Dür & De Bièvre 2007a). Access means “either a successful attempt of an interest group to approach the EU institutions or the incorporation of an interest group into EU policymaking by these institutions” (Eising 2007b: 386).

Multi-level governance in the EU multiplies the number of access points for interest groups, providing them with better chances to be heard (Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch 2004; Hooghe & Marks 2001). Groups can venue shop navigating between different access points at national, EU or even international level (Princen 2007; Princen & Kerremans 2008). But not all access points are equal in terms of their openness and receptivity to outsider inputs (Joachim & Locher 2009a). In the EU, the Commission and the Parliament are more open to interest groups, while the Council is the least accessible, given the secretive culture of intergovernmental decision-making (Coen & Richardson 2009). So, hypothetically, interest groups are likely to exert influence when

they deal with the Commission (or former Commission's units within the EEAS) and the Parliament than with the Council. In EU foreign policymaking, if an issue at stake is to be decided on the basis of consensus by the EU intergovernmental institutions and implemented by the member state governments (the intergovernmental method), interest groups are less likely to achieve influence than, if the supranational institutions are involved in policymaking and implementation and the Council decides by QMV (the Community method). This informs our first hypothesis:

H1 (institutional set-up – degree of influence): On the continuum between the Community method and the intergovernmental method of decision-making in EU foreign policy, interests groups are likely to achieve higher degrees of influence for an issue which lies closer towards the Community method; and are likely to achieve lower degrees of influence for an issue which is situated closer to the intergovernmental extreme.

As presented above, institutional characteristics may change over time with the changes of the Treaties, however, they are relatively static. A more dynamic characteristic of political opportunity structures identified by literature on social movements and interest groups is the presence or absence of elite allies which facilitates or constrains collective action. As Baumgartner puts it, “[m]any of those acting as policy advocates are in fact government officials themselves, acting as allies of others and sharing their interests” (Baumgartner 2007: 483). This statement finds confirmation in Joachim and Dembinski’s case study of lobbying on a CSDP issue: a shift of Great Britain and France to the camp of supporters of European Code of Conduct in Arms Exports made NGO lobbying easier and more influential (Joachim & Dembinski 2011: 1159). In Great Britain this shift came as a result of a change of government, whereas in France it was

driven by strategic government calculations (ibidem). Moreover, from the literature on NSA access to international organisations, we also know that some bodies are more open to non-state actors due to their functional needs (Steffek 2010; Tallberg et al. 2014). They rely on information which non-state actors provide or other services.

Therefore, it is hypothesised that alliances with key decision-makers may facilitate interest groups influence on EU policy, even if the case upon which they lobby is close to the intergovernmental method. In other words, interest groups are likely to achieve their goals if they have allies among key decision-makers such as the member states in the Council, the HR or a member state holding the presidency (for non-CFSP issues), the EEAS and the Commission (when it is involved in policy formulation on the non-CFSP issues or implementation), and the EP if it has any powers. Allies here are understood broadly: they may be ideological allies sharing the same position, or the same objective, or they may simply have overlapping interests with groups.

H2 (alliance building – degree of influence): If interest groups have allies among key decision-makers, they are likely to achieve higher degrees of influence.

We can also expect that policy regime has an impact on a type of influence groups try to achieve. Namely, we distinguish between organised interests defending the status quo and those promoting change. It is expected that it will be more difficult to promote change under intergovernmental policymaking arrangements. In line with an intergovernmentalist account, the member states tend to adopt foreign policy decisions based on the lowest common denominator, which implies a policy of “the status quo (agreement not to change an existing policy) or a new policy that reflects the preferences of the veto player” (Thomas 2011: 20-22; see also Jupille 1999; Meunier 2000). By this logic, if the Council decides unanimously, efforts of national interest

groups from one member state will suffice to block the decision and protect the status quo. If the Council decides by QMV, a coordinated effort of national groups from a blocking minority member states is needed to keep the status quo.

H3 (institutional set-up – type of influence). The intergovernmental method of policymaking mostly favours groups that defend the status quo rather than promoting change.

At the same time, studies show that the lowest common denominator is not always the case and other theoretical frameworks are better in providing an explanation for EU foreign policy decisions (M. E. Smith 2004a; Thomas 2011b), whereas status quo defenders are more likely to achieve success in the Community policy areas too (Bunea 2013; Mahoney 2007). In this case, we will not see a clear win for groups protecting the status quo over those pushing for change as the closer an issue lies to the intergovernmental extreme.

Given that the number of interest groups with interest in foreign policy is growing (as illustrated by the EU Transparency Register) and that even the most intergovernmental parts of EU foreign policy such as the CSDP can be viewed through the prism of (multi-level) governance frameworks characterised by heterarchy, or the existence of multiple centres of power; formal and informal institutionalisation and interaction of multiple actors, both public and private (M. Smith 2004b; Webber et al. 2004; Norheim-Martinsen 2010; Mérand et al. 2011), we expect that interest groups adopt multi-level strategies targeting policymakers both at the EU and national levels (see Joachim & Dembinski 2011).

H4 (multi-level vs. national level strategies): Groups tend to adopt strategies targeting actors at both EU and member state level, even when policymaking is

closer to the intergovernmental method.

An opposite account argues that the two-level games logic is still prevalent in those areas where intergovernmental arrangements are strong (CFSP/CSDP), therefore, there is little or no lobbying at the EU level. If this is so, we will see no confirmation of this hypothesis.

3.2. Case selection

The hypotheses outlined above are tested through a comparative analysis of three case studies, which are selected on the basis of a number of criteria. First, they represent a variation on the key explanatory variable – the policy regime, and thus range from the Community method to the intergovernmental method. I apply Mill's (1875) "method of difference" (Leuffen 2007: 149) by looking for "comparable cases" in Lijphart's (1975) terminology (Blatter & Haverland 2012: 42). Thus I intend to have other variables potentially explaining lobbying and influence of similar value, and either kept constant or controlled. Second, while focusing on the same time period, I opt for cases with a longer timeframe in order to take into account a more dynamic characteristic of alliance building. Finally, cases should cover a whole policy cycle (agenda setting, policy formulation and decision-making, implementation and evaluation). This will allow us to look at influence as a "continuous" rather than "dichotomous" variable, following the suggestion of Baumgartner & Leech (1998: 138) and not to miss interest group influence by focusing on a particular stage of the policymaking process. Moreover, given that few studies on the participation of non-state actors in EU foreign policy are available, we cannot really know where (at which stage of the policy cycle) to look for their influence.

Geographically, all the cases concern countries situated in the EU neighbourhood. The

EU's neighbourhood has been named a top priority in terms of EU's relations with the world, along with building of external relations architecture and strategic partnerships (Ashton 2010). This also implies that neighbouring countries are of similar importance for EU foreign policy and there is also a web of relations between the EU and its neighbourhood at various levels (supranational, state, sub-state) that includes both state and non-state actors. Ideally, it would be good to look at the same country, but it is difficult to find such a case in the real world with all criteria being fulfilled.

In this study, policy dossiers do not represent the most lobbied cases or issues in EU foreign policy, the approach which has been adopted in the previous study (Voltolini 2013). The preference is for cases which represent sub-policy areas that are typical of EU relations with the neighbourhood and in which the EU applies a standard set of foreign policy tools. At the same time, I opt for cases which have been in the spotlight of EU policy towards the regions and countries, thus they are likely to attract attention of interest groups.

A detailed overview of the selected cases is presented in Table 2. The case closest to the Community method concerns EU visa policy, with all supranational institutions involved and QMV in the Council, though the member states are responsible for implementation. The focus is on the EU's eastern neighbours given that visa facilitation and liberalisation have been key objectives of the Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU's Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative and as a means to promote security and reforms at the EU borders. The second case is closer to the intergovernmental extreme and centres on CSFP sanctions, with the Commission's involvement in implementation and the EUCJ's jurisdiction, if the Union measures are envisaged. While the EU has applied CSFP sanctions to many countries in its

neighbourhood (Belarus, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine) as a response to a sudden degradation of governance and human rights standards or as a part of conflict management strategy, the case of Belarus is chosen given it has the longest history of EU sanctions policy towards this country. The third, 'the hardest case' from which supranational institutions are excluded represents the CSDP. The EU has deployed CSDP missions in the conflict-affected neighbouring countries of Georgia, Lybia, Palestinian territories and Ukraine, all of which are civilian. The case turns to the CSDP missions in Palestine and Georgia as the oldest ongoing missions in the neighbourhood. According to the hypothesis H1, we expect that interest groups are more likely to achieve the highest degrees of influence in the first case, lower degrees in the second and the lowest degrees in the third case.

The cases relate to the time period between 2004/2015 and 2014/2015. Such a decade-long time frame should enable us to examine advocacy and eventual group influence on policy change from a longitudinal perspective, which is rather rare in interest groups studies in the EU. According to the literature on advocacy coalitions, a time perspective of a decade or more is necessary in order to understand the process of policy change to check against external factors such as socio-economic and technological changes, changes in governing coalitions, as well as decisions and impacts from other policy sectors that affect a policy under question that vary substantially over the course of a few years or a decade (Sabatier 1988).

Within the studied period, there have been treaty reforms which have amended the institutional design of EU foreign policy. In particular, new foreign policy institutions have been created by the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009. It is assumed that these institutions have affected institutional set-ups in all cases in a sim-

ilar way. There were also a number of legal changes to the decision-making powers of the supranational institutions in all the selected cases. However, I maintain that they have not affected the type of policy regime in place.

Table 2. Description of cases

	Visa liberalisation (EaP countries)	CFSP sanctions (Belarus)	CSDP missions (Palestine and Georgia)
Time period			
	Since 2004	Since 2004	Since 2005
Institutional characteristics			
Access Points			
Council	Decides by QMV (art. 77 TFEU)	Decides unanimously Implements by QMV	Decides unanimously upon a proposal of HR or a member state initiative. Exercises, through the PSC, political control and strategic direction over a CSDP mission.
High Representative	Responsible for overall coordination with other EU external policies	HR and Commission make a joint proposal for implementation	Proposes to initiate a mission; exercises overall authority over civilian missions
Commission	Commission conducts a visa liberalisation dialogue; drafts Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP); reports regularly to the EP & the Council on the implementation of the VLAP. Makes a proposal to the EP & the Council for the lifting of the short-stay visa obligation, through an amendment of Regulation 539/2001 (ordinary legislative procedure)	Commission can be responsible for implementation (e.g. aid suspension, trade bans) or supervise implementation by member states if Union (formerly Community) measures are concerned	Commission is involved in implementation if the Union's resources are used
EP	Co-decides (ordinary legislative procedure)/consent for international agreements	Informed by Council	Informed by Council and HR regularly. Approves CSFP budget from which civilian missions are funded
EUCJ	Conducts judicial review on fundamental rights-sensitive areas of migration, border control and asylum and	Reviews the legality of sanctions implemented through the measures of the Union competence;	Excluded

National governments	related to four freedoms, esp. freedom of movement of services (e.g. Turkish cases on freedom of movement of services) Implement (e.g. issue visas, control borders)	addressed by natural and legal persons in respect of restrictive measures affecting them Responsible for implementation of certain measures, e.g. arms embargoes, visa bans, diplomatic & cultural sanctions	May initiate a mission. Funding of civilian missions if nationals are seconded Funding of military missions
Issue characteristics			
Time frame (Crisis vs. long-term)	Long-term	Short/mid-term towards long-term. Spurred by an external crisis	Short/mid term towards long-term. Spurred by a crisis
Involves violence	Unlikely	Unlikely	Rather likely (low intensity conflicts)
Novelty of issue	Well-established	Well-established	Well-established
Salience	Low	Low	Low
Scope	High politics (It is seen as one of the key offers in the EaP. A number of EU members have a special relationship with the countries in the region. There are also migration flows to a number of EU states – labour, tourism, asylum seekers)	High politics (Belarus has been dubbed as ‘last dictatorship’ in Europe. There is well-developed political interest of a number of member states in this country. Human rights and democracy promotion agenda of the Council of Europe, OSCE, US)	High politics (The Israeli-Palestinian conflict of the most long standing conflicts in the world. EU member states have a long history of involvement in conflict resolution, though secondary to the US. The conflicts in Georgia have an international dimension due to Russia’s involvement)
Types of interests affected	human rights, business, solidarity, security	democracy, human rights, business	human rights, security, solidarity
Changes in the Treaty of Lisbon			
In force since 1 December 2009	EP has acquired co-decision powers (‘ordinary legislative procedure’ and consent, before consultation procedure) EUCJ became fully competent	Commission has no longer has an autonomous right of initiative on CFSP issues. It may support the HR or submit joint proposals. EUCJ powers slightly enlarged with regards to better protection of rights of individuals (Art. 275 TFEU)	The Council can entrust a group of member states with a CSDP mission (Art 42.5 and 44 TEU). Member states are to make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of CSDP.

While examining the relationship between institutional conditions and interest group influence, we have to take into account other determinants of influence. The issue characteristics such the scope and salience of the issue, the level of conflict, the newness, the presence of focusing event are seen as having impact upon the probability of achieving lobbying success (Mahoney 2008; Kluver 2013).

It is assumed that all three foreign policy dossiers chosen for this study are similar in scope: they are high politics issues which concern EU values such as democracy, peace, security and economic freedoms and constitute relations with important for EU countries in the neighbourhood. They are expected to attract different kinds of interests.

The degree of salience of the issues which refers to visibility or importance of the issue to the public (Mahoney 2008; Kollman 1998) is assumed to be similar and relatively constant. In general, foreign policy issues are considered to be low salience issues compared to domestic policies.

New issues are more difficult to lobby on (Mahoney 2008; Joachim & Dembinski 2011). The selected foreign policy issues are well established rather than new, in the sense that they are part of portfolios of the existing structures at the EU level or conform with well-developed EU policies.

The time frame and the degree to which violence may be involved in pursuing the policy is assumed to define to what extent multi-level governance extends to CFSP decision-making (M. Smith 2004b). This largely coincides with what Mahoney (2008) calls a focusing event – “a crisis or disaster” that affects the probability of lobbying success. It is hypothesised that these two characteristics may have impact on interest groups ability to participate in the policymaking process.

The time frame is defined as “a degree of urgency surrounding the issue: crises must be decided within weeks at most (more often days or even hours); short-term/medium-term policies may be decided over months or a few years; long-term problems must be decided over several years or even decades” (M. Smith 2004b). Given the time shortage, interest groups can hardly be involved in policymaking on urgency issues. CFSP sanctions and CSDP missions are often deployed as a reaction to crises or armed conflict in a third country or region. This contrasts with visa liberalisation which may be seen as a more gradual policy development not enacted as an urgent response to an external crisis. Indeed, in the case of Belarus, first sanctions were introduced as a reaction to crisis, but then they were revised in a short/medium term perspective, and given EU sanctions towards Belarus have not been fully lifted since their introduction in 2004, we could argue that they have become a long-term solution. So we will be able to control for the time-frame factor examining several time periods. In the case of Georgia, the CSDP mission EUMM was deployed to monitor the ceasefire in the Russia-Georgia war of 2008. But we will be able to control for this factor having EUPOL COPPS in Palestine which was considered at least a year in advance.

Finally, in the case of CSDP missions, there is a possibility of violence, given that they are situated within conflict zones, though these missions are far from being combat military operations. Thus, we assume that this variation is not significant to explain the degree of interest group influence in comparison with the institutional set-up.

However, there are some issue-level characteristics that are not known in advance (for example, the degree of conflict on the issue). Moreover, group-level characteristics (e.g. financial resources, membership resources, information on constituencies interests, expertise) will vary too given that I do not have theoretical reasons not to expect both

resource-rich and resource-poor groups involved in lobbying. Thus I also employ within-case analysis to trace possible causal links and configurations of the many factors that impact on lobbying strategies and influence. Nevertheless, it is still expected that overall interest group influence will vary across three institutional contexts for all types of groups, even though resource-rich groups may be indeed more able to adapt to less favourable environments than resource-poor groups.

The combination of the cross-case and within-case analyses complement each other (Blatter & Haverland 2012: 212). Through the cross-case analysis I aim to answer the question of whether institutional design matters when seeking influence. Whereas within-case analysis allows us to understand the effect of the institutional design on lobbying and influence. This method is also needed to answer the underlying research question of how and to what extent interest groups influence EU foreign policy, or, in other words, what the consequences are of (intergovernmental) policymaking on the lobbying and influence of interest groups.

3.3. Operationalisation and data collection

Influence is conceptualised here as control over a policy outcome (Dür & De Bièvre 2007b: 3). What specifically constitutes a policy outcome differs across the policy cycle. At the agenda-setting stage it means an issue that groups have been promoting is raised to the EU agenda (or is kept out of it if this was the intended goal). At the policy formulation and decision-making stage, it implies that adopted policy or decision reflects a desired outcome which interest group lobbying has intended to achieve. At the implementation stage, an actual implementation of policy again reflects a desired outcome, whereas if groups are involved in evaluation, control over a policy outcome would imply that their inputs were reflected in the policy evaluation exercise which

feeds back to the earlier stages (agenda-setting or policy reformulation).

In order to measure interest group influence, I apply methodological triangulation as suggested by interest group researchers (Dür 2008b; Helboe Pedersen 2013): I combine process-tracing and assessment of attributed influence. The combination of two methods helps to correct biases of each of them, at least to a certain degree. A similar model has been used by Arts & Verschuren (1999) who combine assessment of influence by non-state actors (ego-perception) with cross-assessment by policymakers (alter-perception) and researcher's analysis.

Through process tracing, researchers "try to uncover steps by which causes affect outcomes. With respect to measuring interest groups influence, scholars scrutinize groups' preferences, their influence attempts, their access to decision-makers, decision-makers' responses to influence attempts, the degree to which groups' preferences are reflected in outcomes and groups' statements of (dis)satisfaction with the outcome" (Dür 2008: 562). The process tracing method is suitable for small-N studies (Cowles 1995; Neuman et al. 2006; Kautto 2007; Joachim & Dembinski 2011) as this is a time consuming exercise which requires good knowledge of a case, including all factors which may have impacted upon a policy outcome. Process tracing also requires thorough data collection to provide accurate and detailed information to uncover all steps of causal process (Dür 2008: 563). For example, a study on tobacco industry lobbying against strict advertisement regulation relied on confidential internal industry documentation which had been disclosed in a legal case (Neuman et al. 2006). Other studies have been based largely on interviews (Kautto 2007; Bugdahn 2008; Joachim & Dembinski 2011). The key advantage of this method is that it helps us to open the black box of policymaking and show how groups lobby. The primary disadvantage however is

that it does not allow for the establishment of the degree of influence, as one can usually only assess whether a group was influential or not. It is also easy to underestimate interest group influence for those actors who did not engage in any active lobbying (Lowery 2013).

To assess the degree of influence, I apply the attributed influence method. This has been applied in both large and small N interest groups studies in which data have been collected mainly through surveys (Egdell & Thompson 1999; Mahoney & Baumgartner 2008; Heinz et al. 1993; Dür & De Bièvre 2007a; Helboe Pedersen 2013; Binderkrantz & Rasmussen 2015). Applying this method, I ask interviewed groups to assess their own influence, namely to what degree they achieved the intended outcomes planned in their strategy (rephrasing the question by Heinz et al. (1993) “To what extent did you achieve your advocacy objectives: all objectives, most, about half, few, or none”). I view influence as the achievement of a group’s objective as a result of the group’s intervention, which implies that a policy outcome should be more in line with the group’s objective than would have been the case had the latter not intervened (Arts & Verschuren 1999: 413). Thus, primarily groups which have mobilised for lobbying are approached for interviews. However, it may still be difficult to distinguish fully goals which were achieved purely due to luck – “the intervention of others, due to external events, or due to autonomous developments” (ibidem) – rather than due to the group’s intervention. By asking groups to explain factors beyond their advocacy success and by introducing cross-assessment by policymakers, I hope to obtain a clearer picture of what has enabled advocacy objectives to be achieved.

The literature speaks of the expansiveness bias evident in expert interviewing, whereby less powerful actors tend to inflate their status while more powerful actors tend to

underreport their influence (Beyers et al. 2014). There is however little evidence that this occurs in practice. Triangulating survey and documentary-based measures of preference attainment, Helboe Pedersen (2013) finds that resourceful groups tend to overstate their influence and activity slightly more than other groups (public interest groups and other types of citizen groups), nevertheless, she finds no clear difference among resourceful groups (e.g. business groups vs. trade unions, for instance). She explains that interest group respondents may lack precise information on their success, providing general evaluations of their levels of influence and suggests posing more concrete questions about specific activities and successes. I take steps to integrate this advice into the process of preparing interview questions and while carrying out the interviews themselves.

Furthermore, to mitigate the bias of self-estimation and the fact that advocacy groups may find it difficult to attribute policy outcomes to their lobbying efforts, I also complement their answers by the cross-assessment by policymakers (who are asked to name lobby groups which have been most influential in their advocacy and which have provided most valuable input). Policymakers may still be tempted to systematically overrate the influence of highly visible actors (the attractiveness bias, see Beyers et al. 2014). But careful phrasing of interview questions (for example, eschewing potentially sensitive words as suggested by Beyers et al. (2014)) and cross-validation of interview findings with interest groups and policymakers should help to mitigate the measurement bias.

Another limitation of the attributed influence method is that it measures perceived influence as opposed to actual influence (Dür 2008: 566). Such a measurement is termed ‘subjective’ as it relies “on policy actors’ *subjective* assessments of the extent to

which they actually attained what they wanted” (Bernhagen et al. 2014: 204, italics in original). While interest group scholars increasingly measure influence as preference attainment spatially, arguing that it is more ‘objective’ (ibidem), this method cannot be applied here in full. First, it is suitable when lobbying takes place through one venue and through one strategy (for example, the Commission and participation in online consultations during the policy formulation stage as in Klüver (2013)), while this study is exploratory in the sense that it attempts to examine who interest groups lobby when attempting to influence EU foreign policy, and how they do so. Moreover, many EU foreign policy documents are not publicly available, consultations with interest groups are not formalised and there is no analogy to the Commission in the legislative making process which is responsible for drafting and possesses knowledge on the positions of decision-making actors and interest groups. It is thus extremely difficult to find a valid primary source for positional data necessary to measure influence spatially.

Given the lack of publicly available (or disclosed) information on foreign policy decision-making and the dominance of informal communication between advocates and policymakers in this area, the study draws on interviews as a source of primary data on aspects of the political process, lobbying and influence. Whereas data collection through interviews introduces a number of biases which are difficult to eliminate completely, I follow the advice of experienced interest group scholars who believe “that a judiciously prepared and well-conducted set of interviews can contribute significantly to research on political mobilization, strategies and policy influence” (Beyers et al. 2014: 177).

The primary data have been collected through 161 semi-structured interviews with interest groups representatives, policymakers and expert observers conducted by the author between May 2013 and January 2015 in Brussels, a number of EU member states

and the neighbouring countries covered by each case. The interviews were conducted face-to-face, and only in a few cases was interviewing done via Skype or telephone. The average interview length was 60 minutes. All interviewees were offered the principle of anonymity in order to allow for more open and frank answers. In order to further enhance rapport with the interviewees, interviews were not voice-recorded, instead written notes were taken down and typed soon after the interview.

My data collection strategy has involved interviewing representatives of all key groups advocating on the case and all key policymakers (representatives of key member states in the Council, key MEPs or their staff, Commission and EEAS officials responsible for the dossier and contacts with outside actors). Initial potential interviewees were identified through background research based on the analysis of secondary (specialist literature on each case) and primary resources (documents produced by interest groups, their websites, media reports, interviews with independent experts in each policy area). Further potential interviewees were added to the list through the ‘snowball effect’ (by asking groups to name other groups who lobbied on the same issue and policymakers whom they target and by asking policymakers to name other policy actors and advocacy groups).

In addition to interviews, documentary analysis (policy documents where publicly available, minutes of parliamentary debates, position papers and reports produced by advocacy groups) and analysis of media reports (English language online media specialised in EU politics, such as EUObserver and EurActiv, and national media covering the countries in focus) were employed. These data were analysed in preparation for interviews and afterwards to corroborate interview findings.

Conclusion

This chapter has introduced main concepts, theoretical assumptions, research design and methodology. In this thesis, I apply the definition of influence which has been predominantly used in the interest group literature and which regards influence as ‘control over policy outcomes’. When assessing interest group influence, I also follow the rationalist assumptions that actors have clear and stable preferences that do not change in the course of interaction with other actors and act to maximise their utility. Such conceptualisation of influence mostly refers to the first and second ‘faces’ of power which are decision-making and controlling the agenda, with the second ‘face’ being more difficult to observe. Despite possible criticism of such a definition of influence on theoretical grounds, an advantage of this conceptualisation is that it is accompanied by a developed methodology for measuring influence which has been widely used and referenced in the literature on interest groups both in the EU and the US. Moreover, without downplaying the importance of socialisation underlined by the constructivist views on lobbying in EU foreign policy, I argue that the rationalist account has the potential to provide a more complete picture not only of interest group influence, but also the reasons behind lobbying strategies and tactics.

This thesis focuses on the role of institutional factors in determining lobbying strategies and interest group influence. From the literature on lobbying in the EU, we know that some EU institutions are lobbied more than others due to their powers in the policy process and openness to input from interest groups. However, the literature mainly draws on the roles of EU institutions in policy areas under the Community method in which the Commission sets the agenda and the Council and, increasingly, the Parliament co-decide within the structured legislative process, resulting in a clear policy outcome –

a piece of EU legislation. In many areas of EU foreign policy, policymaking is still dominated by intergovernmental arrangements. The most lobbied EU institutions – the Commission and the Parliament – have little role to play, whereas the member states control the agenda, decide through consensus and implement the resulting decisions. Moreover, there are specific EU foreign policy institutions set up to assist in intergovernmental cooperation and to ensure inter-institutional coherence in managing the EU's external action.

Few insights on how interest groups interact with institutions under the intergovernmental method were presented in the Chapter 1. From the case study of advocacy on a CSDP policy issue (Joachim & Dembinski 2011) we learnt that the intergovernmental set-up does not prevent group involvement, but affects their advocacy strategies and success. Non-state actors act at both EU and member state levels and their advocacy is facilitated by the presence of EU level norms and powerful allies among the decision-makers. They can on occasion be successful in achieving their advocacy goals (ibidem). But one case study presents a limited story. It does not allow us to examine whether interest groups' strategies and influence have been determined by institutional factors as opposed to, for instance, issue characteristics. Thus, I will conduct a comparative study to shed more light on the issue of whether variation in the institutional conditions of lobbying leads to varying advocacy strategies and influence. I will test four hypotheses:

H1: On the continuum between the Community method and the intergovernmental method of decision-making in EU foreign policy, interest groups are likely to achieve higher degrees of influence for an issue which lies closer toward the Community method; and are likely to achieve lower degrees of influence for an

issue which is situated closer to the intergovernmental extreme.

H2: If interest groups have allies among key decision-makers, they are likely to achieve higher degrees of influence.

H3: The intergovernmental method of policymaking mostly favours groups that defend the status quo rather than promoting change.

H4: Groups tend to adopt strategies targeting actors at both EU and member state level, even when policymaking is closer to the intergovernmental method.

Key independent and dependent variables are summarised in Table 3. Three cases have been selected for this study to present a variation on the key explanatory variable – type of policy regime. Selection criteria have been applied to ensure that cases deviate as little as possible on issue-level characteristics that can also be responsible for variation of advocacy strategies and influence. The impact of group-level characteristics (e.g. material and nonmaterial resources) will be controlled through a within-case analysis. Aside from testing the main hypotheses through the cross-case analysis, I use the within-case analysis to generate more insight into groups' strategies and influence on EU foreign policy, including key factors which condition it.

Table 3. Key variables

Independent variables	Dependent variables
Policy regime (Community method ◀-▶ Intergovernmental method) Allies among key decision-makers (presence/absence)	Degree of influence (advocacy objectives achieved) Type of influence (status quo vs. policy change) Type of strategy (multi-level vs. national-level)

I apply a combination of process tracing and assessment of attributed influence to

measure interest group influence. The latter method grasps influence as it is perceived by groups themselves (self-assessment) and by policymakers (cross-assessment). The former method helps to establish a broader picture of the policy process in which decision-making and advocacy efforts take place and to analyse the effect of institutional conditions on lobbying as well as other conditions that may determine policy outcomes.

Given the scarcity of the literature and limited number of publicly accessible policy documents from which positions of decision-makers and groups can be extracted, the study draws extensively from 161 semi-structured interviews with interest group representatives, policymakers and expert observers conducted in Brussels, EU member state capitals and third countries. Analysis of EU policy documents and documents produced by groups and media articles allows us to supplement and cross-check where possible information provided during interviews. The strength of a methodology relying on interviews is that it allows us to ask interest groups directly about their influence and how they perceive and assess it as well as to see how interest groups' advocacy is seen by policymakers. The weakness is that it introduces inevitable biases on how facts are presented and interpreted by interviewees.

Chapter 3. Visa liberalisation policy towards Eastern neighbours

Introduction

This chapter analyses interest groups' advocacy and influence in EU visa policy towards the Eastern neighbours. This case largely conforms with the Community method of policymaking in the EU. It is hypothesised that interest groups tend to engage in multi-level lobbying as supranational institutions have significant decision-making powers in this domain (in line with H4 hypothesis outlined in the Chapter 2) and that groups are likely to achieve some degree of influence (as hypothesized in H1). Thus, the research findings in this case are expected to be largely in line with the major bulk of the literature on lobbying in the EU, which focuses mainly on interest groups' involvement in Community policymaking. I expect that groups with powerful allies among policymakers are likely to achieve higher degrees of influence (H2) and that groups in favour of the status quo do not tend to be more successful than those promoting a policy change (H3).

The literature on EU visa policy towards the neighbouring countries focuses on the Western Balkan countries, Turkey, Russia and to a lesser extent on other East European neighbours of the EU (Trauner & Manigrassi 2014; Hernández i Sagrera 2013; Finotelli & Sciortino 2013; Bürgin 2013; Voinikov & Korneev 2013; Hernández i Sagrera & Korneev 2012; Hernández i Sagrera 2010; Trauner 2009; Trauner & Kruse 2008). However, the studies omit the role of non-state actors. An exception is a study focusing on member state implementation of EU visa policy, which reveals the impact of the

tourism industry in Spain on the easing of Schengen visa issuance practices by the consulates of this country (Macías-Aymar et al. 2012).

In contrast, studies on immigration and asylum policies of the EU have examined lobbying of pro-migrant NGOs at the EU level and shown that these groups exert influence to varying degrees in these policy domains (Uçarer 2009; Hoffmann 2012; Hoffmann 2013; Kaunert et al. 2013). Assessing influence on the legislation making process in EU immigration and asylum policies, Hoffmann (2013) concludes that pro-migrant NGOs seem to be more successful during the drafting stages with the Commission than during the negotiations in the Council. After the introduction of the ordinary legislative procedure in the Lisbon Treaty, the groups approached the European Parliament, which became co-legislator; however, the research has shown mixed results as to whether the increased role of this institution led to a growing influence of pro-migrant groups (Hoffmann 2013). Her findings seem to be in line with another study that shows a high degree of continuity in EU asylum policy and explains that this is due to the success of an advocacy coalition in favour of more restrictive and weakly integrated EU policy, led by the member states' interior ministers who co-opted pivotal actors within the Commission and empowered the EP against a more liberally oriented advocacy coalition of pro-migrant actors (Ripoll Servent & Trauner 2014). Hoffman explains that the interest group influence is due to the dependence of the Commission and the Parliament on expert knowledge provided by groups, while no evidence has been found of the importance of such knowledge for the Council (Hoffmann 2013). Moreover, factors such as political support and legitimacy that groups may provide to EU policymakers do not matter at all for the EU institutions, according to her results.

This study looks at EU visa policy towards the neighbours as an element of migration

management policy and of foreign policy to promote other goals. This policy represents a mix of different tools applied by the EU to promote desired policy changes in the EaP countries in exchange for the abolition of visa obligation for their citizens travelling to the Schengen zone for the purpose of short-term stay. Visa facilitation and visa liberalisation were offered to the Eastern neighbouring countries within the ENP and later these promises were further developed under the EaP. In a nutshell, the EU offers to its neighbours a greater freedom of movement for their citizens through Schengen borders in exchange for sharing responsibility for migration management (through readmission agreements and other measures) and domestic reforms which go beyond migration and border control. While the offer of visa-free travel is given to all six EaP countries as a region, the EU negotiates specific conditions for the visa regime lifting with each country individually and treats the progress towards visa liberalisation on a country basis. Thus, this case study focuses primarily on Moldova and Ukraine and to a lesser extent on Georgia as the first EaP countries to advance in this process.

The EU visa policy towards the EaP countries includes elements of the EU legislation making, namely amendments to the Council Regulation (EC) 539/2001 in order to abolish visa requirement as a final step, but there are also other non-legislative documents adopted by the EU within this policy as intermediary steps (e.g. binding agreements between the EU and the neighbouring states on visa facilitation; political documents between the EU and the neighbouring states agreeing the necessary conditions for visa liberalisation). Therefore, EU visa policy towards neighbouring states offers a distinct lobbying environment than EU legislation making on Schengen visas or other home affairs issues which envisage clear roles of the decision-making actors and legislation-making procedures, including the time frame.

This chapter draws on 44 interviews with interest group representatives, policymakers and experts conducted between May 2013 and January 2015 in Brussels, Berlin, Warsaw, Vilnius, Madrid, Kyiv, Chisinau, Tbilisi and other locations. In addition, the EU policy documents, documents produced by groups and media articles have also been analysed.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section analyses the development of EU visa policy towards Eastern neighbours and describes the decision-making environment in which interest groups operate breaking EU policy down into distinct policy processes and policy stages at which groups may engage in lobbying. It also provides an overview of groups which have lobbied in this policy domain and have been interviewed for this study. The second section focuses on advocacy strategies analysing advocacy objectives, the start of advocacy activities, advocacy targets, tactics and allies. The third section provides findings on interest group influence in the studied case and factors explaining it.

1. Case description

1.1. Evolution of EU visa policy towards Eastern neighbours

The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 communitarised EU policy on visas. It also envisaged specific arrangements for the UK and Ireland, who completely opted out of the Schengen acquis, and Denmark who reserved the right to opt out of the new developments of the Schengen acquis (for an overview of EU integration in visa policy see Meloni 2006). On the basis of the Treaty, the EU established ‘black’ and ‘white’ visa lists, the uniform format of visas and the Visa Identification system. While the

member states remain responsible for implementation of visa policy at consular level, the Union concludes visa facilitation agreements with third countries that aim to ease issuance of visas for certain categories of travellers. The Commission can also launch infringement procedures against member states who fail to comply with common rules on visa issuance.

Post-soviet countries, with the exception of the three Baltic candidate states, appeared on the first EU-wide 'black list' of third countries whose nationals needed a visa to cross the external borders of the member states which was annexed to Council Regulation (EC) No 2317/95 of 25 September 1995 and superseded by Council Regulation (EC) 574/1999 of 12 March 1999. They reappeared on the 'black list' in the Council Regulation (EC) 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 which has also introduced the 'white list' of third countries whose citizens are exempt from visa requirement, as was envisaged by the Amsterdam Treaty. The criteria which govern a third country's position on either the 'black' or 'white' lists involve concerns of illegal migration, public policy and security, EU's relations with the third country and considerations of the implications of regional coherence and reciprocity (Council 2001). Most commonly the countries are treated in groups as a region, thus, visa policy reflects the EU vision of regionalism (Guild & Bigo 2005: 212).

The idea of easing the visa regime for the European post-soviet countries takes root in the EU's Eastern enlargement. Ahead of the accession to the EU and later to the Schengen zone, Central and Eastern European states had to introduce visa regimes or stricter visa requirements for their non-EU neighbours. It went against historical, cultural, human and trade links across the borders and limited the ability of the 'new' member states to use visa policy as a foreign policy tool. Thus, they have become the

main advocates for EU visa liberalisation with the Eastern neighbours. Their voices against a new “paper curtain” in Europe have been joined by the non-state actors – NGOs, think-tanks, the media – protesting against the visa hurdles and proposing measures to alleviate the impact of the strict visa regulations (Jileva 2004).

The European Commission also supported and contributed to the idea of greater people’s mobility between the enlarged EU and its new neighbours. Proposing the policy framework for EU relations with the new neighbourhood in 2003, the Commission for the first time mentioned visa facilitation in the context of border crossing for bona fide third-country nationals living in the border areas and suggested the EU “examine wider application of visa-free regimes” (European Commission 2003).

In autumn 2004, the EU started negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement (VFA) envisaging a simplified regime of visa issue for certain groups of travellers with Russia and a year after with Ukraine. A VFA was offered as a reward for a readmission agreement through which the EU member states wanted to control illegal migration but which was resisted by the neighbouring countries who feared its negative consequences (Trauner & Kruse 2008: 415). Afterwards, other neighbouring countries (the Western Balkans and Moldova) were offered to conclude a package of a readmission agreement and a visa facilitation agreement (*ibidem*). The Commission further included an offer of visa facilitation with the EU neighbours in the ENP design as part of cooperation on home affairs (European Commission 2004; European Commission 2006a).

At the same time, the EU’s eastern neighbours were asking for more than visa facilitation. They wanted the EU to grant them a visa-free regime. In 2005, Ukraine and Georgia abolished visas for EU citizens, and Moldova did the same in 2007, hoping that such an asymmetric step would invite the EU to respond with reciprocity. Russia kept

visas for EU citizens but the parties established a dialogue to examine conditions for visa-free travel as a long-term perspective in 2007. The EU VFAs signed with the East European countries recognised the introduction of a visa-free travel regime for their citizens as a long term perspective.

Whereas VFAs with Ukraine, Moldova and Western Balkan countries entered into force on 1 January 2008, soon afterwards the Western Balkans countries were offered visa dialogues leading to abolition of visa regimes. The EU used visa policy as a foreign policy instrument to give a new impetus to the creeping enlargement process (Renner & Trauner 2009; Trauner 2009). By the end of 2010, the EU abolished visas with all Western Balkan countries except Kosovo.

After the VFA entered into force, Ukraine asked for a visa liberalisation dialogue arguing that this was the path followed with the Western Balkan countries. In September 2008, the EU launched a visa dialogue with Ukraine, but it did not offer Ukraine a Roadmap for visa liberalisation which would outline reforms necessary for abolishment of the visa regime as it had granted to the Western Balkan countries.

While EU-Russia visa dialogue took a different path (Hernández i Sagrera & Potemkina 2013), the EU adopted a regional approach to visa liberalisation with the Eastern neighbours covered by the EaP initiative launched in 2008. The European Commission (2008: 6) envisaged that for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine “[v]isa policy would follow a phased approach, leading to visa liberalisation under specific conditions and with accompanying measures, including financial assistance for our partners”. The phases included visa facilitation as a first step; revision of existing VFAs introducing additional facilitations, e.g waiving the visa fee for all citizens; a coordinated plan to improve member states’ consular coverage; and “[o]nce

visa facilitation and readmission agreements are effectively implemented, open dialogues on visa-free travel with all cooperating partners. Dialogues would establish roadmaps leading to visa waiver, dealing with four main blocks of issues: document security; fight against irregular migration, including readmission; public order issues; and external relation issues, including human rights of migrants and other vulnerable groups” (ibidem).

The EaP Prague Summit Declaration in May 2009 confirmed full visa liberalisation as a long term goal for all the EaP countries. In November 2010, Ukraine as the first EaP country received an Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation (VLAP). In June 2010, Moldova-EU visa dialogue was launched and half a year later, in January 2011, Moldova become the second EaP country to receive the VLAP from the EU. Parallel to visa liberalisation, the EU also reviewed and amended the VFAs with Ukraine and Moldova, facilitating visa issuance for more categories of citizens. Georgia was the third EaP country to sign the VFA in June 2010 and to receive a visa dialogue with the EU in June 2012 and a VLAP in February 2013. The EU has concluded the VFAs with Armenia and Azerbaijan and negotiates such an agreement with Belarus.

The VLAPs require that EaP countries implement a wide range of reforms, from improving security of travel documents and effective migration management to fighting against organised crime and corruption and protecting minorities. The EaP countries have to meet up to sixty benchmarks. By conditioning a visa-free regime on the success of domestic reforms, the EU uses its visa policy as a tool to push for policy change in the EaP countries that goes beyond migration control and border management.

Unlike in the case of the Western Balkans, the road of Eastern European countries towards visa-free travel to Europe has been bumpier. There is less haste on the EU side.

First, these countries do not have an accession prospect. Second, having experienced negative consequences of visa-free travel with the Western Balkan countries, the EU has introduced a more complicated process of visa liberalisation (Trauner & Manigrassi 2014; Hernández i Sagrera 2013). The VLAP has envisaged a more gradual, two-staged process in which adoption of legislation would be followed by implementation. There are also more specific and further reaching requirements on the adoption of reforms than in the case of the Western Balkan countries (Hernández i Sagrera 2013). This was done to ensure more rigorous checks of reform quality and provide the member states which are sensitive to the opening of EU borders further to the East with more control over the evaluation of reform process on the ground. In addition, upon the insistence of a migration-wary member state, an additional check has been introduced: the European Commission has to provide an assessment of migratory and security risks of future visa-free travel. As a result, all these measures slow down the process of visa liberalisation.

In November 2013, the Commission concluded in its fifth progress report on the implementation of the VLAP by Moldova that the country had fulfilled all the benchmarks and initiated the change of the Council Regulation 539/2001 to transfer Moldova onto the list of third countries whose nationals are exempt from visa requirement. In March 2014, three years after it had been granted a VLAP, Moldova was transferred to the 'white' visa list and since 28 April 2014 Moldovan citizens with biometric passports travelling to the Schengen countries for period up to 90 days do not need to possess a visa. By September 2014, over 200,000 Moldovan citizens had benefited from this possibility (European Commission & High Representative 2015).

The EU decided to graduate Ukraine to the second stage of VLAP in June 2014, after the Commission and the Council had positively evaluated the progress in adopting the

legislation. Soon afterwards, in November 2014, Georgia caught up with Ukraine being transferred to the second stage of the VLAP too. In May 2015, the Commission issued the next wave of progress reports on Ukraine and Georgia, however, none of the countries had fulfilled all the benchmarks.

This case study examines interest groups' involvement and influence on EU visa policy towards the Eastern neighbours, looking at the two distinct but closely intertwined processes: visa facilitation as the process of concluding, implementing and reviewing VFAs with Ukraine and Moldova and visa liberalisation as a policy process leading to abolishment of visa requirements. The next section will overview the policy environment in which interest groups operate.

1.2. Decision-makers and decision-making procedures

The structure of the section reflects the main elements of EU visa policy towards the Eastern neighbours: visa facilitation process which consists of concluding, implementing and reviewing the VFAs; and visa liberalisation which is centred on visa dialogues and VLAPs and finalised with the amendment to the Council Regulation 539/2001 transferring a neighbouring country from the 'black' to 'white' visa list.

VFAs

Having the right of initiative, the Commission proposes to the Council to initiate negotiations on a VFA or an agreement amending it. Acting upon the negotiating mandate of the Council, the Commission conducts negotiations and signs the text of the agreement which has to be approved through the consent procedure by the EP (before the Lisbon Treaty – the EP was consulted) and then adopted by the Council by QMV.

In the Commission, the profile DG for visa issues is Home Affairs.⁶ There are different

⁶ Before 2010, it was DG Justice and Home Affairs that was split into two DGs (with two

Directorates in DG Home dealing with visa facilitation and visa liberalisation issues. Until the end of 2014, the visa unit of Directorate for Schengen affairs dealt with VFAs and implementation of EU visa acquis (Community Code on Visas), whereas the unit on international affairs of Directorate responsible for Strategy dealt with visa liberalisation and VLAPs.⁷

The Director of Visa Unit is chairperson of the Joint Committee for the implementation of the VFAs from the EU side. The Joint Committee is established by the VFA and composed of EU representatives (the Commission assisted by experts from the member states) and representatives of a partner country. The Committee is tasked to monitor the implementation of the VFA, suggest amendments or additions to the agreement and settle disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the provisions in the agreement. The body meets at least once a year or whenever necessary. In practice, it convenes once a year in Brussels and once a year in the partner country or via a video-conference (Interview 15). Member state representatives are invited to these meetings and also briefed afterwards. As a Commission official explained, the Joint Committee on the implementation of VFA with Ukraine was usually more attended, while that with Moldova, as a rule, drew interest mainly from Romania and Poland (*ibidem*).

In the Council, issues related to VFAs are first dealt with by the Visa Working Party. The Visa Working Party agenda includes VFAs, amendments to VFAs and monitoring of work of the Joint Committee for implementation of the VFAs (Interview 13). Other Council bodies that may deal with VFAs are the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration and the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum

Commissioners) in the second Barosso's Commission (2010-2014).

7 In Jean-Claude Juncker's Commission (2014-2019), the DG Home Affairs was renamed into DG Migration and Home Affairs and reorganisations of directorates and units within the two DGs occurred.

(SCIFA). The latter prepares on a monthly basis the agenda of the Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs (JHA Council). When preparing a negotiating mandate, the Council working groups dealing with visa issues usually consult a corresponding geographic working party, which in the case of the Eastern neighbours is COEST – Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Council 2005a). Above SCIFA, COREPER discusses and approves all agenda items for JHA Council meetings. In home affairs, the role of the six-month rotating Presidency is key in forming the agenda of the Council bodies (Interview 13).

In the EP, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) plays a central role on all visa policy related issues. It is responsible for drafting the EP recommendation on the conclusion of a VFA. Visa policy is also discussed by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) that can be invited by LIBE to draft an opinion on the conclusion of the VFA.

Visa dialogues and VLAPs

The decision to offer a dialogue examining the conditions for visa-free travel to a partner country is taken by the EU Council. The formal decision to launch a visa dialogue is taken bilaterally. In the case of Ukraine, it was agreed at a Ukraine-EU Troika meeting at the level of justice and home affairs ministers in May 2008 and further approved by the EU-Ukraine summit of 9 September 2008. In the case of Moldova, the intention to start such a dialogue in 2010 was declared by the EU-Moldova Cooperation Council on 21 December 2009.

From the EU side, the visa dialogue is chaired by the Commission represented by the Director of the Unit on International Affairs of DG Home. The visa dialogue has two phases: an exploratory phase and operational phase. During the exploratory phase, the

Commission in cooperation with experts from the member states assess the relevant factors for visa liberalisation structured in four blocs: document security, including biometrics; illegal migration, including readmission; public order and security; and external relations. This evaluation includes on-site visits to a partner country and dialogue with the relevant authorities. It allows to formulate recommendations for setting up relevant conditions for visa-free travel which are presented in a “Gap Analysis” (Caras 2011). This report is discussed with the EU member states at the Council working groups meetings. As a result of these discussions, the Council may invite the Commission to draft a VLAP setting up conditions to be met by the partner country before the possible establishment of visa-free travel regime.

When the Commission presents the VLAP to the partner country, the visa dialogue enters the operational stage. The Commission is responsible for monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the VLAP by the partner country. The monitoring and reporting on the first three blocks of a VLAP (document security, illegal migration and public order and security) is carried out by the Unit on International Relations of DG Home. The EEAS is responsible for monitoring and drafting the report on the implementation of the fourth block on external relations and fundamental rights. The Commission and the EEAS also draw on reports of EU member states’ experts which evaluate the progress of the partner country on the sets of benchmarks of the VLAP. The experts are selected by the Commission and the EEAS from the proposals made by the member states. The experts write their reports based on findings of the evaluation missions in the country to which they go together with the staff of the Commission’s DG Home and the EEAS (Interview 9).

The final report on the evaluation of implementation of the VLAP is drafted by the DG

Home and after inter-service consultations is approved by the College (Interview 38). The Commission submits reports to the EP and the Council and also publishes it on its website. When the partner country fulfils the complete set of benchmarks of the first legislation stage of the VLAP, the Commission decides to move the country to the second implementation stage. When Moldova was to be moved to the second stage of the VLAP in 2012, there was a dispute between the Commission and the Council regarding the role of the Council in this process. The Commission argued that it should be the decision of the Commission because it was the process of implementation of the VLAP and there was no decision point for the Council. However, France and Germany insisted that the EU member states to co-decide (*ibidem*). Thus, it was decided that the Council takes the decision to launch the assessment of the benchmarks set out under the second phase upon the Commission's proposal (Interview 40). The Council does this by adopting Council Conclusions. In the case of Ukraine and Georgia, this rule was followed (Council 2012a; Council 2014b; Council 2014a). The decisions on VLAP issues are taken by consensus in the Council (Interview 40).

While the member states base their decision on the Commission's report, they may also have some information coming from their capitals on the issues they are interested in most (Interview 9). In some member states' embassies in the EaP countries, there are staff in charge of internal affairs who monitor VLAP issues (Interview 24).

In contrast to visa liberalisation with the Western Balkan countries, in the case of the EaP countries, there is a role for the EEAS and a bigger role of the member states who have reserved the right to disagree with the Commission's assessment of the VLAP implementation. This is a result of lessons learnt from the liberalisation with Western Balkan countries: in the VLAPs there is more emphasis on the fourth block regulating

fundamental rights, including protection of minorities, and the member states want to ensure that they have control over the implementation process (Trauner & Manigrassi 2014).

Amending Council Regulation 539/2001

When the Commission concludes that a partner country has implemented all the benchmarks and the Council endorses this conclusion (in the case of Moldova, there was no separate Council Conclusions, but the decision was endorsed later by the EaP summit in Vilnius), the Commission initiates the amendment of Council Regulation 539/2001 and drafts its proposal to the EP and the Council who co-decide through the ordinary legislative procedure (before the Lisbon Treaty the EP was consulted). The EP votes upon the recommendation of LIBE committee which may also invite AFET to give its opinion. The Council decides by QMV, however, in practice in case of the Western Balkan countries and Moldova, the decision on transferring these countries from the annex I (the 'black' visa list) to the annex II (the 'white' list) has been taken by unanimity (Interview 1).

In the Council, COEST and COPERER deal with visa dialogue and VLAPs. When an amendment of the Council Regulation 539/2001 is considered, Visa Working Party supported by SCIFA and High-Level Group on Asylum and Migration deal with the issue (Interview 38).

1.3. Overview of groups which have engaged in advocacy

Representatives of 24 groups have been interviewed. Of them, 10 are based in the EaP countries and 14 are based in the EU. For nearly all groups, advocacy on EU visa policy is just one direction of their activity.

The majority of the interviewed groups are public interests groups. Among these groups there are think-tanks which do research and advocacy on European integration related issues. EU visa policy towards European countries is an important part of their work (e.g. European Stability Initiative, PASOS, Viitorul, Stefan Batory Foundation and Open Society Foundations network). Rarely, they almost exclusively dedicate themselves to the visa issues (e.g. Ukrainian NGO “Europe without Barriers”).

There is also a group of youth organisations which promote youth mobility, including visa-free travel to the EU (e.g. European Youth Forum, European Students’ Forum, the Young European Federalists as well as their members in the EU and EaP countries). Another set of public interest groups are NGOs who lobby on the issues covered by the VLAPs (e.g. sexual minority rights, fight against discrimination, fight against corruption, fight against human trafficking).

Four interviewed groups represent business interests. Tourism and international carriages services are those sectoral interests which advocate on visa facilitation and visa liberalisation issues. Tourism associations are interested in minimising the role of visas as an obstacle for bringing more tourists to Europe, while for road carriers associations in an EaP country visa is “a necessary condition for conducting international carriage business” (Interview 33).

While all the interviewed groups lobby on EU visa policy, some of them focus on horizontal (EU legislation on visas) rather than geographic solutions (EU visa policy tools towards the Eastern neighbours). For example, Europe-wide youth organisations such as Europe Youth Forum and AEGEE aim at facilitating travel and stay in the EU for young people. Thus, they advocate for changes to the EU legislation regulating Schengen visas (Visa Code) and long-term visas and residence permits for third country

nationals coming to the EU for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, training or voluntary service. Similarly, EU-based tourist associations look for horizontal solutions such as further simplification of visa issuance through the amendments to the Visa Code which would cover all countries of origin of tourists.

Stronger geographic focus is common for groups that have a specific interest in the Eastern Europe region. For example, umbrella business associations whose members work with the East European countries or public interest groups such as foundations who have partnerships with the Eastern neighbours tend to seek geographic solutions such as visa facilitation agreements and visa liberalisation tools. Groups working in the EaP countries are naturally interested in the geographic tools targeting their countries.

There have been no groups identified lobbying at the EU level against EU visa liberalisation with the Eastern neighbours. While anti-migration parties have been on the rise in Europe (van Spanje 2010; van Spanje 2011), it seems that their influence is not channelled via lobbying in Brussels and that interests of citizens who do not support the idea of a more open Europe are mostly channelled via national politics. The interviewed policymakers and groups did not report lobbying at the EU level against visa liberalisation with East European neighbours of the EU. While anti-migrant moods in Europe have impact on EU policy on migration and asylum as the existing research points out (Hoffmann 2013), it occurs not via EU-level lobbying, but rather through electoral successes of anti-migration parties in the EU member states which either join parliaments and in few cases governments and affect positioning of other political parties on migration (on this issue see Alonso & Fonseca 2012; van Spanje 2010; Van Spanje & Van Der Brug 2007; van Heerden et al. 2014), and also through the improved results of anti-migration parties in the EP elections (Treib 2014; Poenaru 2014;

Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou 2014).

The lack of EU level lobbying can be explained by the fact that anti-migrant groups are also largely nationalist and anti-EU in their rhetoric, thus they may avoid lobbying the EU in order not to legitimise it, and focus on the national channel instead given the EU member states veto powers (see Vanhala 2009 on the influence of organisational identity on choice of advocacy strategies).

Among the two countries in focus, the interviewed groups and policymakers recognised that groups were more active on lobbying on Ukraine than on Moldova. This can be explained by the fact that Ukraine is a bigger country, with a higher number of visa applicants and has been a controversial case in terms of visa liberalisation due to its foreign and domestic policy under Victor Yanukovich's presidency (2010-2014).

In the case of Moldova, much advocacy was done by the Moldovan government itself. For example, Moldova's government organised tours to the border for EU member states diplomats and a campaign targeting 'old' member states (including visits of foreign ministers of Benelux countries in September 2013 to Chisinau; visits of Moldova's foreign minister to European capitals and meetings with interior ministers). The Moldovan groups said that they had not advocated on the content of the amendments to the EU-Moldova VFA leaving it to the government.

In Ukraine, when Viktor Yanukovich's administration had been reluctant to conduct reforms before his complete withdrawal from the conclusion of the Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013, interest groups actively advocated at both the EU and Ukraine's government level to push for VLAP-required legislative changes. Given Yanukovich's backlash in democracy and human rights, the amended EU-Ukraine VFA was an issue of debate in the EU at least twice. In July 2012, the

Commission appeared divided upon the conclusion of the agreement as the vice-president Viviane Reding reportedly blocked it for political reasons, mainly due to the continued imprisoned ex-prime minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko (New Europe 2012). Such a position was also taken by the European People's Party in which Tymoshenko's party is an observer. The Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström defended the agreement arguing that it would facilitate people-to-people contacts and benefit the lives of ordinary Ukrainians (ibidem), which was also an argument of Ukrainian NGOs lobbying for visa-free travel. In the end, the Commission approved the conclusion of the agreement on 23 July 2012 (European Commission 2012). In May 2013, the VFA became an issue of debate again when the EP was to give its consent to the agreement. Human rights groups defending sexual minorities called on the EP to pause the ratification of the agreement because Ukraine's parliament was considering discriminatory legislation against gay and lesbian people. After the arrival of a pro-European government in February 2014, the progress in the fulfilling the benchmarks of the VLAP by Ukraine accelerated and the EU decided to transfer Ukraine to the implementation stage. Thus, non-state actor advocacy chiefly turned to focusing on explaining the visa-related reform progress of Ukraine.

2. Advocacy strategies

2.1. Advocacy objectives

On the basis of the overall goals which are fundamental to the realisation of their interests in EU visa policy and sometimes enshrined in their missions, groups formulate more specific advocacy objectives which they try to achieve in their day-to-day

advocacy work or through specific advocacy campaigns. All groups which I have interviewed for this study have sought a policy change. Most of them aim at visa liberalisation (e.g. abolishment of visa regime) as their ultimate goal and visa facilitation as a temporal solution. Some groups are focusing mostly on the implementation issues, other seek changes to the EU legislation.

Organisations that represent more general interests, for example, the interests of all Ukrainian citizens or European business interests tend to set broader goals related to visa liberalisation or visa facilitation law and practices. For think-tanks whose mission is to spread knowledge and inform policy debate, some of their advocacy objectives are long-term, for example, changing policy discourse. For instance, according to a Kyiv-based NGO whose mission is the abolition of visa barriers in Europe, their first advocacy goal is to stimulate policymakers to review their assumptions on the consequences of visa-free regimes as well as policy instruments and arguments, to substantiate basic assumptions with facts and to have a more profound discussion on the visa policy issue. Their second goal is to draw the attention of policymakers to human rights in the context of visa policy, to freedom of movement and freedom of undertake economic activity (Interview 18). For advocacy groups representing the tourist industry, a long-term objective was to change discourse on EU visa policy by incorporating economic interests and arguments (Interview 31). Reacting to an event or trying to influence certain stages of policy process, an organisation may set out a narrower and tactical advocacy objective. For example, the Ukrainian NGO Europe without Barriers supported by its partners in Poland advocated for temporary suspension of the visa regime for Ukraine as an EU response to Euromaidan protests in Ukraine in 2013-2014 (Interview 29).

Another example of an advocacy objective set broadly is the creation of political coalitions to support visa-free travel. As a director of the No Visa Project which was carried out by the coalition of EU-based and EaP countries based think-tanks stated: “[Our advocacy goal was] to move the debate from readiness to the political will of the EU member states. We aimed to make sure that certain key players – member states and the Commission, [Commissioner for ENP] Stefan Füle’s team, are supporting visa-free travel and that there is a political will [to introduce visa-free travel], if the technical criteria are met by the EaP countries” (Interview 22). A lobbyist who had been involved in the advocacy campaign for the Western Balkans defined their goal as “designing the climate of inevitability of visa-free regime for the Western Balkans: the question was raised not *if* but *how quickly* visa-free travel would be introduced. We needed a critical mass of Commission and member states officials, especially those with attention to the Western Balkan countries” (Interview 35).

Membership organisations which serve their members’ needs or represent the interests of a certain well-defined constituency tend to set very concrete advocacy objectives related to changes in the legislation or implementation practices connected to the needs of their members. Good examples of these are tourist organisations, international carrier groups or youth associations that lobby for easier and cheaper procedures for obtaining visas for their potential clients or members. For instance, the Ukrainian association of international road carriers, while declaring visa-free travel as a strategic goal, focuses its advocacy on such priority objectives as simplification and harmonisation of procedures for obtaining visas for professional drivers and preventing the introduction of extra visa expenses, e.g. fees for services of intermediaries.

This overview of advocacy goals suggests that how they are defined influences the

choice of lobbying strategies. Groups with more ambitious advocacy objectives have to define more comprehensive lobbying strategies and target actors at different levels. Groups which focus on EU visa policy implementation do not need to have such a wide outreach of their advocacy activities and may opt for a narrow set of lobbying tactics as will be discussed in the sections below.

Advocacy objectives reflect the mission of the group, but they are also closely related to other factors such as group resources and lobbying environment. Groups which have more experience of lobbying at the EU level tend to set more realistic and achievable objectives. For example, a representative of a Brussels-based European association advancing sexual minorities rights said that they prefer to limit their advocacy objectives to promotion of the VLAP benchmark on the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in accordance with the EU acquis, while LGBTI groups in Moldova wanted to see non-discrimination on the basis of gender identity to be included too. The European association decided not to lobby for the inclusion of gender identity as there was no EU acquis and it was recognised as an unrealistic advocacy objective (Interview 8).

Defining advocacy objectives also depends on when or at what stage of the of policy cycle groups engage in lobbying. For example, European Stability Initiative (ESI) had advocated for many years for the abolishment of the EU visa regime with the Western Balkan countries before turning its attention to Turkey, Kosovo and Eastern Europe. They launched an active advocacy campaign when the implementation of Road Maps for visa liberalisation with the Western Balkan countries started and aimed to make the process transparent and merit-based (Interview 1). Similarly, Georgian civil society groups engaged in more active advocacy when the VFA agreement entered into force

and the VLAP was granted to their country. Their primary goals were transparency of the EU-Georgia visa facilitation and liberalisation process and more space for civil society engagement (Interview 41).

Looking forward to the section on the measurement of interest group influence, we can see a direct relationship between how the groups define their advocacy objectives and how they are able to measure their influence, i.e. whether they reach their objectives or not. If objectives are concrete points such as costs of visas or ease of certain administrative procedures of visa issuance, it can be easier for them to establish whether they have achieved them or not. If an objective is long-term and broad such as a change of EU visa policy discourse, the measurement can be more difficult as it requires a time lag and it is more difficult to attribute influence to a certain group because many actors and factors could contribute to it. Defining broad and long-term advocacy objectives, groups also are less able to exercise control upon their achievement.

In the previous section, I mentioned that there are a number of groups whose advocacy goals are not related to achieving visa-free regime or visa facilitation, but using EU visa policy tools to reach other objectives. They use EU conditionality related to visa policy to promote policy change within the EaP countries. Thus, their advocacy goals at the EU level relate to EU requirements for visa facilitation or liberalisation. While the major bulk of their advocacy targets the EaP countries' governments, these groups also try to influence the EU's views on how conditions for the EaP countries are formulated and advanced by the EU, and how progress on their implementation is monitored and evaluated. For example, a representative of the Brussels office of a big international NGO says that his group does not advocate on visa liberalisation for freedom of movement as such but as a tool to put conditionality related to democratic governance

and rights on East European countries and Turkey. According to this logic, the NGO “would advocate for VLAP for Georgia because it is a tool we can use for promoting anti-discrimination laws, or Roma integration in case of Moldova, etc” (Interview 43).

Given this link between abolition of the visa regime and domestic reforms in the EaP countries, these groups may actually work against visa facilitation or liberalisation lobbying for preserving the status quo as a temporal solution, as a tactic for pushing policy change in the EaP country. Though these groups are not against visa liberalisation, and in most cases whole-heartedly support it because it will bring benefits for their constituencies too, they may opt to block or delay visa liberalisation in order to achieve their primary advocacy goals. For example, human rights and LGBTI rights groups pushed the EP to postpone the approval of the amended EU-Ukraine VFA demanding the EU to pressure Ukraine’s parliament to revise their discriminatory legislation plans. However, as we will see from the sections below, these groups are rarely named as opponents by pro-visa-free travel groups.

2.2. Advocacy targets and levels of lobbying

When do groups engage in advocacy at the EU level?

Frequently, interest groups become involved in advocacy at the EU level when certain “Europeanisation moments” occur – when the EU enacts an EU-level policy or measure. For example, many interviewed groups state that they engaged in advocacy at the EU level when the VFAs had entered into force or when visa dialogues and VLAPs had been granted to their countries. The “Europeanisation moment” may also occur with the transfer of national visa competences to the EU level. Poland-based groups, who had initially lobbied at the national level for facilitation of travel to Poland for the East Europeans, turned to the EU reacting to Poland’s EU accession which required changes

in national visa policy and later accession to the Schengen zone (Interview 23).

The “Europeanisation moment” may also spur creation of a domestic or transnational coalition to facilitate lobbying at the EU level. In Ukraine, a coalition of NGOs “Europe Without Barriers” was an attempt to pull together organisational resources and funding to do monitoring of implementation of the Ukraine-EU VFA and visa liberalisation with the EU. The Visa-free Europe Coalition that united NGOs in the EU and Eastern Europe was also a reaction to the launch of an active stage of EU visa liberalisation process towards the Eastern neighbours, though cooperation between its members had started long before.

The start of advocacy activities can also be related to the domestic process in the EaP countries. For instance, for a group lobbying for a policy change in the EaP country envisaged by the VLAP, EU-level advocacy starts when discussion on fulfilling EU criteria in the EaP country begins. Such engagement may be a two-way street: the EU starts consultations with civil society and civil society starts targeting the EU bodies on the issue of their interest within the VLAP.

At which policy stages do they lobby?

The interviews reveal that groups rarely engage in lobbying at earlier stages of policymaking, such as agenda setting and policy formulation. Many groups start lobbying when there is a decision taken and implementation begins such as in the case of the conclusion of a VFA, launch of a visa dialogue or granting of a VLAP. The existence of norms in the bilateral relations and formal processes allow civil society groups to act as watchdogs calling the parties, including the EU, to comply with the agreed norms and principles (see also Joachim & Dembinski 2011). Advocacy at the implementation stage permits these groups to then engage in advocacy at the evaluation

and policy reformulation stage (e.g. at the process of evaluation of the implementation of VFA and revision of the agreement).

A plausible explanation is that the initial policymaking stages involve to a great extent the Council of Ministers – “the least accessible” EU institution for lobbies. Groups who say that they have been engaged in advocacy at the policy formulation stage did so within the framework of well-established legislation making process (e.g. revision of EU Visa Code or EU directives) in which the Commission has the exclusive role of legislative initiative and the Council is involved at a later negotiation stage. In the case of bilateral EU visa policy tools such as VLAPs, the procedure is developed by the EU institutions ad hoc, often as an exercise in the struggle for competences. For example, even if it drew on the EU experience in the Western Balkans, a VLAP was an EU policy innovation for Ukraine which was after passed to other EaP countries. In the case of Moldova, a pioneer of visa liberalisation in the East, it took the Commission and the EU member states a couple of months just to agree how the decision on the transfer of the EaP country from the first to the second stage of VLAP implementation would be taken (Interview 40). Thus, groups suffer from the tug-of-war between the EU institutions as the lobbying environment is less clear and stable for them.

This is how a representative of an EU-wide youth umbrella organisation which has lobbied for free of charge visas and a visa-free regime for young people since 2006-2007 explains their advocacy strategy: “We were trying to look in the VFAs with Ukraine, Georgia, but as they were bilateral agreements, it was difficult for us to get information about what was being negotiated. Now the revision of the Visa Code is a centralised process and it concerns the whole EU – it is all-European solution, so we have decided to lobby” (Interview 32).

Advocacy targets

The interviews show that groups mostly engage in advocacy both at the EU and the member state levels. The multi-level lobbying is in line with the expectation of H4 outlined in the Chapter 2: EU visa policy is the ‘easy’ case.

All the interviewed groups report targeting the European Commission. This largely confirms the image of the Commission as the most lobbied EU institution within the Community policy domains. This is also in line with the Commission’s role in EU visa policy in which it has the right of legislative initiative and plays a key role in devising and overseeing the implementation of bilateral tools such as VFAs and VLAPs.

The groups working closely on EU visa policy towards the region mention that they target Commission’s DG Home and its two units working on visa facilitation and visa liberalisation. They also name Commissioner’s for Enlargement and ENP cabinet and Commissioner’s for Home Affairs cabinet as their advocacy targets. Business groups say that they have approached their profile DGs: for example, DG Enterprise and Industry – in the case of tourist associations and DG Transport – in the case of international road carriers associations. Groups working in the EaP countries report reaching out to Commission officials via the EU Delegations on the ground.

Approaching the European Commission is facilitated by a number of access points which the institution provides for interest groups. First, consultations with stakeholders are run ahead of proposing legislative changes (e.g. online consultation for individuals and groups “Improving procedures for obtaining short-stay ‘Schengen’ visas” held in March-June 2013 in the preparation of evaluation of the Visa Code). Second, there are consultations with experts from the EaP states, including those representing civil society, within the process of evaluation of the VLAP implementation. Third, issues

related to the VLAP implementation are also discussed within human rights dialogues held between the EU and the EaP countries once a year. As a rule, the EU representatives meet with local and international human rights groups prior to the meetings with EaP government representatives and debrief them afterwards. In case of Ukraine such a two-day-dialogue session is held within the EU-Ukraine Subcommittee on Justice, Freedom and Security and its first day is dedicated to human rights issues covered in the VLAP (Interview 24). Finally, in the case of Ukraine, there is also an access point for interest groups involvement within the overseeing mechanism of EU visa policy implementation – through the Joint Committee for implementation of the VFA. The EU Delegation in Ukraine also organises briefings before and debriefings for NGOs after the Senior Official meetings at the level of Director General of Home Affairs and Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine (*ibidem*).

Unlike on other policy issues in justice, freedom and security area (see Hoffmann 2013; Poenaru 2014), the European Parliament is not heavily lobbied by groups on the visa facilitation agreements and visa liberalisation. A possible explanation is that on the issues of focus of this case study the Parliament appears as a decision-maker at precise points, such as consent (before 2009 – non-binding recommendation through the consultation procedure) given to the VFAs and co-decision for amending the Council Regulation 539/2001 when an EaP country moves to the “white” visa list. Moreover, the EP is generally supportive of EU visa-free travel with the EaP countries. Groups report lobbying the Parliament if they need to make amendments to the legislation (not the case for policy issues of direct interest to us in this case), or when they want to promote a certain issue in a policy debate. Routes to access the EP also pass through individual members, for instance, Polish MEPs advocating for visa liberalisation, or groups with

interest in relations with a particular EaP country or issue such as Youth Inter-Group.

In one particular instance the EP was more intensively lobbied by the interviewed groups. It was when LGBTI groups asked to pause the conclusion of the amended Ukraine-EU VFA as a leverage on Ukraine to halt its plans to adopt discriminatory legislation. The groups managed to push the rapporteur from LIBE committee to call for debate before the vote acting via ALDE group which is more sensitive to LGBTI rights and individual MEPs. ALDE insisted on a referral back to committee and postponement of the vote (European Parliament 2013: 232). However, the majority of MEPs still voted in favour of the agreement.

Only one interviewed group mentioned that they lobbied the Council of EU bodies on the issue of EU visa policy towards EaP countries (Interview 29). A couple of Brussels-based groups did advocacy in the Council on other regions – the Western Balkans and Russia. This confirms the image of the EU Council as the least accessible institution, but seems also to be connected to the issue of resources necessary to carry out systematic advocacy in the Council and its bodies. A Council representative also explains limited contact with advocacy groups by the fact that the Council acts upon the instructions from the capitals and that the information supplied by groups can go to those policymakers in the capitals who draft these instructions (Interview 40).

The Brussels office of a big international foundation approached the Council asking to publish the the Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel of Russia and EU citizens (Interview 33). They did not succeed, however, and decided to bring this issue to the European Ombudsman who investigates complaints about maladministration in the institutions and bodies of the EU. After his intervention, the Council published the text of the Common Steps. Another EU-based NGO with representation in Brussels

reported briefing representatives of Working Party on Western Balkans and Working Party on Visas as well as having individual meetings in the Council for their advocacy campaign for visa-free regime with the Western Balkan countries (Interview 1). Opportunity to approach the Council bodies can be created by other EU institutions: for example, the EU Delegation in Kyiv organised a NGO briefing for the COEST members dealing with Eastern Europe during the visit of the EU evaluation mission.

Litigating before the EUCJ was not reported, despite the powers of the Court in this policy area. None of the groups mention doing advocacy in the EEAS, apart from consulting an EEAS representative in the framework of the evaluation missions on the VLAP implementation facilitated by the EU Delegation. Nonetheless, the EU Delegation on the ground is frequently the first advocacy target from groups from the EaP countries. First, the personnel of EU Delegations usually nurture contacts with civil society as CSOs are not only recipients of EU aid distributed via the Delegation, but also recognised as important sources of information on domestic developments (e.g. human rights, issues related to the Association Agreements) or progress in the VLAP implementation. Usually, the EU Delegations run local civil society consultations on EU funding tools. EU diplomats are also invited to meetings and events organised by civil society organisations. For example, a director of an NGO in Chisinau reported that the EU ambassador regularly attended meetings of the National Platform of the EaP Civil Society Forum (EaP CSF) at which issues like EU visa policy were discussed (Interview 42).

Second, the EU Delegation is also an access point to other EU institutions as it organises or assists in visits of delegations from the Commission, the EEAS, the Council and the European Parliament that may wish to meet with civil society

representatives too. Importantly, the EU Delegation is in charge of organising meetings with representatives NGOs and international organisations during the EU evaluation missions on the VLAP implementation. Moreover, apart from institutionalised practices, informal consultations between local NGOs, the Commission and the EEAS are also facilitated by the EU Delegation staff. As an EU diplomat in Kyiv says:

“When there is a piece of Ukrainian legislation adopted, its translation is sent to Brussels, then a delegation of experts from the EU member states come to visit. They draft progress reports. When these reports are drafted, we have meetings with UNHCR, anti-discrimination NGOs and other CSOs at which they have a possibility to express their opinions on the reports. We try to include them in these documents. Our cooperation with NGOs is institutionalised, but it depends on a person who works on the dossier in the EU Delegation. With me, groups have very informal and very quick access. I am accessible on my mobile and via facebook. It depends on the individual. Some are more reserved about talking to the groups” (Interview 24).

Most groups recognise the importance of national level advocacy carried out in the EU member states capitals, but only a limited few engage in it. They are mostly EU groups that have resources for conducting activities in the member states or groups from EaP states in partnership with groups from EU countries. These groups organise public events to which they invite policymakers in the EU member states capitals and also hold individual meetings with them. They report targeting Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministries of Interior and Border Guards and, in fewer cases, national Parliaments.

Groups based in a member state usually do at least some part of their advocacy in that member state. One European youth association reported that their national members

approach national governments and parliaments. Though national groups may know national decision-making structures and actors well, it is not always the case that such an advocacy is easy to conduct. A Polish based NGO shares their experiences:

“A year ago we had a meeting in the MFA – it was very painful, we are perceived as a threat. We also organised an exhibition in the Parliament and there was a person from the MFA. He was very critical of us, he said that the MFA was doing everything very well, and we just attacked them and we should not exist. But the other day it was a different person who was much more open to our arguments. We see it is a problem of the system: the MFA as an institution is very resistant to any input or criticism from civil society. Sometimes they attend our meetings, but they sit silently and do not say anything” (Interview 23).

National-level advocacy targeting decision-making in European capitals requires a lot of resources, which is why many groups simply cannot afford it. A director of a Prague based NGO running an advocacy campaign project with groups from other EaP countries said that they did not have many activities in the member states “due to the budget restrictions” (Interview 22).

Groups from the EaP countries target the EU member state embassies on the ground. As a representative of a Moldovan think-tank explained: “The Commission has a positive attitude [towards visa liberalisation], they are not needed to be convinced. There is a need to convince EU diplomats working in the EaP countries. They send negative reports to their capitals on the reform process in the EaP countries” (Interview 27). The Visa-free Europe Coalition, which this group is part of, organised events to present their monitoring reports on progress made by the EaP countries in Chisinau, Kyiv and Tbilisi. The organisers say that representatives of several embassies attended the events.

A Kyiv-based NGO asserted that they pay great importance to work with consulates of the EU member states. According to this group, “consulates are close and not transparent bodies and it is difficult to maintain contact with them. If you work long, build trust and loyalty, then the doors open” (Interview 18). A Georgian civil society organisation working on visa liberalisation also complained about the non-cooperative mood of the EU member state consulates: “They do not even come to the presentations of our reports” (Interview 41). Among the interviewed EaP groups, only one Ukrainian NGO is invited to participate in Local Schengen Cooperation meetings, but as the director says: “We are not allowed to attend the entire meeting, we are permitted to come to present our view of the situation. Even the representatives of the Ukrainian authorities are not allowed to attend these meetings. They are closed meetings” (Interview 18).

The NGO representative also adds that the group has initiated meetings with consulates to check on their visa statistics which they use in their monitoring reports. The interviewee said that their first calls for such meetings provoked surprise, but in the end the consulates agreed to meet, except several EU member states. According to the group representative, the first three countries had appeared as not “friendly” in their monitoring of EU visas issuance (namely, Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK), while in the case of another country (Sweden) it was due to the change of the ambassador. However, in the end, the NGO managed to build trust with the Dutch consulate which agreed on the meeting (*ibidem*).

A representative of the Ukrainian association of international road carriers explains their need to do advocacy at the consular level by their mission to help members of the association get Schengen visas for their drivers. The interviewee says that consulates are

hesitant to maintain contacts with the association as a third party (Interview 33). The association started a practice of having regular meetings with consuls after the EU-Ukraine VFA entered into force. As a rule, they hold bilateral meetings, multilateral meetings in the association or within the Joint Committee on Implementation of EU-Ukraine VFA and trilateral meetings at which a representative of the association, a consul and a representative of Ukraine's MFA are present "in cases when the consulate is not eager to have contact with us" (ibidem).

2.3. Advocacy tactics

The groups report using mainly inside lobbying strategies, with some exceptions. The most widespread tactics are private meetings with policymakers. Groups based outside Brussels occasionally organise advocacy tours to the EU institutions. The EaP based groups try to meet regularly with EU and EU member states representatives on the ground. The groups also report sending position letters and appeals to policymakers (mainly to the Commission, but also to consulates on the ground; and a Polish-based group mentioned correspondence with Polish border guards).

They also spread their monitoring and research reports. For example, a Ukraine-based group publishes annual monitoring of EU visa policy in Ukraine based on sociological surveys of visa applicants and official statistics. The Visa-free Europe Coalition developed the Eastern Partnership Visa Liberalisation Index, a systematic and regularly updated monitor of visa liberalisation between the EU and the six EaP countries which serves for "evidence-based advocacy" both in the EU and in the EaP countries (Europe without Barriers 2014: 6). According to the advocates, the Index is to "help to reduce suspicions about visa-free regime by showing how considerably the EaP states are changing" and "to boost the pace of reforms in the EaP states by demonstrating what

still needs to be done in each of the EaP states as well as by introducing an element of competition” (ibidem: 6-7).

Another frequently mentioned tactic is the organisation of briefings, seminars and conferences to which policymakers are invited. Sometimes public events are organised in the EP in cooperation with MEPs. Groups usually hope that such events will attract more MEPs, though this is not always the case. Few groups have also mentioned participation in the events organised by third actors. An interviewee from a Chisinau-based think-tank says: “We used all advocacy events as twin events. We tried to send our products to the EU, on the one hand, underlying progress made by Moldova, and to Moldovan government, on the other, emphasizing those things which still were not done. It was a stick for Moldova and carrot for the EU” (Interview 27).

Groups use various consultation tools run by the Commission to carry out their advocacy. For VLAP implementation, the European Commission, the EEAS and experts from the member states consult with experts from civil society during the evaluation missions. As an EEAS official explains the value of these consultations: “These meetings with NGOs help us to be better prepared for the meetings with the Ukrainian government, to ask them better questions” (Interview 9). The EU Delegation in the EaP country organises such sessions inviting experts from civil society and international organisations or third country (mainly US) embassies.

In addition to these sessions during the evaluation missions, there are also ad hoc consultations which allow for additional exchange of information, usually done via email and facilitated by the EU Delegation. A Commission official comments on this instrument: “ Whenever I need something on a routine basis, I would turn to the EU Delegation in Kyiv and the Delegation may ask NGOs, in addition to the authorities. So

I see their input in what I get from the EU Delegation. For example, on Roma strategy and action plan, there was the OSF plus 5-6 NGOs, plus the Council of Europe (CoE) because this is an UN and CoE benchmark” (Interview 10). Most of the interviewed groups who participated in such consultations claim that their views are largely present in the Commission’s reports on the VLAP implementation.

For the issues covered by the block 4 of VLAP, the EU Delegation also does periodic round tables. Groups both from the EaP countries and the EU also mention that they are de-briefed on human rights issues by the Commission before the meetings of EU-Moldova Human Rights Dialogue and EU-Ukraine Subcommittee on Justice, Freedom and Security. In Ukraine, at least two groups (one NGO and one business association) reported regularly attending the meetings of the Joint Committee for the VFA implementation. This practice, however, has not been reported by groups in other EaP countries.

The participation in online consultations which the Commission usually runs before initiating changes into EU legislation has rarely been mentioned by groups. The groups which mentioned this tactic add that they try to send their contribution apart or organise a private meeting with Commission officials to pass on their position. An interviewee from a Brussels-based youth umbrella organisation is rather sceptical of this tactic: “Online consultations, a generally available tool, is used by the Commission to attenuate the input from NGOs. When there are hundreds of inputs, it is difficult to say that they have not done what was suggested. This is their method for legitimisation of their own ideas. We encourage our member organisations to participate in the online consultations, but we try to talk to the Commission directly” (Interview 32). A representative of another youth group with members in European countries believes that in online

submissions quantity matters more: “Usually, we sent one contribution from AEGEE and then we ask our members to copy our message, because what really matters for the Commission are numbers. If they see that one million of youth supports it, this will work” (Interview 28). The importance of informal meetings with policymakers emphasised by the interviewees shows that the lobby groups do not regard online consultations run by the Commission as the main channel of their influence on the Commission. For researchers of lobbying and influence, this means that while measuring interest group influence based on the analysis of online consultations (see Klüver 2013), they should treat their results more carefully, considering that some groups may choose to advance their positions informally rather than through the formalised process of consultations.

Outside lobbying tactics are less frequent. They include street actions mainly organised by youth groups, film screenings and photo-exhibitions and media outreach. For example, in partnership with organisations from EU member states, Ukrainian NGO “Europe without Barriers” organised a photo-exhibition “Visas? What’s the reason?” in Brussels, Warsaw, Budapest, Prague and Berlin. It presented portraits of famous Ukrainian journalists, sportsmen and academics who had been refused a visa or had faced difficulties in obtaining permission to enter the EU. The director of the organisation explains that they have tried to exploit the power of visual means. The venues for the exhibition were chosen to try to target policymakers (e.g. in Brussels, the exhibition was organised in the European Parliament and in Warsaw in the Polish Parliament). Targeting a larger public is costly: “In order to organise an exhibition for a wider audience, one needs more funds and street format of pictures” (Interview 18).

Few groups say that they systematically work with European media. Some mention

writing op-eds for Brussels-based EU media outlets targeting policy and expert community, but not to the national media targeting a wider public. One group explains:

“We do not really work with media in Poland. In Poland, [visa policy] is not a very successful topic, while in Ukraine it is. In Ukraine, they write “our people are beaten”, while in Poland they cannot write “we beat”. There was a meeting last year and the MFA invited journalists, they made a critical report of the MFA, and it was more an obstacle for our work. It is easier for us to get to EurActiv or EUObserver. Polish commercial media are not interested in this topic. Sometimes we may send something to people from PAP [Polish Press Agency]. It is easier to get access to officials than to journalists, and journalists tend to write in a biased way” (Interview 23).

Another interviewee from a youth organisation further develops this rationale: “Visa issues are not very popular among the national media, they are interested in the economic crisis, unemployment etc” (Interview 28). The experiences of European groups doing advocacy campaign on visa-free travel with the Western Balkans are very similar. The European Stability Initiative representative comments on media strategies: “We did not want to make this issue public. In countries like Germany or France it is very difficult to convince people on this issue, they fear organised crime or that their jobs will be taken by migrants” (Interview 1). Another lobbyist resolves: “We have never tried to write op-eds in the newspapers. Visa is a technocratic issue that would more benefit from direct pressure from officials” (Interview 35).

A Ukraine-based group refines their approach towards media saying that they mainly try to target outlets such as EUObserver because “if one wants to have a policy change in visa policy, it is a specialist and narrow audience. If we want to speak about human rights in the context of visa policy, then we target national media for a wider public (e.g.

a Polish radio or Finnish newspaper)” (Interview 18). Instead, EaP based groups work to reach their national media to keep their societies informed on EU visa policy and the progress on visa liberalisation related reforms and create pressure on their governments to speed up the reforms (the same media strategy was chosen by European Stability Initiative and its local partners in the Western Balkans).

Street actions are organised by youth groups. For example, the Young European Federalists – JEF-Europe – organise annual visa actions: street actions attracting young people in different member countries, sometimes combined with a conference. In 2011, such an action was organised in Warsaw during the EaP summit. The objective of street actions are two-fold: according to a group representative, they are “to attract the attention of public to the topic, to promote visa-free travel in Europe and mobility for young people” and to “attract people in the countries to this action” (Interview 6). The youth group representative explains that street actions are key to mobilise its members and national sections, while the group secretariat provides them with information and public relations support (*ibidem*). Another youth association says that they rely on outside lobbying because they go for visibility which may also be connected to the needs to compete for funds. This conforms with the literature arguing that advocacy tactics should also be seen as a part of organisational maintenance (Lowery 2007).

To sum up, groups prefer inside lobbying, especially face-to-face meetings with policymakers; they also send letters and appeals and present research reports. While many interviewed groups participate in formal consultations run by the Commission and the EU Delegation in the EaP countries, they emphasized the importance of individual meetings with policymakers outside the consultation format in order to advance their messages. When they employ voice strategies, they reach out to media, but still with a

preference to the EU bubble outlets. They may also organise photo-exhibitions, but again more as a means of appealing to the human nature of the policymakers rather than the general public. Outside lobbying tactics such as street actions are used only by youth member-based groups which rely on them for visibility and the stimulation of their members.

2.4. Alliances

The groups from the EU and the EaP countries seek partnerships to lobby together. As a director of a think-tank based in Chisinau states: “If we want CSOs in Moldova to be better equipped to influence the EU and EU governments, we need to establish partnerships with EU-based organisations” (Interview 42). Such partnerships help EU-based organisations to obtain detailed information about the developments on the ground which the EU institutions need, while EaP organisations can receive tools and experience of how to do advocacy to the EU level, access to policymakers in Brussels and the member state capitals and to resources for lobbying.

Eleven public interest groups among the interviewed are united in the Visa-free Europe Coalition. The coalition was created in November 2010 by 20 groups and by 2015 it had grown to over 50 members, mainly from post-communist Europe on both sides of the EU border. A representative of the Stefan Batory Foundation that was behind the initiative explains the main motivation behind establishing the coalition: “[W]e believed that the voice of a number of organisations would be heard better and first members of the coalition were partners of the Foundation. There is a financial aspect. The Foundation has its own funds, whereas other organisations depend on opportunities to get funding for their visa-free projects” (Interview 23). The coalition effect gives the groups advocating on the same issue more credibility in the eyes of policymakers (both

in the EU, but also in the EaP countries) and allows for the sharing of resources.

Meanwhile, as a Ukrainian member of the coalition said, there are few effective allies. According to the interviewee, 4-5 members of the Visa-free Europe Coalition actively engage in advocacy on this issue (Interview 18). Indeed, a number of the Coalition members interviewed for this study stated that they support the coalition, but they are not really involved as the focus of their key advocacy is different.

The members of the Coalition wrote joint letters to the Commission on EU visa issues and established the EaP Visa Liberalisation Index mentioned above. However, there are still many advocacy activities which active coalition members conduct on their own. To a certain extent, it is related to the need to preserve group identity through visibility which is important when they compete for funds with other groups.

Business groups undertook a coordinated lobbying action upon the initiative of a German industry association group dealing with the EU Eastern neighbours. The German organisation involved in the domestic advocacy campaign to lift visa barriers for European neighbours published a position paper “Roads to Visa-Free Travel” about the cost of visa barriers for business in Europe based on a survey of their member organisations. Drawing on this position paper, a coalition of eight industry associations across the EU countries adopted a common position paper “Economic Growth instead of Visa Barriers” presented in Brussels and the member state capitals in July 2012 in which it advocated for deregulation of business visas for Russia, Turkey, EaP countries and Kazakhstan and the removal of business visa barriers in Europe by 2018 (Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft 2012). This action was coordinated by Business Europe, though the name of this Europe-wide business umbrella group did not appear on the position paper.

Groups also tend to work in informal coalitions or partnerships, usually sector-based. For example, EU-wide youth associations tend to cooperate and publish common statements. The same is true of industry associations in the tourism sector. It is noteworthy that although public interest and business interest groups share the same vision of a visa-free Europe, cooperation between them has been reported only in a few cases and mostly based on personal relationships between group representatives. Civil society groups may acknowledge that some business groups are on their side, but seldom name them as their allies. Business groups are more open to name NGOs as their allies. A representative of the German business association revealed that after they had started to advocate on visa-free travel, they received positive feedback from NGOs: “Then we joined forces with NGOs, we started to work with them, though they are normally sceptical towards business. NGOs’ work helps me with arguments for visa liberalisation and you need to work at European level on this issue too” (Interview 5).

3. Influence and its determinants

3.1. Measurement: degree and type

The overall achievement of advocacy objectives appears partial to the groups’ self-assessment. None of the groups state that they have achieved all their objectives. Half of the groups describe having achieved their objectives to a certain degree. Three groups explicitly state that they were not influential and did not reach their goals. Some groups could not give a definite answer about achievement of their advocacy goals.

Whereas non-state advocates teaming up with their strategic allies in the EU have contributed to promoting the issue of visa-free travel for non-EU European countries

onto the EU agenda – first in the case of the Western Balkans and then in the case of the Eastern neighbourhood, their involvement and influence is more visible at later stages of the policy process – during implementation and evaluation. For most of them the Council bodies which take strategic decisions are simply not accessible. This is in line with the literature on the participation of non-state actors in international organisations and lobbying in the EU that show limited access to intergovernmental bodies.

Influence has been most often reported on technical issues. Groups speak of achievement of their objectives as related to the transparency of EU documents, evaluation by the Commission of the progress made by the EaP countries in the VLAP implementation, inserting provisions in the amended VFA, and certain aspects of visa issuing practices by EU consulates. Influence on technical issues is also more traceable and recognisable as groups can check whether the proposals they have made appear in final policy documents and policymakers can also state which groups have been consulted on the given issues.

The interviews with groups show that it is not an easy task for groups to assess their influence and measure its degree. Most groups tried to avoid answering the question about the degree of their influence when it was posed (“To what extent did you achieve your advocacy objectives: achieved all of your objectives, most, about half, few, or none?”). The semi-structured format of interviews does not favour them choosing an option from the list. Instead most go for an open answer.

The most common difficulty for groups is an attribution of the policy outcome to their advocacy efforts. While recognising that the desired outcome was achieved, the interviewed groups often acknowledge that they cannot say for sure whether it was result of their advocacy or whether other factors intervened and were more powerful in

determining the policy outcome. For example, a director of a Prague-based association shares: “After the recent meeting in May in Prague with the participation of our Ukrainian partners and representatives of the Czech ministry of interior, the Czechs relaxed their visa rules. But we never knew whether it was our push or if they were going to do this anyway” (Interview 22). In a similar vein, a representative of a Warsaw-based group says: “A year ago we had a meeting in the MFA and we were trying to suggest softly that Polish consulates had to issue more long-term multi-entry visas. The results somewhat improved, but only to a certain extent: before there were a few visas from three to five years duration and now we have fifteen. It may be our success that they increased the number of this type of visas issued, but it is difficult to establish a link”(Interview 23).

Especially, on more strategic issues, such as the change of policy trend or issue reframing, as in the case of economisation of visa policy or emphasising the human rights aspect of visa policy, when there may be an array of factors influencing the shifts in EU policy, the attribution to individual or even collective advocacy efforts is difficult, if possible at all. This quotation from a lobbyist from a Brussels-based EU tourism industry association demonstrates the difficulty of attributing the policy outcome to a single factor:

“For many years ago I have followed the discussions in the Council on visa policy as prior to this position I worked for the Portuguese Permanent Representation in Brussels. There is a huge progress in how visa policy is viewed now. Before, the economic vision was not listened to. The Council and the Commission did not listen to the economic interests. Now the Commission does listen and it is a huge progress that along with security reasons they take into account the economic vision too. What has played a primary role in this change – the economic crisis in

Europe or tourism industry advocacy? I think both. It has been a priority in the agenda of the tourism industry” (Interview 31).

In some cases, talking to policymakers with which groups interact helps clarify to what extent the policy outcome can be attributed to non-state actor advocacy, if at all. For example, an official working in the EU Delegation in Kyiv believed that local civil society groups are influential as they are the key sources of information to assess the progress achieved by the Ukrainian government in the implementation of the VLAP (Interview 24). Though it must be acknowledged that policymakers tend to hesitate speaking of influence of third actors on their decisions, especially if it concerns consuls who issue visas upon their own discretion.

The interviews also reveal that few groups conduct a systematic evaluation of their own advocacy efforts. And even if they do so, they say that they have problems with workable indicators. In most cases, such evaluation is purely intuitive. As one group states:

“We do not assess every action in a mathematical way. What is most important for us is that the issue is on the agenda, and it is important and it reappears all the time. It is very difficult to assess our impact, oftentimes it is not possible. For example, we do not really know if the fact that the Polish consul in Kyiv issues more long-term multi-entry visas is a result of our action or not. What we know for sure that when an official from the MFA takes fifty copies of our report to distribute in the field (to Polish consulates abroad), it is an indicator that our voice is welcome. Our aim is to get through with our argument. If we have got through, it is good. A change of policy is not always palpable” (Interview 23).

A Brussels-based advocate shares the experiences of his organisation: “We had discussions at the foundation on how to evaluate the impact. In the end we decided that

the most important is when it has happened. Most of the mechanisms of evaluation are so expensive that it is better to dedicate efforts to promote the goal and if it happens, it is good” (Interview 43).

The interviews have also shown that different methods of measuring influence can lead to different results, something that was already highlighted in the literature (Dür 2008b). For example, if one applies only process tracing method one may ascertain that the LGBTI groups were not able to achieve their declared goal to postpone the EP’s decision on the amended EU-Ukraine VFA. However when speaking to the groups themselves and their partners one learns that what may appear to be a failed advocacy may actually be deemed a success, as the publicly declared goal and the one that the group established for itself as desirable differ. The groups have managed to ignite parliamentary debate on their issue of concern, as well as highlight it in the press. In this case the EP paid greater attention to the issue, talking to the Ukrainian counterparts, and in the end the plans to approve discriminatory legislation in Ukraine were stopped. As the group representative estimates their influence on the EP decision: “We were happy with it. It was the best possible outcome. A few weeks later there was a delegation of the Ukrainian parliament to discuss this issue in the EP” (Interview 8). A representative of the partner organisation explains further: “One can ponder whether it was successful or not, but in the end the issue has been put on the agenda - MEPs met with Ukraine’s Ambassador Yelisieiev and raised their concerns on the issue” (Interview 43). This example shows that the assessment of attributed influence method can give a different picture to the process tracing alone, because how the groups set their goals and how they assess their achievement may be different from the simple criteria of whether the publicly declared goal was achieved or not.

To conclude, groups partially achieve their advocacy objectives. Their influence is most visible on technical issues dealt with by the Commission or EU Delegation during the implementation and evaluation stages of the policy process. This, however, means that non-state actors struggle to achieve more substantial influence on EU visa policy towards the Eastern neighbours. Whereas the Commission and the Parliament are seen as more in favour of visa-free travel, the national governments, in particular those of a number of 'old' EU members, are more concerned with the security risks of visa-free travel and are more resistant to changes to the status quo. While pro-visa-free travel groups have the support of the 'new' member states, given the fact that the Council relies on de facto unanimity, the security-minded Council members have been able to introduce procedural and substantive measures that are prolonging the visa liberalisation process. In this case, the groups advocating visa-free travel focus on greater transparency of the visa process and merit-based assessment of the progress in visa liberalisation-related reforms made by the EaP countries, as well as the presentation of a wide range of arguments explaining why visa liberalisation is beneficial for the EU as a whole.

3.2. Factors explaining influence

Expertise and information are the most frequently named factors determining interest group influence highlighted by both groups and policymakers. This conforms with the minimal conception of lobbying as "the informal exchange of information with public authorities" (Van Schendelen 1994: 3). Given that the groups most frequently mentioned the Commission as a lobbying target and given the Commission's needs in technical expertise and information, this finding is in line with the literature.

One group pointed out: "When we approach the European Commission, what matters is

high-quality expertise, the language of data which they do not have, exclusive data (e.g. on duration of multi-entry visas)” (Interview 18). A Commission official explained the value of interaction with NGOs: “They have information on the ground and they contextualise this information for us. Because in Ukraine we have a different political culture to the EU member states, NGOs provide a reality check. I have to treat their information with caution, though. They are not only NGOs, they also do advocacy, there is an internal logic to the way they work and why they say certain things to me” (Interview 10). An official working in the EU Delegation in Kyiv describes the role of Ukrainian groups in a similar vein: “The EU experts need insiders in order to know details [about policymaking process on VLAP related legislative acts in Ukraine]. We in the Delegation are not able to follow these nitty-gritty details, we do not have such capacities. We would need to have a person who would be a diplomat – a lobbyist who would go and meet the members of the Ukrainian parliament...I also follow other themes: Ukraine’s relations with Russia, energy, Maidan. There is no capacity to monitor this topic. That’s why we need experts from NGOs” (Interview 17). A MEP summed up this viewpoint: “NGOs often deliver information you cannot get from politicians or the media” (Interview 39).

Expertise and information on the developments in the EaP countries are important *resources* which groups can pass to policymakers. What also matters is information that helps groups to understand the policy process and know when to advocate, who to target and with what kind of argument. As a Commission official put it: “You need to know the context, the inherent logic of the process in order to put your small or big thing in” (Interview 10). She here referred to an international organisation (not an interest group) as a positive example of an advocate understanding the peculiarities of the policy

process: “They want to use the VLAP as an engine for their cause to tackle deficiencies of the asylum system. We explained them that the issues of their concern could be dealt within the implementation stage of the VLAP. In the end, during our meeting with the evaluation mission in Kyiv, they passed us a note in which they outlined those issues which concern the legislative framework and it appeared in our report. This is a constructive attitude to see how your interests can fit into the system” (ibidem). To emphasise the point that not knowing the policy framework impedes successful advocacy, there is a negative example provided of interaction with advocacy groups by another Commission official: “The data they presented was right, but they seemingly did not understand what the VFA was about. It was when the new VFAs entered into force, but they were presenting old cases and trying to apply the new rules to them” (Interview 15).

Another factor of *group-level characteristics* which is often recognised as important for successful advocacy is experience. Several groups mention that the transfer of advocacy experience from other groups facilitated their work or that experience in lobbying the EU facilitates the achievement of their objectives. A Brussels-based advocate reveals that pushing for realistic goals and understanding the framework in which politicians and diplomats work are among key factors defining the group influence (Interview 8). Experience also enables groups to design a better advocacy strategy, learning how to effectively use certain advocacy tactics, fully exploiting existing contacts and attracting partners, and better understanding interests of policymakers in the interaction with advocates. Several groups and policymakers mention a group’s credibility or reputation as a factor explaining advocates’ influence. Credibility often comes with experience of interacting with policymakers and building relationships based on trust and with a good

record of reliable information which groups provide.

As most of the groups are public interest groups, funding is also crucial for them to undertake advocacy. These groups often depend on public funding coming from the Commission or the EU member states or private funds. Several groups say that they have failed to implement certain advocacy tactics which they envisaged (e.g. several groups speak of making a website with personal visa stories for which they cannot find funding; one group would like to create a documentary film or a big photo exhibition for which they have not been able to attract funds yet) or important elements of their advocacy strategies (e.g. lobbying at the member states' level in the European capitals) or have discontinued their efforts due to the lack of funding. For EU-based groups, funding also allows them to attract partners in the EaP countries where CSOs are less resourceful. Several youth groups relying on volunteering recognise their low membership and lack of experience to undertake systematic advocacy on given issues.

Brussels-based groups acknowledge that their presence in Brussels facilitates their advocacy success. As one advocate reveals:

“When one is sitting in Warsaw it is very difficult to understand what is going on here, in Brussels. I thought the policy process was transparent and it was easy to get the information, but then I realised how I get most of my information. It is through private meetings with Ukrainian or Moldovan diplomats, or people you know in the Commission. It is mostly due to informal networks. I knew X [desk officer for Ukraine and Moldova in the Commission's DG Home Affairs]. I remember after the first meeting with her, I was sending her emails and she would never reply. She would call me and then we would talk or we would meet for a coffee. She did not want to put these things in writing. It is difficult to know all this when you are not even based in Brussels and you do not have this kind of informal

contacts. You cannot really influence the process” (Interview 43).

In a number of cases interest groups acknowledge that they have not been able to achieve all or most of their goals due to the drawbacks in advocacy *strategies*. Advocacy strategies include decisions on when to lobby, whom, how, what objectives to set and what arguments and information to employ. For example, one group said that they could not conduct advocacy in the EU member states reluctant to abolish visas while it was necessary to approach their goal. Several groups acknowledge that their advocacy strategy would benefit if they could introduce some elements of outside lobbying tactics, allowing them to show the ‘human stories’ behind visa applications to a wider public. However, in both examples, the groups claim that they did not have the resources to implement a more effective – as they saw it – advocacy strategy. In some cases, despite the fact that groups undertook advocacy, some elements of their strategy were mistaken. This is well illustrated by an advocacy tour made by several NGOs from an EU member state and EaP countries with the support of their Brussels-based partner organisation as recounted by a representative of the latter:

“They said they wanted to do lobbying, but in a way the trip was organised, they hardly can target the most important decision-makers now – the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States. First, there was an event in the Parliament organised by a Polish MEP. Why to approach the Parliament, if the Parliament has no role about the process now? Now it is the Commission and the Council [taking] the decision on Moldova. OK, they wanted to go to the EP because they have a friend among the MEPs and they wanted to have an event in the EP. But in the end, this MEP appeared there for only 15 minutes and left. He also did not fulfil his promise of bringing other MEPs in. In the end, there was just few assistants and the group can say it has convinced them. But it was an empty event. Next day they

went to the Commission DG Home. They had a contact with an official who gathered other people from Visa Unit and International Affairs Unit dealing with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The meeting was OK, but they did not know all the nitty-gritty details the Commission was interested in. They say: OK, Ukraine still has to adopt an anti-discrimination and anti-corruption law, but the Commission knows it. The Commission people asked them questions about what is going on with these laws in the Parliament, at what stage they are, who is in favour and who is against. [The group from EU member state] could not answer these questions... They did not really prepare, they did not do their homework” (Interview 43).

Two Commission officials share their impressions about the same meeting:

“We were quite surprised how they are not mastering the process, we are not speaking the same language. Maybe it is a problem of human resources and that there is a new person” (Interview 10).

“The data they presented was right, but they seemingly did not understand what the VFA was about. ... Local NGOs from Ukraine are more accurate than NGOs from the EU” (Interview 15).

From this illustration, one can see that designing an effective advocacy strategy is an important part of achieving advocacy goals. Groups’ resources may limit their ability to implement the most effective advocacy strategy, but even with the limited available resources a well designed advocacy strategy may still give desired results.

Speaking of the role of *institutional factors*, several groups refer to access to policymakers, personal relations with them and the culture of dealing with third parties within the institutions they target. The groups underline that access varies greatly: while it is easier to meet with representatives of the EU Delegation, Commission and the EP, the EU member states consulates are usually closed and non-receptive to NGOs which

impedes lobbying on Schengen visa issuance matters. This variation of access across institutions seem to be in line with the major bulk of interest group literature that presents the Commission and the Parliament as relatively accessible venues, in comparison with the Council (Greenwood 2007). The literature on NSA access to international organisations also points to weaker access during the decision-making and enforcement stages, as member states do not want to allow the involvement of outsiders due to higher sovereignty costs (Steffek 2010; Tallberg et al. 2014).

However, even having access to the decision-makers does not always guarantee influence. There is a good illustration of a business group which has access to the Commission through the Joint Committee for the Implementation of the EU-Ukraine VFA:

“In 2008, when the VFA implementation had started, we passed the list of all breaches of the VFA by consulates (e.g. on extra fees, extra documents, limited term of visas issued, or when consulates lower the category of visa issuing a visa with month or three-month validity after a visa with a year validity). However, there was no quick reaction from the Joint Committee. In 2009 we came to the next Joint Committee meeting and inquired about the list, but there was no reaction. There was a new person chairing the Committee and he said that his predecessor did not pass the list to him. Maybe in other spheres such as tourist visas, the Joint Committee is helpful, but not in our sphere. We pass the information, but it gets stuck” (Interview 33).

Finally, what is of interest for us in this study is the extent to which alliances with key policymakers facilitate the achievement of advocacy goals (H2). Not many groups mention this when listing factors influencing successful advocacy. However, a number of them recognise that having “powerful sponsors at the governmental level”, “friends in

the EU government”, “common interests” with decision-makers or the “supportive stance” of an EU institution or member state help them to achieve their objectives or facilitated their advocacy efforts. In the case of the Western Balkans, the two interviewed NGOs acknowledged that support for visa-free travel among key EU institutions and member states, or at least not facing strong opposition among the member states, made the process to move faster (Interviews 1, 35).

Conclusion

The EU visa policy towards the Eastern neighbours is not lobbied as intensively as other Community-level policy, for example, related to trade or the internal market. Many groups have chosen to advocate on horizontal solutions (e.g. visa facilitation through changes to the Visa Code). Geographical focus on visa facilitation and visa liberalisation for the EaP countries is prioritised by the groups directly affected by the existing visa regimes (e.g. groups coming from or having links with those countries).

The interviewed groups advocate at both EU and national level, even the groups coming from EU member states engage in multi-level lobbying which reflects the communitarised nature of EU visa policy. This confirms the hypothesis H4 outlined in Chapter 2. All interviewed groups seek policy change advocating for visa facilitation and/or visa liberalisation, so it is not possible to conclude to what extent H3 hypothesis holds. Nevertheless, it appears that pro-visa-free groups find it difficult to advance their positions on more political issues and move beyond the status quo protected by the majority of the member states who favour a gradual and slow process of visa liberalisation.

There also exists a category of groups that use EU visa liberalisation as a tool to push for domestic reforms in the EaP countries, for example, to fight against corruption and discrimination and for the protection of minorities. These groups lobby in two different arenas – the EU and an EaP country. While lobbying the EaP country government they try to use the EU as an ally in domestic advocacy, therefore asking the EU to apply strict conditionality towards the EaP government. Many of these groups are from the EaP countries, thus while trying to use the VLAP as a reform tool, they are not interested in delaying visa liberalisation. Hence, while adopting their advocacy strategies, they navigate between their demands of domestic reforms and the benefits of visa-free travel.

The Commission is the most lobbied institution in this domain, which is logical given its powers over visa facilitation and the visa liberalisation process. The Parliament is much less targeted, partly because its role comes at the very end of the process and partly because it is largely supportive of visa liberalisation. The Council is hardly lobbied at all, while more advocacy goes via the national route which reflects the powers the member states possess in EU visa policy across the entire policy cycle. The diplomatic representations of the Union and the member states in the EaP countries are targets for the groups based there. The Commission is also a relatively easy target to lobby given the access it grants to the groups. The same can be said about the EU Delegation which has institutionalised practices of consultations with local groups. The advocacy in the Council or the EU member states' capitals requires more resources such as presence in Brussels and advocacy trips to the EU capitals or partnerships with EU-based organisations. Many of the lobby groups come from the EaP countries or they are NGOs stripped of necessary resources. Even for business groups, visas is usually one of many issues they lobby on, so they also complain about the scarcity of resources in

order to systematically target more actors across the EU.

The groups mainly rely on inside lobbying tactics. Media outreach is barely employed and if it is, groups target mostly specialised Brussels-based outlets. Protest tactics are employed by certain types of groups (i.e. membership-based youth organisations at national level) and seem to serve more for organisational maintenance than to seek influence on policy outcomes. Groups tend to establish transnational partnerships and coalitions uniting groups with similar interests from EU and EaP countries. However, there are no cross-sector (business-civil society) pro-visa-free travel coalitions, though cooperation on an inter-personal level between business and public interest groups exists.

Most groups report achieving partial influence on the issues which they have advocated. The interest group influence has been traceable on technical issues (e.g. transparency of EU documents, Commission's evaluations of the implementation of VLAPs by the EaP countries, some provisions in the amended VFAs, certain aspects of visa issuing practices by EU consulates).

The research also reveals important methodological difficulties in measuring influence. The interviews show that groups find it difficult to assess their influence as they often cannot attribute the obtained policy outcome to their advocacy efforts or define the degree of their influence. It also comes out that most groups do not measure their influence systematically. Cross-assessment by policymakers can help to control for attribution, but it should be taken into account that policymakers are sometimes reluctant to speak of the influence of third parties on their decisions. Nevertheless, the methodological triangulation – the combination of the assessment of attributed influence with process tracing – improves measurement. As we have seen in the case of lobbying

the EP on the amended EU-Ukraine VFA, the application of two methods allows compensation for the drawbacks of each of them, at least to a certain degree, and a clearer picture of interest group influence.

The groups do not report counterlobbying at the EU level, though some of them acknowledge that at the national level anti-migrant parties and public opinion are hostile towards a more open visa policy. The groups mostly claim that the opposition – or the other side – are the member states or specific policymakers (e.g. ministry of interior) and political actors (e.g. conservative parties in the national parliament) within those member states. The Commission and the Parliament are generally seen as having a pro-visa liberalisation stance as well as the ‘new’ member states, though the positions of different agencies or individual members are nuanced mainly due to the extent of conditionality attached to visa facilitation and visa liberalisation. Having powerful allies among policymakers has been recognised as a key factor of advocacy success by a number of groups (in line with the H2 hypothesis). Such allies may be institutions with similar interests (e.g. the Commission, the European Parliament, a friendly MFA or Ministry of Economy) or staff at these institutions who share information and are open to group input.

The analysis shows that despite communitarisation of this area since the Amsterdam Treaty, EU visa policy is still firmly controlled by the EU member states which take part in agenda setting, policy formulation, decision-making and enforcement of the EU visa policy at the consular level. This confirms the results of other studies looking into policy change in other areas of Justice and Home Affairs (see Hoffmann 2013; Ripoll Servent & Trauner 2014). While formally visa policy is under the Community method, member states attempt to control the decision-making process and restrict the

Commission's autonomy as the inter-institutional dispute on the VLAP management in the case of Moldova has shown. Moreover, groups' access remains restricted to decision-making in the Council and enforcement stages (EU member state consulate practices of visa issuance), as it has been predicted by the literature on institutional access to international institutions which associates these stages with high sovereignty costs for member states (Steffek 2010; Tallberg et al. 2014). Despite some advocacy successes, particularly those related to increased transparency and civil society inclusion in the policy process and contributions to the evaluation of progress made by the EaP governments in the VLAP implementation and facilitation of visa issuance practices, it appears that civil society groups which have mobilised for visa-free travel advocacy (and often sided with the 'new' member states and EaP governments) are not powerful (resourceful) enough to resist decision-makers with more restrictive views on the visa liberalisation policy.

Public interest groups, the bulk of which are also concentrated in the EaP countries, do not have enough resources to design and implement effective lobbying strategies, especially when targeting the hesitant or neutral member states. Business groups claim to be in favour of visa-free travel for the Eastern neighbours, but few engage in systematic lobbying. The EU-based groups who engage in lobbying on EU visa policy towards the Eastern neighbours in the majority of cases come from the 'new' member states which are generally supportive of a more facilitated visa regime and smoother process of visa liberalisation.

Whereas the institutional factors explain the limits of overall interest group influence in this case, group-level characteristics play a potent role in explaining the variation in advocacy success among groups. Material resources, including presence in Brussels and

funding, previous experience in lobbying the EU, sector-based expertise and information on-the-ground developments are seen crucial by groups to be able to advance their goals. Learning and experience-sharing also appear to be important conditions of successful advocacy.

The interviews with groups point out that experienced advocates tend to “maximise” their influence by establishing “realistic” advocacy objectives, or in other words, seek a lesser degree of policy change taking into account the policy framework. While de facto playing a role of a technical ‘helper’ of the Commission may not lead to a significant policy change in the visa liberalisation process, the small issues which the groups succeed to push through can be presented as an advocacy success that the advocates also need to justify their work to their members and sponsors. Thus, the ‘logic of support’ is at times as important for groups as the ‘logic of influence’ (see Lowery 2007; Berkhout 2013). This strategy could be captured only due to the application of assessment of attributed influence, while process tracing and gauging the degree of preference attainment hide this nuance.

This chapter adds to the literature on lobbying and influence of interest groups in the EU by looking into a policy area which has so far received little scholarly attention. It also contributes to the literature on policymaking in the external dimension of EU internal security by examining the role of non-state actors. In sum, it seems that institutional context has a great potential to explain interest groups’ access and influence in EU policymaking. Despite the fact that EU visa policy has been communitarised, the member states still remain in control at the decision-making, enforcement and evaluation stages, whereas access of non-state actors suffers in the areas which are associated with high sovereignty costs. Moreover, in line with literature on non-state

actors' participation in policymaking, security policy is one of those policy fields shielded from access to outsiders (Steffek 2010; Tallberg et al. 2014). This seems to be the case of EU visa policy which has suffered from securitisation of EU migration policy too. However, groups, including those coming from the EU neighbouring states, become involved in EU lobbying trying to adopt multi-level advocacy strategies and manage to achieve a certain degree of influence. In doing so, they try to secure alliances with key decision-makers. However, in order to be able to say more as to what extent policy regime can account for variation in interest group influence, we have to examine the cases which are close to the intergovernmental method which will be analysed to the next two chapters.

Chapter 4. EU policy of CFSP sanctions towards

Belarus

Introduction

In this chapter I examine advocacy strategies and the influence of interest groups on CSFP sanctions towards Belarus. This policy case is situated closer to the intergovernmental extreme as the powers of supranational actors are limited. The Commission can monitor the implementation of measures that fall within the scope of the Union's competence and has the right to propose regulations implementing restrictive measures under the Union competence which is shared with the High Representative since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. The EU Court of Justice has judicial powers to monitor compliance when the Union measures are applied and, since the Lisbon Treaty is in force, to review the legality of restrictive measures taken by the EU against natural and legal persons.

According to the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2, I expect that interest groups are likely to achieve the lower degree of influence in EU sanctions policy towards Belarus than in the case of EU visa policy towards Eastern partner countries, as this case is closer to the intergovernmental extreme (H1). I also expect that groups which have allies among key decision-makers are likely to achieve higher degrees of influence (H2). Furthermore, it is hypothesised that groups which seek to preserve the status quo tend to be more influential than groups promoting a policy change due to the power of a member state's veto in the intergovernmental arrangements (H3). Finally, it is expected that groups tend to adopt advocacy strategies targeting policy actors at both EU and

member states level (H4).

The literature on EU sanctions sets out a role for non-state actors in this foreign policy area (Giumelli 2013). NGOs and media are trying to influence EU sanctions policy during the agenda-setting stage by raising the visibility and salience of certain events such as human rights violations in third countries (see also Murdie & Peksen 2012). Their value for policymakers derives from their expertise and knowledge of the reality on the ground (Giumelli 2013: 32). NGOs may also target private actors to push them to introduce private sanctions and influence public opinion in order to demand more normative behaviour of states initiating sanctions (Kowalewski 2013). Business actors are more involved when sanctions are designed and may try to block restrictive measures which are seen as negatively affecting them. They also may provide technical expertise to policymakers that can enhance the effectiveness of EU sanctions (Giumelli 2013: 33). NGOs and the media are important during the implementation and evaluation stages as they possess specific expertise on the impact of sanctions on third countries and possible violations which does not exist at the EU level (*ibidem*). This literature gives us certain assumptions as to what kind of groups will engage at which stages of the policy cycle and what advocacy strategies they are likely to adopt in our case study.

The history of EU-Belarus relations has been marked by EU sanctions since the country slid into authoritarian rule after President Aleksandr Lukashenka came to power in 1994. Therefore, Belarus is chosen as a case to study lobbying on a CFSP-governed issue as the neighbour of the Union with the longest record of being under EU's restrictive measures. Moreover, the EU has pursued a two-track strategy towards the East European country, limiting relations with the authorities and supporting pro-democracy non-state actors. Belarus has never become a signatory of the Partnership

and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which the EU, a basis for contractual relations with the post-soviet states in 1990s; it does not participate in the ENP and the EaP bilateral track. Instead, the EU has increasingly supported Belarusian civil society groups.

This chapter looks at interest groups' involvement in the current sanctions regime which was initiated in 2004 and further modified in 2006, 2008, 2011 and 2012 when new categories or new types of measures were introduced. While the ambition of this chapter is to overview the EU sanctions policy towards Belarus in 2004-2014, given the scarcity of data on the earlier years, the focus will tilt towards the second half of this decade, namely the events preceding and following the post-electoral crackdown of December 2010 in Belarus and the EU reaction to it with a new wave of sanctions.

As a part of the field research for this case study, 50 interviews were conducted between May 2013 and September 2014 with interlocutors in Brussels, Minsk, Berlin, Warsaw, Vilnius and other locations. The interviews took place with representatives of interest groups, policymakers, experts and donors to civil society in Belarus. The research also draws on the analysis of EU policy documents, media reports and secondary literature looking at the EU-Belarus relations (Bosse 2012; Bosse & Korosteleva-Polglase 2009; Marin 2011; Korosteleva 2012; Portela 2011; Giumelli 2013; Jarabik & Rabagliati 2007), developments in Belarus (Balmaceda et al. 2009; Wilson 2011; Сіліцкі 2012; Korosteleva 2015), EU member states policies towards Belarus (Fedorowicz 2012; Fedorowicz 2009; Kłysiński 2013; Bošs et al. 2012; Potjomkina 2014) and the role of non-state actors in EU policy towards Belarus (Kłysiński 2013; Зуйкова 2013).

The chapter is divided in three sections. The first section sketches the EU sanctions policy towards Belarus and describes key policy actors and procedures of CFSP sanctions. It also overviews interest groups which have engaged in advocacy on CFSP

sanctions on Belarus and who have been interviewed for this study. The second section analyses advocacy strategies, including advocacy objectives, venues and targets, tactics and coalition building. The third section provides findings on interest group influence in the studied case and factors explaining it. The conclusion of this chapter summarises the research results in the context of this thesis and the contribution to the literature.

1. Case description

1.1. Evolution of EU sanctions policy towards Belarus

Sanctions are “politically motivated penalties imposed as a declared consequence of the target’s failure to observe international standards or international obligation by one or more international actors (the senders) against one or more others (the targets)” (Giumelli, 2013: 7). In practice, they can also be imposed “in reaction to forms of behaviour that the sender considers objectionable, even if they do not constitute a breach of codified norms” (Portela, 2010: 21).

The EU applies sanctions under two legal regimes: first, sanctions can be decided exclusively by the Union because they fall entirely within its competence and, second, sanctions need to be agreed within the CFSP (Portela 2010: 27). The former cover the withdrawal of GSP preferences and the suspension of financial, development or technical aid, while the latter are agreed by the member states within the CFSP and implemented either by the member states (e.g. arms embargoes, visa bans) or by the Union (trade embargoes, financial restrictions) (ibidem: 27-28). The Council defines CFSP sanctions as “restrictive measures [...] imposed by the EU to bring about a change in policy or activity by the target country, part of country, government, entities

or individuals, in line with the objectives set out in the CFSP Council Decision” (Council 2012e). Whereas restrictive measures may target governments of third countries, more often ‘smart’ sanctions are introduced targeting non-state entities and individuals whereas there are clear criteria, tailored to the specific case in order to determine who should be on the list (European Commission 2008).

The history of EU-Belarus relations has also been a story about sanctions. Since President Alaksandr Lukashenka took office in 1994, there were just a few periods when sanctions were not in force (for a detailed overview of EU sanctions against Belarus Giumelli, 2013: 79-99; Portela, 2010: 87-94, 155-56; 2011). The first informal sanctions were introduced as early as 1997 in reaction to an unlawful referendum amending the constitution, which led to the concentration of power in the president’s hands and the worsening situation with civic and political freedoms in Belarus (Wilson 2011: 178-184). The EU froze its technical assistance programmes and ratification of the PCA with Belarus, limited political contacts and withdrew its support to Belarus’ membership in the Council of Europe (CoE). These measures were informal, not adopted within the CFSP framework. Some of these measures were temporarily lifted when Minsk agreed to the establishment of the Advisory and Monitoring Group of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1998 which was tasked to assist the government to promote respect for human rights and democracy (Wieck 1999). In July 1998, as a response to the diplomatic crisis between Belarus and EU states caused by the unilateral eviction of European diplomats from the residences in Drazdy by the Belarusian government, the EU adopted a Common Position within CFSP introducing an admission ban on 130 government officials, including President Lukashenka (Council 1998). The visa ban was repealed in February 1999 when the Drazdy incident

was resolved (Council 1999).

In October 2002, the Belarusian government effectively discontinued the presence of the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Minsk, thereby expressing discontent with the fact that the organisation had criticised the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential election, which were not free and fair according to international standards and led to a new crackdown on the opposition, independent media and civil society. In November 2002, the EU-15 discussed the imposition of a travel ban on Belarusian government officials, however, Portugal vetoed a Common Position on this issue. As a result, fourteen member states decided to proceed with travel bans against Lukashenka and seven senior members of the government (BBC News 2002). These restrictive measures were removed in April 2003 after the opening of an OSCE office in Minsk (Kreutz 2005: 38).

On 24 September 2004, the EU introduced CFSP sanctions against Belarus which are still in place. The EU banned the admission of four Belarusian officials, three of whom were figured in the Pourgourides Report passed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE on 28 April 2004 (Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE 2004) as key actors responsible for the politically motivated disappearances of four persons in 1999-2000, and one (the then Minister of the Interior) for failure to initiate an independent investigation and prosecution of the alleged crimes. To lift the sanctions, the EU demanded that the Belarusian authorities investigate the disappearances fully and transparently and bring those responsible for the crimes to justice (Council 2004a).

Three months later, in December 2004, the EU expanded the admission ban on the officials responsible for the fraudulent elections and referendum in Belarus on 17 October 2004 and those responsible for severe human rights violations in the repression

of peaceful protests against the electoral fraud. The Council added two new individuals to the list, including the Central Election Committee chief (Council 2004b). The review of restrictive measures was conditioned upon the reform of the Electoral Code in line with OSCE and other international democratic standards and “concrete actions by the authorities to respect human rights with regard to peaceful demonstrations” (ibidem).

Following the presidential election of March 2006 which did not cohere to OSCE standards and the arrests of peaceful demonstrators protesting against the fraud, the EU decided to target via sanctions the “Belarusian leadership and officials responsible for the violations of international electoral standards and the crackdown on civil society and democratic opposition” (Council 2006a). Thus, the Council extended the admission ban to a further 31 persons, including President Lukashenka. The review of these measures was conditioned upon “the speedy release and rehabilitation of all political detainees, and in the light of reforms made to the Electoral Code to bring it into line with OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections as recommended by the OSCE/ODIHR, the conduct of future elections and concrete actions by the authorities to respect democratic values, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of expression and of the media, and the freedom of assembly and political association” (ibidem). Moreover, the EU froze the assets of 36 out of the 37 individuals on the admission ban list (except for Yury Sivakov, ex-Minister of the Interior listed in 2004) (Council 2006c). In October 2006, four Belarusian officials were added to the admission ban and the asset freeze lists (Council 2006b). The restrictive measures were subsequently renewed in March 2007 and April 2008 for another 12-months period.

Parallel to this, the Commission initiated a policy approach to engage with Belarus

within the ENP. In the non-paper issued in November 2006, the Commission offered Belarus the development of close people-to-people, economic and business links and financial assistance conditioned upon the fulfilment by Belarusian government of twelve criteria. The conditions included the release of political prisoners and an end to arbitrary detention, free elections, respect for freedom of media and association, labour and entrepreneurship rights, national minorities rights, independent judiciary, investigation into the politically motivated disappearances of 1999-2000, abolition of the death penalty and cooperation with the OSCE and other organisations promoting human rights (European Commission 2006b). The non-paper brought more clarity to the concrete steps which the Belarusian government had to undertake in order to establish a fully-fledged relationship with the EU (Jarabik & Rabagliati 2007: 7).

The Commission's offer coincided with the deterioration of Belarus' relations with its key strategic ally and economic partner – Russia, spurred by a bilateral energy dispute. This pushed President Lukashenka to seek economic and political support in the West. Belarus agreed on the opening of the Commission's Delegation in Minsk. Lukashenka also promised to launch economic reforms, including privatisation. In August 2008, the last political prisoners were released and a large OSCE observation mission was allowed to watch the September 2008 parliamentary elections. Responding to those developments, in October 2008, while renewing the sanctions for another 12 months, the Council decided to suspend temporarily (for a six-month period) the travel restrictions (with exception of persons listed in 2004 and the chief of the Central Election Committee) and restore a political dialogue with the Belarusian authorities. The continuation of the suspension was made conditional on the Electoral Code reform and “other concrete actions” to respect democratic values, the rule of law, human rights

and fundamental freedoms (Council 2008a; see also Council 2008b).

The warming-up period in the EU-Belarus relations was over after the presidential elections of 19 December 2010 and the resultant repressions against the opposition and civil society. Responding to these events, on 31 January 2011, the Council terminated the suspension of the admission ban and imposed travel restrictions and an asset freeze against “persons responsible for the fraudulent Presidential elections of 19 December 2010 and the subsequent violent crackdown on democratic opposition, civil society and representatives of independent mass media” (Council 2011a). Under these criteria, 117 persons were targeted, and as a result the travel ban list was increased to 158 individuals and the asset freeze list to 157 (Council 2011d).

As the situation in Belarus was further deteriorating with the ongoing trials and jail sentences for the opposition and civil society representatives, on 21 March 2011, the Council added new individuals to the list and updated some listings (e.g. excluding deceased individuals) (Council 2011e). There were 175 individuals covered by the admission ban and an asset freeze (ex minister of interior Yuri Sivakov was included on the latter list too). On 23 May 2011, further 13 persons were added (Council 2011f). On 20 June, the Council introduced embargo on weapons and equipment which can be used for internal repression and added four persons on the list, including businessman Vladimir Peftiev, “chief economic advisor of President Lukashenko and key financial sponsor of the Lukashenko regime”, as the EU reasoning stated, and three entities, controlled by Peftiev (Council 2011b). On 10 October 2011, the Council added another 16 individuals (Council 2011c), and on 16 December 2011, two more persons were added (Council 2011g), thus raising it to 210 individuals and three entities targeted by the EU sanctions.

On 23 January 2012, the Council decided to introduce additional criteria for listing extending restrictive measures “to persons responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, in particular persons in a leading position, and to persons and entities benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenka regime, in particular persons and entities providing financial or material support to the regime” (Council 2012b). On 28 February 2012, 21 individuals were added to the list (Council 2012d), and on 23 March 2012, 12 more individuals, including two businessmen associated with the regime – Iury Chyzh and Anatoly Ternavsky – and 29 entities controlled by the three businessmen (Council 2012e). As a result, the Belarus sanctions list peaked to 243 individuals and 32 entities.

In October 2012, stating that the September parliamentary elections in Belarus were “inconsistent with international standards” and “the situation as regards democracy, human rights and rule of law had not improved”, the Council extended sanctions until 31 October 2013 (Council 2012c). In May 2013, the Council removed from the list one person and two entities belonging to Vladimir Peftiev (Council 2013a). In October 2013, the Council extended EU restrictive measures against Belarus for another 12 months as “not all political prisoners have been released, no released prisoner has been rehabilitated, and respect for human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles has not improved in Belarus” (Council 2013c). Three persons were added, while several persons and entities were de-listed as there were “no longer grounds for keeping” them (Council 2013b). In July 2014, the Council amended EU sanctions list adding one person and taking off eight individuals (Council 2014d). In October 2014, the sanctions were extended for another year, while the list was reduced to 201 individuals (among others, two businessmen Vladimir Peftiev and Anatoly Ternavsky were removed from

the list) and 18 companies (Council 2014c).

While the EU imposed sanctions on the Belarusian authorities, it has continued a limited dialogue at the technical level with the government and provided support to the social needs of the Belarusian population as well as funding for non-state actors, including NGOs, media and political activists. In 2007-2013, the EU provided €22.5 million of direct support for engagement with civil society, media and local authorities and for targeted scholarship programmes in Belarus out of €94 million committed from the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (European Commission 2015a). In addition, Belarusian civil society receives aid from other EU instruments – the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and Non-State Actors and Local Authorities (see Shapovalova & Youngs 2014). Since 2010, EU aid to civil society increased fivefold (EU Neighbourhood Info Centre 2012). After the 2010 post-electoral crackdown, the European Commission provided urgent aid to political dissidents and their families as well as civil society and relaxed its rules to provide aid to non-registered organisations. It is estimated that the EU and the member states (among which Sweden, Germany and Poland are the largest donors to Belarus) give a third of their aid to civil society in Belarus, while the US, another big donor to the country, provides the major bulk of its support to nongovernmental actors (Zuikova & Yadorau 2014: 34).

Apart from funding, the EU and the member states also politically supported the Belarusian opposition, political prisoners and civil society activists: through frequent statements, diplomatic pressure on the Belarusian authorities, high-level meetings and consultations with opposition and civil society leaders and symbolic awards for human rights defenders. In March 2012, the EU launched a European Dialogue for

Modernisation involving the EU representatives and Belarusian opposition and civil society to develop reform programme for Belarus and ways for European support. Given that the authorities refused to participate in the initiative, it served as an EU tool to empower non-state actors in Belarus.

1.2. Decision-makers and decision-making procedures

The central role in the decision-making process on CFSP sanctions is played by the Council of the EU and its bodies. The political aspects and broader parameters of the proposals for a Council Decision are discussed by the relevant regional working party which is COEST in the case of Belarus. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) can discuss the proposals and provide political orientation to the working parties, notably on the type of measures selected for further proceedings. The legal, technical and horizontal aspects of the proposed restrictive measures are discussed in RELEX (the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Group). Usually, the COEST is the main working group deciding upon proposals on criteria for imposing restricting measures, what individuals or entities to be put on the list and what reasons for listing are, while RELEX looks into legal details and prepares a legal act (Interview 84). Before the Council adopts a formal decision, the COPERER reviews the legal act. The Council adopts a CFSP decision by unanimity.

If the imposed measures fall outside the realm of EU competence (such as arms embargoes or visa bans), they are implemented directly by the member states, which are legally bound to act in conformity with Council Decisions (no Council Regulation needed) (Council 2012f). If the sanctions fall under the Union competence (e.g. trade embargoes, freezing assets and investment bans, suspension of international agreements), they require a Council Regulation adopted by QMV upon the proposal of

the HR and the Commission under article 215 of TFEU (before the Lisbon, it was just the Commission making proposal), preferably simultaneously with the Council Decision imposing restrictive measures. The pre-Lisbon Commission had implementing powers for Council Regulations to modify targets on an assets freeze list, now these implementing powers are held by the Council. Since the Lisbon Treaty is in force, the Council should inform the EP about its CFSP decisions which envisage implementing measures falling under the EU competence.

Though the Lisbon Treaty envisaged QMV for the adoption of Council acts implementing Council Decisions (“Council Implementing Decisions” or “Council Implementing Regulations”) which modify the lists of targeted persons and entities, in practice QMV is not used. As a Council representative explained, it is mainly due to two reasons: first, there is a “gentlemen’s agreement” to take decisions by unanimity; and second, when decisions need to be taken quickly, the choice is for unanimity, because the Council Rules of Procedure envisage many possibilities for the member states to block a decision taken by QMV for quite a long time (Interview 84).

At the level of the working parties the member states may decide on proposed listings or de-listings using the silence procedure (a decision is deemed to be adopted at the end of the period laid down by the Chair unless if a member state objects). Legal acts on a urgent matter may be adopted by written procedure (again, if no objection is raised by a member state, the decision is deemed adopted) (Council 2012f).

A proposal for sanctions, including who to put on the list, is made by the member states or by the EEAS (Council 2012f). The Heads of Mission (HoM) of EU Delegations in third countries are invited to provide their advice on proposals for restrictive measures and specific listings or de-listings. They play a role of “competent brokers” (Giumelli

2013: 27). Since the HoM are in the field, they are also asked to evaluate the suggestions made by the member states.

The EEAS participates in Council meetings and provides its expertise on the country related issues (geographical department: in Belarus case – Directorate III B dealing with Russia, EaP, Central Asia Regional Cooperation and OSCE) and horizontal issues (Division K 3. for Security Policy and Sanctions). A representative of the EEAS chairs COEST meetings, while EEAS experts from the Sanctions Unit participate in RELEX meetings (chaired by the rotating presidency), assisting in drafting the text since they hold the institutional memory of EU sanctions policy (Giumelli 2013: 27).

The annual review of sanctions starts with a report of the HoM in Minsk which covers the political and economic situation in Belarus, developments in Belarus' foreign policy and focuses on the situation with human rights and political prisoners. The HoM also provides recommendations and suggestions regarding the revision of restrictive measures. The HoM also asks member states' embassies in Minsk for their recommendations. On the basis of the HoM report, the EEAS makes a proposal for the COEST on the revision of restrictive measures. The member states can also initiate proposals for revision through different Council groups or the EEAS. In practice, a greater role of the member states in initiating the revisions of the list is played in the period of between the annual reviews (Interview 59). Most initial proposals on listings and de-listings come from the HoM (Interview 84). As one Council official said, "In case of Belarus sanctions, the HoM is very active" (ibidem). Another EU official mentioned that the HoM's advice also tends to be sought when there is no strong consensus in Council (Interview 80).

Each listing should be legally sound, which implies that new entries should provide

“accurate, up-to-date and defensible” statements of reasons for listing based on the criteria set out in the CFSP decision upon which restrictive measures were imposed (Council 2012f). However, as an EU official explained, “[t]here is no clear division between political considerations and legal arguments. Someone can use legal argument for political reasons, if this someone does not want certain person to be listed” (Interview 84).

All interviewed EU officials dealing with Belarus sanctions underline that the EU aims to keep its sanctions list ‘alive’ to reflect EU policy and changes in the political situation in Belarus. This implies revising it and making listings and de-listings. The first candidates to be removed are legally questionable entries. As an EU official explains: “We try to clean up the list, to remove former officials who have nothing to do with the regime right now and do not correspond to the criteria stated in the Decision” (Interview 59). Usually, cases considered by the Court of Justice are discussed. The Council Legal Service presents the court cases and cases of individuals who wrote requests to the Council for delisting. The Council may need to provide information to strengthen the evidence for the listed persons. However, as one EU member state diplomat put it, “[i]t is also a political decision to judge whether the person should be delisted or not” (Interview 84).

As far as Belarus sanctions are concerned, admission bans and arms embargo are implemented by the member states and there is no EU-level body supervising the implementation of such measures. An assets freeze is also implemented by the member states, though the Commission can hold them accountable and appeal to the Court of Justice in line with Articles 259 and 260 of the TFEU, but such action has not been undertaken in the area of sanctions (Giumelli 2013: 28).

The EUCJ plays a key role in the shaping and making of EU restrictive measures (Giumelli 2013: 29). The Court has power to review the legality of sanctions implemented through the Union measures (competence for the movement of capital and trade matters) and, since the Lisbon Treaty, individuals and entities targeted by the CFSP sanctions can appeal to the Court of Justice to be delisted (Article 275 of TFEU). After Court's ruling in the case of Kadi I (Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation vs. Council and Commission 2008) and Kadi II (Yassin Abdullah Kadi vs. European Commission 2010) and Jose Maria Sison (Jose Maria Sison vs. Council of the EU 2009) in which the Court ordered to repeal EU restrictive measures, more and more targeted individuals and entities use their right of appeal in the EUCJ (Giumelli 2013: 29).

The European Parliament plays no role, but takes an active position on the EU policy towards Belarus adopting non-binding resolutions and recommendations. For example, on 20 January 2011, ahead of the Council's decision to renew and expand restrictive measures against Belarus, the EP adopted a resolution calling for sanctions renewal. This resolution received much press both in the EU and Belarus and provoked a fierce reaction from Belarusian authorities.⁸

Nonetheless, it comes out from the interviews with the EEAS and Council officials that the EP documents are not read by them. As one Council representative mentioned, the practice of the EP to call in their resolutions for sanctions against certain persons is counterproductive, as it encourages potential targets to transfer their funds somewhere outside of the EU, while the sanctions list should be kept confidential, until it is

8 Without mentioning the resolution or the EP, President Lukashenka made a statement on the same day calling the government to adopt measures in response any possible sanctions against Belarus and to work to counteract the anti-Belarus campaign abroad (see Naviny.by 2011b; Naviny.by 2011a). The Belarus parliament also adopted a statement in response to this resolution, in which it criticised the EP for 'ignorance of objective facts' and turning dialogue into pressure.

published (Interview 84).

The EU member states play a crucial role in agenda-setting, decision-making, implementation and monitoring of restrictive measures. However, important parts of the decision-making process are done by Brussels-based actors – the EEAS with the support of HoM and Council bodies. The involvement of the EU supranational institutions is limited, with the exception of the EU Court of Justice. The EP has no formal role at all, but it is a venue for political debate. Since the DG RELEX and delegations on the ground were moved to the EEAS, the role of the Commission has been reduced to monitoring of implementation of restrictive measures which fall under EU competence (e.g. assets freeze), but in fact it has been little exploited in practice. Through its case law, the Court of Justice has established itself as a key player in EU sanction making. The judicial review of EU sanctions against individuals and entities seemingly has an impact on Council legal documents which have been complemented by exemptions, exceptions and more specific procedures (Giumelli 2013: 31) as well as concrete decisions on listings putting legal arguments at the centre of Council deliberations.

1.3. Overview of groups which have engaged in advocacy

The EU sanctions policy towards Belarus attracts all sorts of groups trying to shape it. The peak of advocacy activities is connected to the crises in Belarus and EU's decisions to extend further sanctions. Within the period in focus, this happened in the aftermath of the December 2010 elections and the crackdown on civil society in Belarus to which the EU responded by targeting an unprecedented number of individuals and companies.

Not all interviewed groups that engage in lobbying the EU policy towards Belarus have necessarily taken an explicit and clear stance on the CFSP sanctions. This may be due

the fact that over a decade in force the EU sanctions on Belarus have produced mixed results in the evaluations of many groups.

Groups which take a clear position on EU sanctions and engage in advocacy are public interest groups, including human rights organisations, think-tanks and other NGOs, political and civic activists, and business groups. The large share of all groups advocating on EU sanctions come from Belarus. These are NGOs, political opposition groups, and relatives of political prisoners who live in Belarus or in exile,⁹ usually in one of EU member states. Public interest groups such as think-tanks or human rights organisations tend to engage in continuous advocacy as they monitor developments in the country. Business groups tend to mobilise at precise moments where their interests are at risk. Such groups mainly try to block a decision which can affect them or their interests negatively or to overturn them entirely.

Groups lobbying on EU sanctions towards Belarus can be divided roughly into three camps. In the first camp are those advocating for the tightening or at least maintenance of the current sanctions regime and its consistent application. They advocate no, or limited, dialogue with the authorities unless the conditions spelled out by the EU are met – they consist of Belarusian, European and international human rights groups, NGOs, Belarusian diaspora groups in Europe, Belarusian political opposition and relatives of political prisoners. The second camp are business groups who advocate against any EU sanctions and opt for EU engagement with Belarus. The third camp consists of groups in the middle – there is small number of think-tanks and NGOs denouncing EU sanctions policy as ineffective and lacking strategically. The debate on sanctions seems to be strongly framed as a dichotomy, ‘Lukashenka vs. a free Belarus’,

⁹ For an overview of Belarusian diaspora groups see Astapenia (2013).

thus as a result groups criticising EU sanctions are blamed for supporting ‘the regime’.

However, the reality presents a much more nuanced array of stances and arguments. Within the first camp, there are groups which in the aftermath of the December 2010 events called on the EU to mount pressure on Belarus and impose tougher sanctions. There are also groups supporting the EU’s current sanctions regime, but also calling for engagement in a dialogue with Belarusian authorities to increase links between Belarus and the EU. Finally, there are also NGO and human rights groups which do not advocate concrete solutions, but bring information on violations of rights and freedoms in the country and call for an EU action and coherent and consistent application of sanctions once they are introduced.

Business groups from the EU and Belarus favour EU engagement with Belarus and advocate against any sanctions. In most cases, they lobbied to avoid putting certain business people and companies on the EU list or litigated against the imposed measures before courts. Unlike in the previous case of EU visa policy, there is a clear division between public interest groups and the business lobby, even if some public interest groups criticize sanctions. They do not lobby together and they engage in very different advocacy in terms of objectives, tactics and targets.

For the purpose of this case study, representatives of 22 groups have been interviewed. Most of them are groups founded by Belarusians or having Belarusian organisations or individuals as members, based in Minsk or in the EU. Most EU-based groups are in the countries with a stronger interest in Belarus and geographical proximity – the Eastern EU member states and Germany.

The majority of the interviewed groups are public interest groups. Two interviewed groups represent industry interests. The fact that more public interest groups are

involved in advocacy on EU sanctions against Belarus is due to the fact that this population is more varied and tends to be more divided on the issue, while business groups are united in national and European associations and often come as a consolidated front against sanctions. In addition, unlike in the case of EU sanctions against Russia, economic relations with Belarus are modest from the Union's point of view, since Belarus' economy remains predominantly state-owned, with limited foreign investment, the bulk of which comes from Russia. Though EU-Belarus trade has been continuously growing within the studied period, Russia has kept its position as the main trade partner of Belarus (half of Belarusian foreign trade goes to this country, while a quarter to EU28, as of 2013) (see European Commission 2015b). Belarus counts for 0.3% of the Union's trade with the world (compare with Russia – 8.4%, or even Israel – 0.9%), according to the European Commission. Thus, stakes for European businesses are significantly low which may explain much weaker business mobilisation than in the case of EU sanctions against Russia. Moreover, I should add that major European business associations approached for an interview were not responsive to the request, whereas some national business associations and companies mobilised for lobbying could not be interviewed for travel reasons, thus, information on their advocacy positions and lobbying tactics was extracted from media reports where possible.

2. Advocacy strategies

2.1. Advocacy objectives

Groups engaging in advocacy on EU sanctions towards Belarus set up their objectives in different ways. Some define their goal as broadly as keeping the issue of Belarus on

the EU agenda or “maintaining Belarus in the mainstream of political and public debate” in their member state. Though these groups may have a position on sanctions and advocate on the issue when it is opportune, it is rather secondary to their overall goal.

Another subset of the interviewed groups formulate their advocacy objective as influencing the debate in the EU and member states on which direction the EU policy towards Belarus should take. As a result their advocacy position on CFSP sanctions is not isolated from other issues, such as the facilitation of contacts between the EU and Belarus at different levels, support to civil society, liberalisation of EU visa policy and a pro-active strategy of engagement with Belarus.

There are also groups which have not taken an explicit position in favour of or against sanctions because it is a divisive issue for their members. As a representative of a Belarusian diaspora coalition uniting different organisations explained their advocacy task: “[We aim] to present a full picture that one part of us is for sanctions and what their arguments are, and other part of us is for dialogue and what arguments we have. We want to show all the sides, so diplomats and policymakers have a complete picture” (Interview 48).

Some groups abstain from taking a position on the EU sanctions because they prefer to advocate the EU “to do something” in reaction to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Belarus leaving it to policymakers to decide what kind of pressure will be most effective. Some of these groups also focus on the coherence and effectiveness of EU sanctions policy (e.g. sanctions modalities, uniform implementation, well-informed listing and delisting based on clear principles) rather than who should be targeted. Others pass on to the EU institutions information on

human rights violations and perpetrators (“naming and shaming”) in order to increase pressure on the Belarusian government in multiple ways. In such a way, these groups influence the EU sanctions policy unintentionally (see Murdie & Peksen 2012). I will not include them in the last section on the self-assessment of advocacy objectives, as they explicitly set their objectives not in terms of sanctions but in terms of mobilising the EU to pressure Belarusian authorities towards changing some aspects of the human rights situation (e.g. release of political prisoners) or policy in Belarus.

As an interviewed representative of a human rights organisation says “there is no common voice on the issue of what kind of EU policy measures would work for Belarus. Nobody can say what works for Belarus. Neither theorists nor practitioners” (Interview 54). A representative of the Belarusian Association of Civil Society Organisations shared: “We have over 300 members and each of them can express their position individually. We never set it as a goal to have a united position on these issues. The only thing which we would like to see is that Europeans use this mechanism effectively. The EU should compose the lists carefully in order not to put unnecessary people on them and there should be clear criteria whether these restrictions are eternal or not. It is not logical that if the situation is changing, a person is excluded from the list. He or she does not cease to be guilty” (Interview 81).

Advocacy objectives are fluid: they may change as the situation in Belarus changes and the EU’s policy develops. So it would be easier to analyse them through the episodes of EU’s sanctions policy towards Belarus. Before December 2010, most of the interviewed groups supported the EU’s policy of engagement with Belarusian authorities and suspension of CFSP restrictive measures. After the post-electoral crackdown, many groups have taken a clear position on sanctions. The first voice was those calling for

economic sanctions, namely against the state-run companies (such as the United States introduced in November 2007 when imposed asset freeze and prohibited doing business with Belarusian state-owned oil and petrochemicals company Belneftekhim¹⁰), as they believe this kind of sanctions could have significantly influenced the behaviour of the Belarusian authorities leading to the release of political prisoners and even precipitate the disintegration of the regime, if they had been introduced during the economic crisis in Belarus in 2011 (Interviews 47, 50).

The second voice encompassed those groups which advocated to extend the existing sanctions regime (visa ban and asset freeze) and target individuals involved in the repressions against civil society and individuals supporting the regime, but avoid introducing economic sanctions. It was argued that sanctioning the state-run enterprises would hit ordinary Belarusians and lead to increased Russian influence in Belarus (Interviews 46, 51). Finally, they said that it was not realistic to expect the imposition of economic sanctions because they would hit the interests of EU member states.

The third voice involved interest groups which opposed economic sanctions and the expansion of the existing sanctions regime, and the inclusion of certain individuals and entities in it. Above all, business groups opposed any measures “that would cease or reduce cooperation in the business field” (Interview 94). There was also a group of NGOs arguing that the extension of the list would not be effective in terms of improving the human rights situation and would lead to further isolation of Belarusians and Belarus in Europe (Interview 77).

As it became clear in 2012 that the EU would not change the sanctions regime significantly, as the sanctions had been evaluated as bringing mixed results in terms of

10 On U.S. sanctions against Belarus see Woehrel (2013).

changing the situation of political prisoners in Belarus, many groups changed their focus to lobbying for a more effective use of the current measures. They seek the change of modalities under which EU sanctions work. For example, a representative of a Belarusian opposition group said: “We would like to see these visa bans half-automatic, meaning that there is a rapid mechanism of reviewing sanctions, not just through the slow Council meetings. Then if there is a political court decision, then the judge is automatically put on the blacklist” (Interview 46).

Some groups have advocated to put new people on the list who are seen responsible for ongoing violations (e.g. electoral fraud, illegal detention and mistreatment in prison, police beatings, labour rights violations etc.) and better target business entities which act as ‘major sponsors of the regime’. Other were saying that they would like to see more clear criteria of listing and delisting, clear and measurable benchmarks for lifting sanctions, more precise identifying information about the listed persons and better information campaigns from the EU explaining the sanctions to the Belarusian population. Meanwhile, many groups also started to advocate for a conditioned dialogue between the EU and Belarus at the governmental level and increased EU efforts to promote more people-to-people contacts.

As one can see some groups sought a policy change, while other were trying to keep the status quo. But after the EU decisions, these groups may shift their roles (for example, status quo defending business groups started lobbying the EUCJ and the Council for the removal from the list, once the Council decision listing them had been taken). The degree of policy change sought also varies from seeking the sanctions regime change (e.g. introducing economic sanctions) to modifying certain modalities under which sanctions are employed or amending the sanctions lists (e.g. introducing new names and

statement of reasoning why certain people should be on the list).

It is worth mentioning how some groups justify their lobbying goals in terms of *organisational survival* (pursuing ‘logic of support’ and ‘logic of reputation’, in the typology of Berkhout 2013). Several members of Belarusian opposition groups mention that it is not in the opposition’s interest to advocate for EU sanctions against Belarus, because these measures are unpopular among the Belarusian population. “When we are talking about sanctions, we are distancing ourselves from people”, one interviewee stated (Interview 46). An interviewed NGO representative said that some groups may advocate for sanctions because if the EU and Belarus renewed a full dialogue at the governmental level, there would be less attention to Belarusian civil society and opposition (Interview 48). A study on Belarusian NGOs and opposition positions on EU sanctions also points out that not all positions are expressed publicly and that public statements regarding restrictive measures do not necessarily represent an advocacy position, while different leaders of the same structure may express different opinions at different times (Еропов & Шытов 2012).

Some interviewees were pointing to self-censorship among Belarusian opposition members in the first half of 2011 when many of them were imprisoned, tortured and sentenced to years in jail: “They were not speaking openly about sanctions. When the first round of opposition leaders were released, they were afraid” (Interview 47). One of the presidential candidates in the 2010 elections, Dmitri Uss, was even fined for calling for economic sanctions against Belarus (Charter97 2012). This is not necessarily an indicator that some Belarusian groups may feel pressed to hide their “true” advocacy objectives, but it may explain to some extent the choice of their tactics: for example, preference for private and confidential meetings with EU policymakers and avoiding

public statements indicating their position, which will be discussed in the following sections. Another example is a case when a group of NGOs advocated for the reduction of the sanctions list for which it was blamed for being ‘KGB collaborators’ and ‘Lukashenka regime lobbyists’ and, as a result of this negative campaign, the group decided to cease further advocacy efforts. In the next sections, it will be discussed how advocacy goals are related to the design of advocacy strategies. Some groups who need to preserve the status quo may just advocate at the level of one or two member states hoping that a member state’s veto would block the EU decision, whereas groups who seek a more far-reaching policy change need to build broad coalitions behind their causes.

2.2. Advocacy targets and levels of lobbying

When do groups engage in advocacy at the EU level?

The first EU sanctions regime on Belarus spurred little advocacy by Belarusian groups. Since the late 1990s – early 2000s, the question of sanctions became more important for domestic actors who sought EU support in their fight with the Lukashenka regime (Interview 52). It was a time when the EU was still poorly engaged in Belarus, while more active European regional organisations were the CoE and the OSCE. At the beginning, it was mainly the Belarusian opposition trying to influence EU’s policy towards Belarus through European party channels (Interview 51).

For Belarusian NGOs EU advocacy did not start until the mid 2000s. The human rights organisations first targeted other venues such as the UN or OSCE. As one long-term observer of Belarusian civil society describes: “Belarusian NGOs were completely passive before 2004-2005. There were no attempts to influence EU policies. They were following the track of political parties or played a role of crowd scene by listening to

and approving what has been decided” (Interview 87). Afterwards, with the increased engagement in Belarus, the EU became considered by them as a leverage to change the situation in the country.

Belarusian organisations engaged in more systematic efforts to influence EU policy when Belarus was included in the EaP in 2008. Belarusian NGOs also received an additional channel of communication with the EU through the EaP Civil Society Forum (EaP CSF), established in 2009, and the EU Delegation, which opened in Minsk in 2008. However, for many organisations interviewed for this study, their advocacy on the EU sanctions issue started in 2011 or later as a reaction to the December 2010 events in Belarus and the subsequent wave of sanctions. 2011 and 2012 saw a peak of advocacy activity on the CFSP restrictive measures towards Belarus.

At which policy stages do they lobby?

Advocacy groups are involved in lobbying during the agenda-setting, policy formulation and decision-making stages of policy cycle. At the agenda setting phase, in line with the literature (Giumelli 2013; Murdie & Peksen 2012), groups raise the visibility and salience of domestic events in Belarus such as human rights violations that require an EU response. They also engage in debate on what kind of measures would be most effective in the case of Belarus. Moreover, as will be discussed, the EU has introduced formal and informal channels of communications with different advocacy groups in order to receive on-the-ground information about developments in Belarus. When restrictive measures are designed, human rights groups and pro-democracy NGOs are instrumental in documenting human rights violations and this data may serve the EU when reasoning why certain individuals or entities should be put on the list. Business groups mobilise to prevent EU Council decisions on sanctions that would affect them

(again as assumed in the literature Giumelli 2013: 33). The affected business groups and individuals contract law firms to challenge Council's decisions in the EUCJ.

Civil society groups also monitor the implementation of EU sanctions and share their opinions on the impact and effectiveness of EU measures, though it seems difficult as the restrictive measures are implemented by 28 member states, while coordination of implementation and evaluation at the EU level appears to be rather weak. Still, groups highlight cases of what they perceive as violations of the sanctions regime, point out incorrect data in the sanctions list (e.g. mistakes in the identifying information on listed persons) and report on how the EU's policy affects the human rights situation in the country.

Advocacy targets

Most groups attempt to engage in multi-level advocacy approaching both EU institutions and EU member states governments. Many groups name the EU Commissioner for ENP Stefan Fule (2010-2014) and his cabinet and MEPs as their advocacy targets, despite the fact that neither the Commissioner nor the EP have any formal role to play in EU sanctions. This may be explained by the fact that both the Commissioner Fule and the Parliament as an institution and some individual members have been open to contacts with civil society and active supporters of pro-democracy groups in Belarus. These two targets can put political and diplomatic pressure on other policy actors to advance civil society causes, for example, the release of political prisoners (they are the most receptive venues, in line with the interest groups literature, which also act as advocates themselves). The Commissioner attended the EaP CSF annual assemblies and often met with Belarusian civil society and opposition representatives when they visited Brussels. Moreover, the Commissioner's staff shared

information with groups and provided advice on what other policymakers should be targeted.

For groups based in Belarus, their most proximate targets are those frequently approached – the EU Delegation and EU member states embassies in Minsk (again, in line with the interest groups literature). During their visits to Minsk, the EEAS delegations tend to meet with Belarusian civil society representatives. The Delegation is not large and there are regular meetings with civil society groups on the issues of funding, human rights situation or involvement of civil society in such initiatives as the European Dialogue for Modernisation. Approaching the EEAS headquarters for advocacy is mainly reported by EU-based groups.

Nearly all groups, regardless of their location, engage in advocacy at the EU member states level, which underlines the fact that CFSP sanctions are still viewed as a policy area dominated by intergovernmental arrangements. They either try to reach out to foreign ministries in the key EU member states interested in Belarus or approach their embassies in Minsk or in those European countries in which the groups are based (for example, Poland or Lithuania). The fact that some Belarusian civil society groups and opposition members had to leave Belarus in the aftermath of the 2010 events and opened offices or settled in one of the EU member states (most often Poland and Lithuania, but also Czech Republic and the UK) helps them to conduct advocacy at the national level in the host countries. Some Minsk-based groups say that they try to reach out to the EU member states indirectly through their EU-based partner organisations.

Despite the fact that the Council of the EU is key in the decision-making process on EU sanctions, few – only Brussels-based – groups mention targeting the Council bodies. As one Minsk-based NGO explained: “We do not understand how to work with the

Council. Civil society has relations with the member states. They have been inherited from our cooperation experience. These relations are often with ministries and agencies responsible for development aid” (Interview 86). This further confirms the image of the Council as “the least accessible EU institution” (Hayes-Renshaw 2009), but also seems to be related to lobbying capacity – most interviewed groups do not have offices in Brussels.

An international human rights organisation which advocates the Council briefs members of COEST or COHOM – the Human Rights Working Group – either individually (meeting members with interest in Belarus) or in a group. For human rights groups, COHOM is also an important venue to influence EU position in the UN Human Rights Council. As a group representative says, “If we had more capacity, we could develop more advocacy for each member state – we partially do this: my colleague went to Italy – but we did not manage to have this level of sophistication in our advocacy strategy. We need more resources for that” (Interview 66).

Groups whose main activity takes place in the member states where they are based report targeting national policymakers in the government and the parliament. A couple of civil society groups based in Poland also say that they try to reach out to the general public directly (e.g. through street actions) or via national media. National groups from EU member states engage in advocacy at the EU level via partnerships with European platforms or umbrella organisations. However, some groups say that not having a presence in Brussels makes EU level lobbying difficult. As representatives of a national-level association explain:

“Our task is to maintain contacts with German policymakers: with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy and the Federal Chancellery. We do not have an office in

Europe. Our Managing Director often travels to Brussels. Sometimes we join the letters of organisations like Business Europe, but it is not on the regular basis. Normally once a year we have meetings in Brussels. [Our mother organisation] has an office in Brussels and is a member of Business Europe. [In such a way], we get information from Business Europe. We have contacts with Peter Balas [Deputy Director General] from DG Trade and with people in EEAS and the last time we talked on Belarus issues too. We inform them and they inform us. We are not lobbying. We need an office to do that” (Interview 74).

Of the numerous advocacy groups, the Belarusian political opposition enjoys access to the highest levels of the decision-making structures of the EU institutions and member states. Belarusian opposition leaders have high-level contacts among chiefs of government and foreign affairs ministers of EU member states with interest in Belarus (Poland has been most frequently mentioned). They also meet the EU Commissioner for ENP and high-positioned members of the European Parliament. Two opposition parties in Belarus are members of the EPP, and Aliaksandr Milinkevich, the united opposition candidate in the 2006 presidential election and the European Parliament Sakharov Prize laureate, are regularly invited to the EPP summits and maintain relations with other political groups in the EP. Due to international contacts the Belarusian opposition not only tries to influence EU policy towards Belarus and voice their position, but, as one interviewee said, this activity is also “connected to obtaining resources which can be spent on the activities in Belarus” and “increasing the movement’s popularity or significance by meetings top-level politicians from Europe such as Angela Merkel” (Interview 53). Moreover, “for the more high profile groups from Belarus the contacts is a specific protection”, as noticed by an EP official (Interview 72). Thus, there is also an element of organisational survival in the advocacy of Belarusian opposition.

Aside from this, Belarusian citizens and business companies affected by sanctions with

the support of law firms approach national courts (in Lithuania, against the Lithuanian government's decision to freeze funds) and the EUCJ to appeal against the measures imposed by the Council. In particular, all three businessmen and the majority of companies connected to two of them litigated against the Council decision to freeze their assets. A number of Belarusian individuals targeted by the sanctions also wrote to the Council Secretariat arguing why they should not be on the sanctions list or appealed to the EUCJ hiring law firms.

Advocacy at the European Parliament: “a coalition of the weak”, or advocating the advocates

The EP attracts lobbyists due to its informal role in the EU's policy towards Belarus and openness to civil society. While the EP lacks a formal decision-making role in EU sanctions policy, it has always been very outspoken on the issue of Belarus.

The EP takes positions on EU sanctions towards Belarus mainly through its resolutions and recommendations. The resolutions are frequently adopted in the urgency mode on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and human rights and they find support among all political groups. In the course of 2011-2012, the EP in its resolutions called for extension of EU sanctions and welcomed such EU moves. For example, in the resolution of 15 September 2011 on the arrest of human rights defender Ales Bialatski, the EP called “to extend the restrictive measures against the Belarusian regime, including by imposing targeted economic sanctions, in particular against state-owned enterprises”(European Parliament 2011). In its resolution of 5 July 2012 on Belarus, in particular the case of Andrzej Poczobut, the EP called “the Member States to evaluate the efficiency of the existing restrictive measures against Belarus and to consider broadening the existing sanctions by expanding the list of Belarusians subject to a visa

ban and asset freeze” (European Parliament 2012b). The Paleckis report – the European Parliament (2013) recommendation on EU policy towards Belarus – in which the EP attempted to revivify the EU policy debate on the issue provoked an intense discussion in the Parliament and attracted attention of advocacy groups and media.

Political groups and MEPs also try to influence EU policy towards Belarus through submitting written questions to the Commission and the EEAS, organising and participating in public hearings, conferences and private consultations on Belarus related issues, and by commissioning studies (e.g. on impact of targeted sanctions on Belarus published in 2012¹¹). The EP Presidents Jerzy Buzek (July 2009– January 2012) and Martin Schulz (since January 2012) were outspoken on Belarus’ human rights situation. The EP Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought was awarded to Belarusian civil society actors twice: to the Belarusian Association of Journalists in 2004 and to Aliaksandr Milinkevich in 2006, and the Parliament and individual members keep relations with the laureates. Contacts with advocacy groups depend upon specific MEPs – there are several MEPs who maintain continuous interest in Belarus. Most of them are from Poland or Lithuania where Belarus features high in public and political debate – “almost a domestic issue”, as one interviewee put it (Interview 72).

Since the EP does not recognise the Belarusian parliament as democratically elected, there are no official contacts with the Belarusian legislature and members of the EP Delegation for relations with Belarus have not been able to travel to Minsk since 2012 (European Parliament 2012a). Thus, the EP has built up relations with Belarusian opposition and civil society groups to reach out for first-hand information about Belarus

11 According to an interviewee in the EP (Interview 82), this study was commissioned by the EP Delegation for Relations with Belarus and the demand came from three MEPs active on Belarus. The original idea of the study was to map businessmen and business entities connected to the regime, but it has resulted in an impact assessment of potential targeted sanctions against sectors of Belarusian economy.

developments.

Representatives of the Belarusian political opposition, civil society and relatives of political prisoners, European and international NGOs, along with the Commissioner Fule and representatives of the EEAS, are invited to the meetings of the EP Delegation for relations with Belarus which take place every one or two months. Another channel of access for interest groups is the Working Group on Belarus of EURONEST parliamentary assembly for relations with six EaP countries which was constituted in 2011. The EURONEST does not have an official representation of the Belarusian parliament and the Working Group discusses ways to involve Belarus.¹² The Working Group invites civil society, journalists and opposition from Belarus to its meetings which take place three times a year.

Groups use MEPs to submit written questions to the Commission and the EEAS (only during 2012, several submissions addressed the issue of sanctions, for instance, regarding an alleged violation of arms embargo by German and Austrian firms, France's admission of the blacklisted minister of interior, and economic costs of sanctions). For example, MEP Marek Migalski's question about arms embargo reflects information given by the NGO "Belarusian Tribunal".

A member of a Minsk-based NGO explains why the group advocates the EP, despite the fact that it lacks decision-making powers in EU policy towards Belarus: "Our organisation sees the sense in interacting with the European Parliament. The Parliament sets a certain political canvas for the EU relations with Belarus and we would like to

12 As one interviewee at the EP explained, "the initial idea with EURONEST was to invite civil society, because the EP does not recognize the Belarusian Parliament. But the Belarusian authorities did not agree. Then the formula was offered 5+5: five representatives of the Belarusian parliament and five of civil society. But again the Belarusian authorities did not agree. As a result, there was a decision to leave these 10 places empty" (Interview 82).

keep this canvas from turning into very primitive in understanding Belarus, from reaching the two extremes – either isolate the dictatorship or lift the sanctions. The Paleckis report was an important catalyst. The last version was adequate and sober and it was balanced” (Interview 86).

A representative of a Belarusian human rights organisation provides another account of why lobbying the Parliament is important: “When the EP prepares its resolutions, we try to make accents from the point of view of human rights. The EP is not important for our authorities, but on the other hand, the Pourgourides Report¹³ in which key actors responsible for the disappearances of four well-known persons in Belarus in 1999/2000 were named was very important. The EP resolutions are important as a reaction to what’s going on in Belarus” (Interview 88).

Groups ally with the EP to lobby other EU institutions. This is a “coalition of the weak” as mentioned in the interest groups literature (Kohler-Koch 1997). Having no formal powers in EU sanctions policy, MEPs behave as advocates themselves by calling EU institutions and their own governments to act (or serve as “door openers” – see also Kowalewski (2013) on NGO lobbying in case of Burma). Significantly, few MEP offices active on Belarus noted that they organise advocacy events such as expert discussions and round-tables with the participation of civil society groups not only in Brussels, but also in their home capitals – Warsaw and Berlin.

2.3. Advocacy tactics

Private meetings with policymakers are a primary tactic used by all groups. These can be individual face-to-face meetings, group meetings organised with other advocacy

13 Approved by the Parliamentary Assembly’s of the Council of Europe on 28 April 2004 Pourgourides report had impact on the EU policy towards Belarus as on 24 September 2004 the Council imposed sanctions on the persons mentioned in the report as responsible for disappearances. See section 1.1. of this chapter.

groups or policymakers, briefings or in-camera hearings or talks at the margins of diplomatic receptions or conferences.

Interest groups distribute position papers and monitoring reports among policymakers. Many groups report having the mailing lists of European politicians, policymakers and opinion makers, but they believe face-to-face contact to be more effective. Indeed, the interviewed policymakers, especially in the EP, report receiving hundreds of emails daily. Thus, they pay attention only to those which are directly related to their work. As a member of staff of an MEP office states: “It is important for advocacy groups to remind us about their activity: to invite for coffee, to shake hands, to hand in reports. Human rights organisations often send emails. We get 400 emails a day, this is not spam, these are emails with content. We cannot read them. Newsletters, even if there was a lot of effort put into them, lose value. We are not able to work on it” (Interview 60).

Groups also organise and participate in conferences in Brussels and EU member states. Many say they appreciate informal talks on the margins of such events. It is also helpful for building networks and preparing future contacts. Groups from Belarus use their partners in Brussels and other European capitals to help them carry out advocacy tours in the EU that typically include both public events and private meetings with officials.

Tactics are usually combined. An international human rights NGO give an example of their multi-level advocacy campaigns: “Through a network of sections in EU member states, we call our lobbyists in EU members to call their governments for action. We organise this kind of multi-level campaigns. When there was a report issued on civil society in Belarus, our activists in the EU member states were called to contact their governments, to arrange meetings with MFAs, and at very least to send them the report”

(Interview 64).

Many of the interviewed NGOs and opposition movements reported sending amendments to the Paleckis report on EU policy towards Belarus. The rapporteur, a Lithuanian MEP Justas Vincas Paleckis from the Socialists and Democrats group, met with civil society representatives during his visit to Minsk to prepare the draft and also sent the first draft “to 6-7 NGOs to have their amendments”, according to his assistant (Interview 68). However, the report in which the MEP argued for renewing dialogue with Belarusian authorities provoked a heated debate in the Parliament. The EPP, ALDE, Greens/EFA and ECR groups had a harsher stance on Belarus – and a strong criticism of civil society groups who picked up some controversial phrases such as “an improvement of the situation of human rights was discernible in 2012” or “consider the suspension of key officials from the EU visa ban list with a view to broadening the main and essential diplomatic communication channel with Belarus, also in view of the Eastern Partnership summit” (European Parliament 2013b).

As a result, many groups passed their amendments to the report via a rapporteur or via other MEPs. With the support of a Green MEP, Belarusian groups organised a conference in the Parliament to discuss the draft report. The Human Rights Committee Secretariat also organised a hearing on human rights to which the rapporteur and human rights groups were invited. A representative of a Belarusian NGO describes their tactics for amending the parliamentary report:

“We participated in the development of Paleckis report on EU policy towards Belarus. I had been an intern in his office before, so I knew his team. We talked to his assistant informally, they sent us the draft for comments. Our partner, a human rights organisation from Belarus [the name omitted on purpose – author], sent recommendations to the second draft of his report themselves. Moreover, they made a media campaign in Belarus. Later, our partner

organisation also sent their recommendations through myself. When Paleckis drafted the first draft, he went to Minsk. He chose himself whom to meet. For example, he met our Chairman of the Board. We also worked with the office of MEP Werner Schulz [German Green Party]. Our Chairman has a good relationship with him. Schulz is more eager to work with us than Paleckis. We also organised a round-table discussion on EU's policy towards Belarus in the EP premises in Brussels in June 2013 before the second draft was adopted. It was attended by around 40 people. The MEPs mostly sent their staff, only one MEP came in person. There was a hearing on Belarus that day, so most MEPs, including Werner Schulz, preferred to go there. There were also people from the Commission, the EEAS and Brussels-based NGOs. Amendments on the role of civil society were inserted in the draft not by Paleckis, but by other MEPs" (Interview 45).

Many groups were consulted in the process of preparation: "There were Belarusian, international, European NGOs, such as Viasna, FIDH, Amnesty, Belarusian journalists (Belsat TV), the opposition. Paleckis met with the opposition in Minsk and during hearings organised either by the EPP or the EURONEST Working Group on Belarus. Jacek Saryjusz-Wolski organised a meeting and the opposition came", says an AFET Secretariat official involved in the process (Interview 70).

Given the EUCJ's powers of judicial control over CFSP sanctions against natural and legal persons, litigation strategies have been used mainly by Belarusian businessmen and their companies to appeal against EU measures. In most cases, litigation strategies followed unsuccessful attempts to block the Council decisions to list these individuals and companies associated with them. Apart from corporate actors and business people, only two other individuals used litigation before the EUCJ which may also suggest that this strategy requires resources to hire experienced lawyers, while the costs of legal defence may only be reimbursed in case of judicial victory.

About half of the interviewed groups report using outside lobbying tactics. Working

with media is the most common tactic. Many NGOs and Belarusian opposition groups give comments and interviews to national and European media. A lot of them also have frequently-updated English versions of their websites and a mailing subscription of materials to offer. A few Belarusian groups in exile have their own media resources in English. International human rights networks through their sections in the EU member states and Brussels have access to national media and outlets which focus on EU policy issues (such as EUObserver). One human rights group reported writing and publishing op-eds on behalf of MEPs (Interview 66). Some groups also turn to social media such as Facebook and twitter.

One group reported having a database of contacts with 1300 addresses of individuals in the European and national parliaments working on Belarus, foreign ministries, think-tanks and NGOs, foreign journalists and international donors to Belarus. They also run a competition for Western journalists writing on Belarus. A group representative says: “Due to this competition we have a group of engaged journalists and we work together on themes because it is difficult to write on Belarus all the time” (Interview 92).

Street actions are organised mainly in the member states where public interest in Belarus is particularly prevalent. A Poland-based youth NGO mentions organising annual concerts for Belarus which are broadcasted on national TV stations. The most recent reportedly gathered 3000 people. Politicians are invited to speak at these street events (Interview 73).

Belarusian diaspora groups organised several protests in Brussels on the days when key decisions were to be taken by the Council of the EU: “We organised three pickets in Brussels. The first was on the 31st of January 2011 in front the Council building on the Schuman roundabout. There were “Poles” [Belarusians living in Poland] coming and

sister of jailed opposition presidential candidate. The second was on the 23th of May of 2011 also on the Schuman roundabout and it was also initiative of the “Poles”. In 2011, we also picketed Deutschebank’s office, because they bought bonds from Belarusian government, as well as BNP Paribas bank and other” (Interview 93). However, the tactic is not seen to be effective by the group, even for the sake of organisational maintenance: “I see little benefit from these pickets. There must be continuation. People get tired going out here. It is not like in Belarus that people decided to go out every month. You cannot do it here. You need other types of activities, otherwise people burn out” (ibidem).

If organised well and timely, street actions attract media attention to a cause which the group wants to promote. TV reports showing the Council meetings are likely to show the protesters gathering in front of the building, thus such gatherings provide an additional opportunity to raise the salience of the issue. As the interviewee mentioned, street actions should not be in isolation. Advocacy groups combine them with other tactics to keep group members and supporters involved (pursuing ‘logic of support’), such as petition writing, talking to media, organising photo exhibitions, film screenings, public debates and charity evenings.

An interviewee from an international human rights network stated gathering over 60,000 signatures on their petition for the abolition of the death penalty in Belarus. They also organised a letter writing campaign for the release of a Belarusian human rights defender (Interview 64). Such campaigns reportedly mobilise hundreds of thousands of people globally, raising public awareness about human rights in the affected countries.

Other outside lobbying tactics include film screenings. As one advocate shares their experience:

“The elections are always a factor in the West’s agenda on Belarus. So I seized the opportunity and supported by Polish MFA we organised a cycle of press-conferences and a short four minute film about the [December 2010] events in Belarus in European countries. We went to Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and the US. The route was made on the way. It had a good media effect. We did not allow the wave of interest in Belarus to disappear.

When we saw a good effect from the short film, we made a full-length film “Belarusian dream”. It was shown in twenty countries, in many cases there were local activists organising premiers.

The second wave of press-conferences was organised after the trials against the opposition. And the next year it was a different format, as there was less media attention to the issue, so we organised in camera round-tables with experts and policymakers and diplomats participating” (Interview 92).

Typical outside lobbying tactics are often used to target policymakers. Film screenings and photo exhibitions are often organised in the EP to deliver an emotional message to politicians. MEPs often use opportunities to host such events. As an assistant to a MEP recounts: “The events on Belarus which organised here in Brussels are mainly aimed at attracting the attention of other MEPs towards Belarus, to inform them about the situation in Belarus to make it easier later to gather for EP resolutions and reports on Belarus. [...] We also organised movie screenings. Last week we showed a movie ‘Viva Belarus!’” in order to show the situation in the country. Sometimes we discuss Belarus in the context of other Eastern countries. For example, there was a screening of documentaries on human rights in different states to the east (Belarus, Kazakhstan etc)” (Interview 82).

An unknown group trying to attract EU attention towards the death penalty in Belarus employed a creative tactic by posting packages with plastic sacks for the corpses of

executed Belarusian prisoners. An EP official who demonstrated this artefact to me said that it was “quite memorable, because of the emotional message” (Interview 72).

Business groups mainly rely on inside lobbying. As a representative of an industry association says: “We are not lobbying against sanctions at public level. In media here, the view of Belarus is just one option. It is not possible to lobby on this issue via media. The press is not very interested in Belarus. If we send a press release arguing against sanctions, the press would put pressure on the industry” (Interview 74). An exception is a Latvian business group that gave figures to the press on Latvian-Belarusian economic cooperation and the estimated losses of potential economic sanctions, supposedly to influence public opinion and increase pressure on the Latvian government (Kłysiński 2013).

The press material against business interests on the issue of sanctions often framed the situation as one of human rights vs. money. According to a Council official, media coverage may play against a member state which tries to protect a certain business interest, if the press learns about it, as happened in the case of Slovenia vetoing EU sanctions in order to keep Belarusian businessman Iury Chyzh off the list: “It is inconvenient, it gives a different flavour to the discussion. A member state does not want to be seen as a blocking state” (Interview 84).

2.4. Alliances

EU sanctions on Belarus is an overcrowded advocacy field in comparison to the case of visa policy towards Eastern neighbours examined in Chapter 3. However, despite the many Belarusian and EU organisations involved in lobbying, few broad coalitions exist.

The business interests stand out as more united. First of all, the interviewed business

groups were already united in the national-level industry associations. Furthermore, they are members or partners with BusinessEurope at the EU level. Finally, Belarusian business groups are connected to national industry associations in a number of EU member states via bilateral business councils.

Belarusian human rights organisations have lasting partnerships with international networks and counterparts in the EU member states. Aside from this, other Belarusian NGOs are less connected with European umbrella organisations or platforms. There are partnerships with EU-based donor organisations and NGOs which help Belarusian groups to lobby in the EU, but large and stable coalitions are lacking.

Belarusian NGOs are interlinked via the National Platform of the EaP CSF, but the Platform did not take a common position on EU sanctions. Belarusian opposition groups have also taken different positions on the issue. Belarusian diaspora groups and EU-based Belarusian organisations merely reflect the inside-Belarus reality. They may share the same office, as six Belarusian organisations in Warsaw united in Belarusian House do, but hold different views on the EU sanctions issue. Apparently this is not merely due to the nature of the issue. The majority of Belarusian groups and their foreign donors recognise that civil society in the country is divided. A representative of the Belarusian NGOs association points out that it is difficult for Belarusian organisations to come forward as a united front: “We do not communicate very well inside the civil society sector in Belarus. If human rights issues are concerned, there is private consensus that human rights organisations are specialists and professionals in this field. But if other topics are discussed, we do not have such unanimity. We also have a sector of political parties and movements which communicate poorly with us and between themselves” (Interview 81).

The lack of unity within Belarusian organisations is also seen as an obstacle to participation in European platforms. A representative of the Belarusian National Platform of the EaP CSF discusses this problem: “There is a need for Belarusian civil society to develop relations with big civil society platforms in Europe and the National Platform would be more convincing in this role. But for that we need a consolidated position and delegation of voice. Everybody wants to be a leader in their own organisation rather than to delegate a part of the authority to an independent force”(Interview 86). Efforts to establish a network of Belarusian diaspora offices in Europe existing in Belgium, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Switzerland have not been successful (Interview 93).

The unfavourable climate for associational life in Belarus and reliance on foreign funding seem to be among the reasons for the division. Belarusian organisations try to preserve their group identity as they compete for funds and attention from European policymakers (see also Ash (2014) who argues that opposition is fragmented as result of electoral contestation and subsequent post-electoral repression, whereas competition for foreign aid creates a need among Belarusian opposition leaders to demonstrate their ability to mobilize support through electoral campaigns). Belarusian NGOs working in the country are critical of groups working in exile because funding for Belarusian civil society is being pulled out of the country. The groups in exile argue that certain donors prefer working with registered organisations and they are “accountable to [the donors] and further spread funds to Belarus” and “that before Belarusian organisations appeared abroad, Polish or Lithuanian organisations had been taking the donor money for activities in Belarus” (Interview 48). The competition for the attention of European policymakers divides the opposition, which is illustrated by the following remark of one

of its representatives: “Our possibility to influence [EU policy] decreased because a part of the opposition did not recognise Aliaksandr Milinkevich. The EU follows a parity rule and invites other opposition politicians too. The attention enjoyed by Milinkevich induced other opposition politicians to want taking his place on Belarusian and international arena” (Interview 46). A diaspora group says of being approached by a chairman of one of the Belarusian opposition groups: “He asked us ‘Why do you exist here? Join us while it is still not too late’. They look at us in the context of competition for political attention and resources” (Interview 93).

3. Influence and its determinants

3.1. Measurement: degree and type

As in the case of EU visa policy examined in the previous chapter, advocacy groups find it difficult to estimate their influence. Some groups avoid answering the question at all. Among those groups who attempted to answer the question about the achievement of their advocacy goals, most were speaking about partial influence which was still difficult to attribute clearly to their advocacy efforts as many actors have been involved in advocacy and policymaking process.

Civil society groups seem to be most successful in putting and keeping the issue of Belarus on the EU agenda. They present information on human rights violations in the country and maintain the frame of Belarus authorities as severe human rights violators, calling on the EU to protect international law and human rights standards. This goes in line with the literature on sanctions (Giumelli 2013; Kowalewski 2013) that expects non-state actors to play a role during agenda-setting process by providing information

from the ground and raising salience of the issue. This also conforms with the literature on non-state actor access to international organisations which emphasises the need of international bureaucracy to have information about local conditions, especially in the human rights field (Steffek 2010; Tallberg et al. 2014). However, the fact that Belarusian civil society and opposition are divided on the issue of sanctions weakens their influence in the EU as the EU member states and other actors can pick up opposing arguments in this debate. In this context, groups which take a more moderate (visa ban and asset freeze, but no trade embargo) and “realistic”, as they said, position appear as the most successful. The groups who lobby for dramatic policy changes, namely the introduction of economic sanctions, have failed to gain the support of the Council. The same goes for groups who lobby against extending sanctions to Belarusian business or other domestic actors.

Several groups said that they had provided policymakers with the names of people involved in repression in Belarus in order for them to be included in the EU sanctions list. However, all the groups stated that it was not very clear for them upon which criteria the EU lists are formed and that not all people from their lists appeared in the Council decisions. As one Belarusian opposition politician described their experience: “Our party and human rights NGOs submitted their views on who had to be in the list, however, some people got there and other did not. There is a lack of clear criteria what people can get to the list and how they can be excluded” (Interview 51). A Warsaw-based NGO reported of having passed the list of people involved in repressions in Belarus to Polish MFA several times, including upon the explicit request of diplomats, but again the success was partial: “There must be 10% of those persons from our Black List on the EU blacklist” (Interview 81). It is a question whether ten percent of people

on the EU list automatically translates into ten percent of advocacy objectives achieved by an NGO. It can be a part of an advocacy tactic that NGOs compose very extensive lists showing the scale of human rights violations in Belarus.

Whereas it is difficult to capture influence at the decision-making stage in the Council, a number of Belarusian and international groups were confident of their influence at the EP, thus contributing to the political debate on Belarus in the EU. They spoke of their proposals for amendments being copy-pasted to the texts of EP resolutions and reports.

The success of the advocacy efforts of public interest groups to generate pressure on the EU and fill in the EU sanctions list is also confirmed by policymakers. NGOs were reported to be particularly influential during the first half of 2011 when the EU sanctions list increased to nearly two hundred individuals in the aftermath of the post-electoral repression. An official from the EU Delegation in Minsk says that during that period “NGOs were influential in terms of advising on whom to include”. However, he adds that they are selective in terms of whose views to take on board: “We look at who is talking, at people’s backgrounds, from where these people are coming, if this is because of their personal revenge, or there is a wave in the society. It’s a restrictive measure after all and we have to be careful on the criteria we use” (Interview 80).

In the aftermath of the 2010 crisis in Belarus, the EU’s reliance on evidence from Belarusian advocacy groups for information about those involved in repressions was due to “difficult working conditions in the repressive country” (Rettman 2011). As a result the first list approved on 31 January 2011, to which the Council added 117 individuals in addition to renewing previous sanctions, was based on the reports posted on the internet by Belarusian human rights and democracy activists “because EU diplomats could not conduct interviews with victims of the post-election crackdown. In

many cases, EU structures do not know what Belarusian officials actually do beyond their official titles or even how old they are” (ibidem). While the sanctions list are decided by Brussels-based diplomats from the EU member states, they have to rely on information ultimately originating from Belarus, which may come via reports from their capitals, the EU delegation and EU member states embassies in Minsk who all consult human rights and advocacy groups on this issue.

The EU policymakers recognise that they are interested in listing related information coming from NGOs such as “companies, belongings, or concrete information to update the reasons for listings or identifiers” of the targeted individuals (Interview 59). There are also legal grounds for this. As explained by an EU member state diplomat working in the RELEX, the Council cannot rely only on intelligence coming from the EU member states. In its decisions, it needs to refer to publicly available information when it puts the evidence against the sanctioned persons and entities because if they appeal to the EUCJ, the Court cannot deal with classified information and the case is likely to be lost. This explains why information coming from open sources, such as the media or the websites of Belarusian NGOs is useful (Interview 84).

Interest groups also lobbied against the inclusion of certain individuals and entities on the EU sanctions list. Such advocacy was mainly done via EU member states given their right of veto in the Council, but groups also targeted the EEAS officials who propose the listings. Mainly business groups were involved in lobbying against, though some NGOs also advocated against expanding the EU sanctions list and keeping certain categories of individuals off the list.

The evidence of their influence is mixed. On the one hand, the media report when lobbied by business groups, certain member states vetoed the listing of a number of

Belarusian businessmen and entities which were considered by the Council. For example, a media report quotes the then French foreign minister Alain Juppé saying that Slovenia vetoed the inclusion of one daughter company of Iury Chyzh, Belarusian businessman, in the sanctions list. The firm associated with Chyzh, Elite, has a contract worth around €100 million with Slovenian company Riko Group to build a luxury hotel in Minsk (Rettman 2012a; Rettman 2012c). Latvia also reportedly vetoed the listing of another of Chyzh's companies, Belneftegaz (Rettman 2012b), which exports oil products via Latvia (Nielsen 2012b).

On the other hand, the interviewed groups are less positive about the achievement of their advocacy objectives. They say that their advocacy efforts to keep certain individuals off the list or prevent new listings were unsuccessful (Interviews 74, 77). The media reports support this mixed picture. Different business groups from a number of member states, including the above-mentioned Riko Group from Slovenia, lobbied their governments not to list businessman Iury Chyzh, a known associate of President Lukashenka. However, despite numerous efforts, he was included, though not during the first attempt in the Council.¹⁴ A Council official explains that when information is leaked to the media, it is more difficult for a member state to defend the interest of business groups as it does not want to be seen a spoiler (Interview 84). Thus, bigger coalitions are still needed even to protect the status quo.

There have also been several successful litigation cases brought to the national courts (Lithuania) and the EU Court of Justice by individuals and companies targeted by the

14 Slovenia and Latvia were reported to veto the inclusion of Iury Chyzh and his entities to the list of EU sanctions in February 2012. A business group from Slovenia Riko Group who had business with Chyzh's companies was seen as the main cause behind Slovenia's veto. German, Lithuanian and Latvia business groups also report lobbying against the inclusion of Chyzh, however, only Latvia was reported attempting to block the issue to the Council. In 23 March 2012, Chyzh and his companies were included on the EU sanctions list (see Rettman 2012c).

EU sanctions. In 2012, a court in Lithuania ruled out in favour of the blacklisted businessman Vladimir Peftiev, ordering the unfreezing of his money to pay legal fees to the Lithuanian law firm LAWIN representing him and his companies in the EUCJ (Nielsen 2012a). The Court of Justice preliminary ruling was favourable on this matter (EUCJ 2014a). In 2014, there were also five judgements of the General Court on appeals against the Council Decisions, of which four were in favour of the appealed individuals and business entities. In September 2014, the General Court ruled in favour of Belarusian journalist Aliaksei Mikhalechanka, annulling his listing in 2011 and 2012 on the grounds of an error in assessment of his role (EUCJ 2014g; see also Lester 2014a; Ругайн 2014), whereas the Council removed him from the list in October 2014. The Court, however, left in force the listing of Deputy Chairman of Central Electoral Commission Vadzim Ipatau (EUCJ 2014f).

In the case of *Vladimir Peftiev vs. Council*, in December 2014 the General Court annulled Mr Peftiev's listing in 2011 and in 2012 Council Decisions ruling out that the Council could not substantiate the grounds on which Peftiev was listed – a close associate of Lukashenka and his family, financial supporter of the regime, including through BelTechExport, an arms exporting company, and provider of economic advice (EUCJ 2014d). Whereas the judgment did not concern the relisting of Peftiev in the 2013 Council Decision, the Council removed Peftiev from the list in October 2014. The Council also lifted sanctions against another businessman, Anatoly Ternavsky, though his appeal to the EUCJ to suspend sanctions against him as interim measures was dismissed in 2012 (EUCJ 2012). In addition, the General Court annulled Council Decisions listing three companies associated with Peftiev – BT Communications, Sport-Pari and BelTechExport (the latter one on the grounds that the right of defence has been

breached) (EUCJ 2014c; EUCJ 2014e; EUCJ 2014b; see also Lester 2014b). However, by the time of the EUCJ judgements BT Communications, Sport-Pari as well as another twelve companies associated with businessmen Vladimir Peftiev, Iury Chyzh or Anatoly Ternavsky had been delisted by the Council in May 2013, October 2013 and October 2014.¹⁵ The interviewed EU officials insist that the sanctions against the companies were lifted due to the ownership change. It cannot be however ignored that the ongoing trials as well as the previous EUCJ rulings on other sanctions regimes led the Council to revise the evidence more rigorously and resulted in delistings ahead of eventual Court rulings. The listing of BelTechExport was annulled in the Council Decisions of 2011 and 2012 and recognised as inadmissible for the Council Decision of 2013 due to the application time. However, the Council relisted BelTechExport in October 2014 on amended grounds as a company which “benefits from the regime as a main exporter of arms and military equipment in Belarus, which requires authorisation from the Belarusian authorities” (Council 2014c).

Several groups speak of their influence in terms of luck or aligning with the EU position. As one group representative said, “The time has passed and their position is changing towards ours. The sanctions did not influence anything, they only irritated the authorities and froze the dialogue” (Interview 57). The interviewed business groups report lobbying for the suspension of EU sanctions against Belarusian foreign minister Uladzimir Makei, however, it is difficult to attribute the influence to them, as the EU member states were also eager to have a channel for a formal dialogue with Belarus and were behind this initiative, including Lithuania’s Presidency in the EU who wanted Belarus to participate in the Vilnius EaP summit in November 2013.

15 LLC Delovaya Set, CJSC Sistema investicii i inovacii, PUC Sen-Ko, PUC BT Invest, Tekhnosoyuzpribor.

The reduction of the sanctions list in late 2013-2014 saw little lobbying activity from the pro-sanctions camp. The majority of groups that had advocated for tightened EU sanctions in 2011-2012 hardly opposed the move. It is likely that this also comes as a result of internal reflection among Belarusian and international civil society groups. The EU restrictive measures have not led to the release of all political prisoners and human rights improvements. While the sanctions regime has remained in place, other issues have come forward both in Belarusian and European policies. On the one hand, the EU launched new attempts to engage in dialogue with Belarusian authorities, partly reacting to the low effectiveness of sanctions policy and partly to the changing geopolitical context of the region after Russian aggression towards Ukraine. On the other hand, Belarusian authorities have changed their rhetoric in favour of the EU, showing eagerness to cooperate in an attempt to resist Moscow's pressure (Korosteleva 2015).

This study focuses on lobbying and interest group influence at the EU level. It remains beyond the scope of this research to consider how member states' positions are formed and the extent to which they are influenced by national interest groups. This aspect does remain salient given the direct impact it has upon EU agenda-setting. For example, one can hypothesise that EU member states did not consider economic sanctions against Belarus due to influential business actors in their member states. As a result, national business actors may have succeeded in keeping the issue off the EU agenda – the 'second face of power' (Bachrach & Baratz 1962). Experts interviewed for this study believe that in some cases business groups did not influence the position of their governments (such as Germany) as there are no important economic dependencies with Belarus, while in other cases (such as Latvia) the dependencies exist and they are seen to define the member state's position to a greater extent. However, to shed the light on

the question of interest group influence on the domestic arenas in the EU member states, one needs to open a blackbox of national foreign policymaking which is a research exercise of its own.

Finally, some methodological remarks. First, the question concerning their influence appeared to be a sensitive issue for few groups which were not ready to speak about it openly. Second, this case study has further proved the benefits of methodological triangulation. While business groups are often reported to be powerful by the media, they do not always estimate their influence positively when the question is directly put to them. They report the achievement of their advocacy objectives only to a very limited degree. They may be successful in averting economic sanctions, but they did not manage to prevent certain individuals from being listed and the EU sanctions list from expanding. One should bear in mind that business groups lobby not only against economic sanctions or measures affecting businesses, but against any restrictive measures because the spoilt EU-Belarus relations also restrict the groups' ability to do their business in Belarus. If one did not ask the groups about their objectives and their self-assessment, one could come to a different outcome based on media reports, for example.

3.2. Factors explaining influence

Group-level characteristics, particularly connected to group's resources such as funding, network, office in Brussels and a capacity to design and implement an effective advocacy strategy, come forward in advocates' own assessment of factors contributing to their influence or lack thereof. For Belarusian organisations, regardless of where they are based, one of the most frequently mentioned factors determining influence is the presence of a broad coalition advocating the same goal and having allies among other

groups, especially international partners, to make their voice heard in the EU.

An NGO representative from Minsk believes that the weak influence of Belarusian civil society organisations on the EU sanctions policy is due to the lack of a consolidated position among Belarusian organisations: “On the contrary, they had contrary, polar opinions” (Interview 87). In a similar vein, another Belarusian advocate stresses that successful advocacy depends on the ability to mobilise other groups: “whether it is just one think-tank speaking or the National Platform, or the six plus coalition of the opposition, or it is civil society, parties and think-tanks all together” (Interview 57).

Belarusian groups emphasise the importance of having international partners who are based in the EU, who are more experienced in EU-level advocacy and with an understanding of the policy process and a network of policymakers to which they can communicate. Such partners help Belarusian organisations to organise advocacy tours or events in Brussels and other European capitals. They also share important information on the intricacies of decision-making and bear a part of the advocacy costs.

Most groups both from the EU and Belarus speak of *access* to policymakers and “good relationship” with them as an important factor defining influence. Some groups speak of access and of the fact that policymakers themselves approach the group for information as a proxy of influence. For example, one representative from a Warsaw-based NGO says: “We are contacted and listened to, we are asked about our opinion – it is also a criterion of our success. We are invited to meetings. If Polish governmental think-tanks write something, they often use our opinion in their analysis. Poland’s MFA gives our contacts to diplomats of other countries” (Interview 48). Another member of a Minsk-based group shares: “Interested EU member state embassies periodically ask us to clarify our position, for example with regard to political prisoners. We also send them a

lot of materials, monthly monitoring reports. The embassies are eager to use our materials. There is also a practice when all ambassadors are gathered together and we speak of current problems and trends. I guess this influences them in a certain way” (Interview 88).

Brussels-based groups are seen in a beneficial position in terms of access to policymakers. An EP official stresses the importance of presence in Brussels for advocacy groups:

“Those who are in Brussels, they have access, they know which MEPs to approach and how. If you know the process, it is easier to lobby. Even the EEAS did not know the process. You do not lobby the members in the same way. Brussels-based NGOs have this knowledge, experience and skills. NGOs based in Minsk do not have resources to pass message to Brussels. I received hundreds of open letters also addressed to MEPs. But these open letters from Minsk that say something about the regime do not work for MEPs. There is a need in concrete amendments, with names mentioned, with references. There is a big difference between well equipped and trained NGOs, mainly here in Brussels, and less resourced NGOs” (Interview 70).

A member of an international human rights organisation shares the view that having an office in Brussels is key for building relationships with policymaking bodies: “Very often it is policymakers who come to us to obtain information rather than us going to them” (Interview 64). This confirms the relationship between group resources and access to EU policymakers, which is in line with the interest group literature, which points out that resourceful groups are better prepared to lobby at the EU level.

Having *allies* among policymakers is also mentioned as one of the factors conditioning advocacy success, while not having them at all impedes successful advocacy. Some groups named allies who are not powerful, but eager to listen to their views and take

them on board such as MEPs or Commissioner's Fule office, who are rather advocates themselves on the issue of EU sanctions on Belarus. Others named the member states that have a strong interest in Belarus and have driven EU policy towards the country (for example, Poland, Germany and Lithuania). An international human rights group said that their allies are mainly those governments for whom human rights are an important part of their agenda (for instance, Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Germany).

Both groups and policymakers speak of the necessity of understanding the complex decision-making process of the EU that often comes with experience. A Vilnius-based NGO member believes that "it is important to know the institutional design of those bodies which you target, but not a theory which is written somewhere, but practical things, for example, when to hold an event, after or before launch, to have a coffee break or not, how to hold your audience for three hours" (Interview 54). Several groups also stress the importance of timing in order to have more impact on the future decisions. This view is also reflected by an adviser in the EP: "It is important to know what is being prepared, e.g. a report, who is the rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs, whom to approach, what is the stage of preparation, or if it is about organising a hearing or an event. It is important to have a concrete message about the topic they want to advocate on" (Interview 60).

Understanding the EU policy process on Belarus sanctions also allows groups to set up realistic advocacy objectives. As a representative of the Belarusian opposition says, "Our chairman knows the situation in the EU very well. We could not expect a radical political position of the EU. That's why our position on what EU policy should be and the EU position often overlap" (Interview 46). An interviewee from an international

human rights group speaks in a similar vein: “You have to be strategic. You cannot just say the EU is stupid, but to be more constructive, telling to policymakers: “It is hard for you to do this, but maybe this or that is an option”. Not coming with a big flag to them” (Interview 66).

In contrast to the previous case of EU visa policy, groups have talked less of the importance of information. Only human rights groups stress the importance of presenting well-researched and credible information as a factor of successful advocacy. However, information scored high for policymakers when interacting with the groups. They report mainly seeking information about developments in Belarus and new ideas for the EU policy. Whereas the EEAS and the Council working groups designing sanctions value information helping them to compile the listings, to “calibrate EU sanctions”, the EP looks for information which helps them to understand Belarus and Belarusian society better and “concrete data that helps to fine-tune MEPs’ views on Belarus” (Interview 68) as well as new ideas on what the EU can do for the country. The reputation of an advocacy group matters for policymakers based on their previous experiences of interactions and the value of the information it provides.

Advocacy experience and understanding of the policy process, on the one hand, constitutes a group resource, meaning that it is usually a characteristic of an organisation that has access to information and to policymakers and engages in advocacy systematically. On the other hand, it is an important requisite when designing an effective advocacy *strategy*, which is frequently named by the groups as a crucial factor of advocacy success. An effective advocacy strategy includes a clearly defined message and goals, an understanding of who to lobby, when and how. One human rights group representative described this factor very well:

“You have to present a clear message. To have a clear task what you would like to advocate for. Your task can be just to keep the issues on EU agenda or to have the mandate of UN special representative on human rights for Belarus prolonged until next presidential elections.

You have to formulate a strategy and involve as many organisations in a coalition. Nobody will lose their independence, but it is important to have a common message, not everybody going and telling their things. It is important to know the specifics. In the UN we do not use the word regime in order not to grow opposition from certain countries. There is an art of diplomacy.

You need to have international partners who understand to whom to talk, when, and how [decision-making] mechanisms work. One must understand that there is no quick result of advocacy efforts. Some issues take a year or two of advocacy efforts. While people in Belarus say “we went there two times, but nothing come out”. Again, it is because a strategy is lacking” (Interview 54).

The interviewee believed that an effective advocacy strategy is dependent on group’s resources and that Belarusian groups often suffer from a lack of resources to engage in advocacy in a systematic way (Interview 54).

As another Belarusian advocate summed up “the problem of resources is a key. We live through projects, while doing advocacy in the EU is very expensive” (Interview 45). It is noteworthy that while assessing the influence of other advocacy organisations, many respondents underline such factors as contacts at the high level, access to policymakers, offices in Brussels and financial resources.

Conclusion

Interest group lobbying and influence on CFSP sanctions towards Belarus have been

examined in this chapter. This policy area is characterised by strong intergovernmental arrangements with the dominance of the EU member states and the Council of the EU in agenda-setting, decision-making and implementation stages, while the involvement of supranational institutions is limited, except for the EUCJ powers to review the legality of restrictive measures imposed on natural and legal persons.

This institutional design has been reflected in the advocacy strategies of the interviewed groups. Most of them target the EU member states. However, the majority of the interviewed groups also engage in lobbying at the EU level using all the venues accessible to them and not necessarily reflecting the formal powers of policymakers. Groups target the EEAS and the Delegation in Minsk given their role in the preparation of sanctions and review process and the EUCJ which has judicial powers on sanctions targeting physical and legal persons. Nonetheless, groups also lobby the European Parliament and the Commissioner's for the ENP office which do not have formal power over EU sanctions policy.

This is in line with the assumption that interest groups approach institutions receptive to their demands as a means of strategic empowerment. The case of litigation in the EUCJ is illustrative because the Court's rulings have impact on the Council decision-making on CFSP sanctions as legal arguments are increasingly important in the process of designing the list of targeted persons and entities. Lobbying the European Parliament and the Commissioner for ENP is more about lobbying powerful advocates, with a hope that they will further influence the policy debate in the EU member states and the Council. Some groups have also used the right of democratic oversight of the Parliament through addressing questions to the Commission and the EEAS related to the EU sanctions against Belarus. Therefore, our expectation about interest groups

involved in multi-level lobbying (H4) has been confirmed.

As in the previous case study of EU visa policy, few interviewed groups target the Council of the EU and its bodies. This confirms the reputation of the Council as the least accessible EU institution and is largely in line with the literature on NSA access to international organisations, which demonstrates the most limited access to intergovernmental bodies during the decision-making stage. All the institutions which the groups target have informal mechanisms of consultations with non-state actors (the EP, the Commissioner's office, the EEAS and EU Delegation in Minsk as well as EU member states embassies in Minsk but also in other EU members states). Such mechanisms do not exist at the Council level. Moreover, lobbying the Council also incurs advocacy costs. Only groups with offices in Brussels that being able to invest in building relationship with diplomats from EU member states' Permanent Representations can afford to target the Council bodies systematically.

Groups of all kinds have engaged in lobbying at the agenda-setting and decision-making stages. At the implementation and evaluation stages public interest groups, following up the cases of possible violations of EU sanctions by EU member states, pointed out factual mistakes in the lists and shared their views on the effectiveness of CFSP sanctions on Belarus.

Alliances with key decision-makers are seen by the interviewees as an important factor determining influence on EU policy. Certainly, lack of allies is considered as the main reason for the failure of advocacy efforts. First, groups with allies among the EU member states exploited (and in some cases – successfully) them as veto players in the Council to block unwanted listings. For other groups, allies among the EU member states were important for making proposals for listings when sanctions were designed,

and for putting the issues on the Council's agenda. Second, the EU institutions and the member states who need information about developments in Belarus appear as strategic allies for those groups who are ready to provide them with it. Thus, having allies or common interests with key policymakers corresponds to higher degrees of interest group influence, in line with H2.

Not all the groups were able or willing to answer the question about achievement of their advocacy goals. Those groups who attempted to answer this question spoke of partial, minimal or zero achievement (H1) and some of them underlined that it was difficult for them to estimate their impact on the policy outcome. Most groups spoke of their influence on calibrating the EU sanctions regime (e.g. on the EU implementing decisions on the listing and delisting and providing information related to it) rather than altering it (e.g. on blocking the Council decision to extend the sanctions list, introducing different types of measures). However, it appears from interviews with policymakers and expert observers that groups seem to underestimate their role in agenda-setting and keeping the issue of human rights in Belarus in the EU's spotlight. This can be explained by the fact that it was the result of collective lobbying rather than an individual effort.

The right of veto of a member state in the Council has been instrumental for some groups to preserve the status quo. However, a number of groups that have been promoting a policy change also reported similar degrees of achievement of their advocacy goals, thus the H3 cannot be fully confirmed.

The access to policymakers is seen by the groups as a crucial factor determining influence or even a proxy of it. Belarusian groups also pointed out the divisions within civil society and opposition groups as a reason for the lack of influence and emphasise

the presence of a broad coalition of Belarusian groups as well as international partnerships as a key factor for advocacy success. Generally, group-level characteristics, especially resources, are considered of utmost importance for an effective advocacy at the EU level. This does not necessarily mean that business groups always win. But it implies that only resource-rich public interest groups can engage in systematic advocacy and achieve advocacy success and that poorer groups have to pool their resources in coalitions in order to be effective.

Finally, several methodological remarks. The combination of process-tracing and assessment of attributed influence has led to research results which could not have been obtained had only one method been applied. The self-assessment method helps us to see how groups themselves define their advocacy objectives and evaluate their influence, thus revealing nuances one would not become aware of if only relying upon open sources, interviews with policymakers or observers. At the same time, the problem with applying self-assessment is that groups are not always comfortable to reveal their influence and they lack the full picture of what their influence was. Moreover, this method cannot take into account lobby groups which did not take an explicit position on the EU sanctions, but whose advocacy on human rights violations in a country to which sanctions are considered or applied can indirectly influence decision-makers.

Unfortunately even the combination of two methods leaves the question of interest group influence in penumbra. The groups say that it is difficult for them to trace their own influence, even on more ‘technical’ issues. It is easier when lobbying takes place at one institution (e.g. the European Parliament or the Court of Justice) or at a very specific moment of the process, but decision-making in the Council is still blackboxed with too many actors involved (28 member states in different working party groups and

levels of seniority, representatives of the EEAS, sometimes Commission and the Council Legal Service). For a researcher of interest group influence in EU policy areas driven by intergovernmental arrangements, it means that influence is not necessarily absent, but that it is difficult to trace and attribute to a concrete advocacy effort.

The research also reveals that there is a strong relationship between advocacy strategies and organisational survival, which has been little explored in the previous literature (Lowery 2007). This is not just about lobbying tactics, but also about formulating advocacy goals and entering lobbying coalitions. In some cases, the interviews revealed a difference between publicly declared advocacy objectives and those which the groups actually try to pursue. Moreover, the extent to which advocacy objectives of Belarusian actors depend on their donors is a question for further research. Given that sponsors of Belarusian non-state actors and key decision-makers are sometimes the same actors (e.g. EU member states), could it be the case that the EU member states empower non-state actors out of strategic calculation to gain additional leverage in the intergovernmental decision-making, in line with power-oriented institutionalist explanations (see Tallberg 2010)?

This chapter contributes to the literature on interest groups in the EU, examining lobbying and group influence in a contested area of EU foreign policymaking. In light of the recent sanctions regime imposed by the EU on its neighbours, including Russia, and deteriorating human rights situation in the neighbourhood, the influence of non-state actors on EU restrictive measures is worth exploring in greater depth, as it can add to our understanding of why the Union decides to impose restrictive measures in some cases, but not in other, as well as choice of measures and targets. The chapter also adds to our understanding of EU foreign policymaking in the case of sanctions, highlighting

the role of different EU policymakers in practice (e.g. growing role of EUCJ and its impact on Council decisions and of EU diplomacy) and their relationship with non-state actors. Finally, this chapter also adds to the literature, more broadly on non-state actor participation in international organisations, and more specifically on the international sanctions regime. On the one hand, it confirms the previous findings showing the greater access that non-state actors have to international organisations in the field of human rights (Steffek 2010; Tallberg et al. 2014); on the other hand, it goes a step further in showing the relationship between access and influence, and the role of for-profit non-state actors, who are frequently overlooked by the literature (Kowalewski 2013; Murdie & Peksen 2012).

Chapter 5. Civilian CSDP in the neighbourhood

Introduction

This chapter focuses on strategies and the influence of groups lobbying on the EU policy of conflict resolution and civilian crisis management looking in particular at CSDP missions. The CSDP is a text-book example of the strong intergovernmentalism in EU foreign policy. The supranational institutions are excluded from the CSDP, while EU member states decide upon and implement policy.

In line with the theoretical assumptions, advocacy groups are expected to achieve the least, if any at all, degree of influence (H1). In addition to intergovernmental decision-making, potential influence will be cumbersome due to policy issue characteristics such as time frame – CSDP missions are often launched as a reaction to crises or armed conflict which may shorten the decision-making period to a matter of weeks or even days, leaving little room for interest groups' advocacy. If any influence is achieved, it is due to alliances with key decision-makers (H2). Groups interested in keeping the status quo are expected to be more influential than those seeking a policy change due the requirement of unanimity (H3). Finally, it is hypothesised that groups tend to advocate at both the EU and member state level (H4).

Three CSDP missions – EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah in Palestine and EUMM Georgia are in focus of this case study. Having three missions in two different conflict contexts will enable us to better explain factors beyond engagement and the influence of non-state actors in the civilian CSDP.

CSDP missions are just one, albeit very prominent, tool of EU policy for managing

crises and dealing with conflicts. They often go together with other tools at the Union's disposal from the CFSP or other policy areas of intergovernmental or mixed competence nature (e.g. diplomatic engagement and mediation by EU Special Representatives, by EU presidencies or groups of member states, Union's participation in multilateral peace talks, humanitarian aid and development assistance, specific funding with conflict prevention or mitigation focus provided via the Instrument for Peace and Stability). This research, however, aims at examining the impact of institutional factors on interest group advocacy and influence, and thus, while having a broader picture in the frame, it zooms in on the civilian CSDP.

The rapidly expanding literature on the CSDP mentions the role of non-state actors *en passant*. In a book-length volume, Ginsberg and Penksa (2012) recognise the inputs of "interest groups, NGOs and political parties within the union who have special foreign policy interests that are pursued at the EU level" in EU foreign policymaking, however, they do not provide in-depth analysis of their strategies to provide inputs or their influence. They see international NGOs as seeking "to influence the making of EU foreign policy (e.g. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) and/or subcontracted by the EU to implement its humanitarian programs (e.g., Oxfam, International Rescue Committee)" (Ginsberg & Penksa 2012: 38). Scattered throughout the book are examples which narrate the quite limited engagement of non-state actors with CSDP structures. Analysing the politics of CSDP missions, the authors conclude: "While CSDP field operations have modestly increased their consultation with NGOs and civil society (e.g., BiH, Georgia, Kosovo, and DRC), the CSDP planning and conduct process in Brussels is less inviting of outside feedback" (Ginsberg & Penksa 2012: 95). The authors underline the importance of engagement with local actors,

including civil society actors, in enhancing the external effects of CSDP missions as “[c]ivil society provides valuable knowledge for multinational operations and has an essential role in consolidating democracy in post-conflict countries” (Ginsberg & Penksa 2012: 116).

The only exceptions to the literature are articles by Joachim and Dembinski examining civil society participation in the case of arms exports control and as a remedy to the democracy deficit in the EU (Dembinski 2009; Joachim & Dembinski 2011; Dembinski & Joachim 2014). Several policy papers produced by advocacy groups also address the issue of CSDP engagement with civil society (Gourlay 2006; Weitsch 2008; Palm 2010), one of which focuses on EUPOL COPPS as a case study. These papers analyse the existing record of CSDP structures’ openness and engagement with non-state actors from perspectives of both the CSDP missions and non-state actors. What comes out through in the academic literature and policy reports is that CSDP structures do engage with non-state actors, mainly NGOs, think-tanks, community groups and media, but this engagement is not systematic and varies case by case.

The case of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in Indonesia when an NGO – the Crisis Management Initiative of the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari – brokered the peace agreement and played a prominent role in early warning, decision-making in the Council and the planning of the CSDP mission stands out as exceptional, also due to the personal background and experience of Ahtisaari and his access to and relationship with the then High Representative Javier Solana (Gourlay 2006; Dijkstra 2013: 124-144). In the case of EUPOL COPPS, a study reveals that co-operation between the mission and civil society organisations takes place “on a largely ad hoc basis” and depends “to a certain extent on the personal engagement of individual staff

members” which can have “a negative impact on the long-term sustainability of the Mission’s co-operation with CSOs” (Palm 2010: 20-21). The same pattern of non-systematic cooperation holds for the mission’s contacts with women’s organisations as a part of gender mainstreaming work when women’s CSOs are occasionally involved in training provided by the mission for Palestinian police or asked for feedback on police accountability and oversight (Sundin & Olsson 2014). In the case of EULEX, the largest civilian CSDP mission with over 2000 people on the ground and executive mandate, civil society organisations were involved at the planning stage and invited to participate in the evaluation of the mission’s performance, EULEX’s contacts with them were “largely informal and unstructured” (ibidem: 4). Thus, apart from contributing to the main objectives of the comparative study on advocacy and influence in EU foreign policy, this chapter will also be a unique study in the nascent academic and policy debate on non-state actor participation in CSDP policymaking and engagement with CSDP missions.

The chapter builds upon 67 interviews conducted between June 2013 and January 2015 with policymakers, group representatives and experts in Brussels and London in Europe, in East Jerusalem, Ramallah and Jericho in Palestine, and in Tbilisi, Gori, Mtskheta and Zugdidi in Georgia. The fieldwork for this study has been bounded by the dividing lines that separate conflict areas. These boundary lines do not only affect populations living in the conflict zone by hindering their freedom of movement and access to basic services and development, but also limit access for outsiders to the areas behind the division line. Due to these reasons, it was impossible for me to conduct interviews in Gaza, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Thus perspectives of advocacy groups from these areas maybe under-represented in this study.

The research has been enriched by the secondary literature looking into policymaking in CSDP (Dijkstra 2013; Koutrakos 2013; Ginsberg & Penksa 2012; Grevi et al. 2009); role of non-state actors in the EU policy of dealing with conflicts (Tocci 2011; Irrera 2010; Irrera 2013); the EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and state-building in Palestine (Bouris 2014; Bulut 2010; Musu 2010; More 2008; Dosenrode & Stubkjær 2002; Tocci 2010) and towards the conflicts in Georgia and EUMM's role (Popescu 2011; Simons 2012; Freire & Simão 2013; Whitman & Wolff 2012; Crombois 2010; Bosse 2011; Sasse 2010; Martin 2010).

This study also draws on EU policy documents, media reports, position papers and reports produced by advocacy groups. It has not been possible for me to reach out to EU policy documents beyond those available for the public, for in the CSDP more than in any other policy area, all policy documents on the missions are confidential. So I have largely had to rely on my interviews with policymakers to compare what is written in the documents and what is done in practice in terms of their relations with non-governmental actors. The benefit of such limitation is that it puts me in the same shoes that advocacy groups have to wear, helping me better understand obstacles which they must overcome when engaging into the CSDP.

As with the previous two chapters, this one is divided in three sections. The first section overviews three CSDP missions within the context of EU policy of dealing with conflicts in its neighbourhood and describes key policy actors and policymaking procedures. It also overviews groups which have advocated on the CSDP and the conflict issues and which have been interviewed for this study. The second section analyses advocacy strategies focusing on decisions to engage or not, advocacy objectives, venues and targets, tactics and alliances. The third section provides findings

on group influence and factors explaining advocacy success. I conclude summarising the research results of this chapter and contribution to the literature.

1. Case description

1.1. Civilian crisis management in Georgia and Palestine

The two conflict contexts in which the CSDP missions have been deployed are very different, however, in terms of EU engagement they share a number of similarities from the institutional point of view. While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is long-standing and internationalised, the conflicts in Georgia are more recent and have rather regional impact, though their international dimension came to light with Russia's military intervention in Ukraine. In both cases, the EU has been a relative late-comer following other international players. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the EU is still seen to play a secondary role after the US, while its more active engagement started after the Oslo accords with the deployment of a Special Envoy (later named Special Representative) to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and provision of aid for state-building in Palestine, scaled up after the Second Intifada of 2000-2005 with two CSDP missions. In the case of Georgia, the EU became more engaged in 2008 when the French presidency mediated the six-point ceasefire agreement between Russia and Georgia which envisaged an international presence to monitor the implementation and the EU subsequently took this role deploying EUMM. The EU also dispatched its Special Representative (EUSR) for the crisis in Georgia (in addition to the existing EUSR dealing with South Caucasus since 2003) in September 2008.¹⁶ Through EUMM

16 Since 2011 two posts are merged in a single EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia.

the EU has become the only international security actor in the conflict, since UN and OSCE which were present on the ground since early 1990s discontinued their mandates due to Russia's veto. Moreover, in both conflict contexts the EU has been reluctant to introduce sanctions against the occupying state. To sum up, in Georgia and in Palestine, the EU deployed a similar array of conflict resolution tools: CSDP missions, EUSRs, humanitarian, development and other financial aid as well as participation in the multilateral peace talks.

The *EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM)* in Georgia has been a part of the EU response to the Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two regions which broke away from Georgia after civil wars in the early 1990s. However, it was not the first EU attempt to get involved in conflict resolution in Georgia via CSDP. The first CSDP mission to Georgia – EUJUST Themis – was deployed in July 2004-July 2005. The small mission of ten experts was tasked to assist the newly elected pro-European Georgian government who came to power as a result of the Rose Revolution to carry out criminal justice reform. While the mission signalled the EU's political support to the Georgian government, it was rather a contribution to stability and democratic transition rather than conflict resolution as Tbilisi had wished (Helly 2006; Kurowska 2009; Di Puppò 2009). As the Themis mandate was approaching the end, in May-June 2005 the EU considered another ESDP mission to step up the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation on the Georgian-Russian border which was discontinued due to Russia's veto. While Georgia was "literally begging for the EU to take over from the OSCE" (Lynch 2006), the Council was divided on the issue, with the UK and the Baltic states supportive, and the Southern member states, France and Germany opposing such a move (Helly 2006: 95; Popescu 2011: 75). Instead, the Council expanded the mandate

of the EUSR for the South Caucasus and his support team to include border monitoring, though the EU kept the profile of the EUSR border support team as low as possible in order not to antagonise Russia (Huff 2011: 19). In April 2007, the proposal to extend the mandate of the border support team to cover Abkhazia and South Ossetia was vetoed by Greece, who was probably tacitly supported by a number of other member states that preferred not to upset Russia (Popescu 2011: 82).

Deploying EUMM, the EU aimed to contribute to long-term stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding areas and short-term stabilisation reducing the risk of a resumption of hostilities. The EUMM mandate includes four key tasks: (1) stabilisation: the mission monitors, analyses and reports on the situation pertaining to the stabilisation process, centred on full compliance with the six-point agreement, including troop withdrawals, and on freedom of movement and actions by spoilers, as well as on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law; (2) normalisation: the mission monitors, analyses and reports on the situation pertaining to the normalisation process of civil governance, focusing on rule of law, effective law enforcement structures and adequate public order; (3) confidence-building: it contributes to the reduction of tensions through liaison, facilitation of contacts between parties and other confidence building measures; and (4) informing European policy (Council 2008c).

Despite its Georgia-wide mandate, EUMM has never got access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moreover, Russia has never implemented the six-point agreement fully. It has not withdrawn its troops to pre-war positions, but occupied additional territories after the war (Akhalgori and the Kodori Gorge). The access to humanitarian aid is restricted by Russia and the de facto authorities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After Russia unilaterally recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it has

established a long-term military presence there. In 2010, Russian troops started the process called borderisation – erecting fences, barbed wire and placing additional guards along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL). On 24 November 2014, Abkhazia and Russia signed the Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership which envisages coordination of foreign policies and the creation of a common defence and security space, including joint armed groups and border patrolling. Moscow signed an even more far-reaching Treaty on Cooperation and Integration with South Ossetia on 18 March 2015, the anniversary of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

The mission has headquarters in Tbilisi and three field offices in Gori, Mtskheta and Zugdidi. The field offices share responsibility for monitoring the ABL. While the Zugdidi office is responsible for the ABL with Abkhazia, the field offices in Gori and Mtskheta are responsible for the ABL with South Ossetia. Each FO has three teams. The ABL/Confidence Building Team monitors the security regime and the safety and living conditions of the local population, including crossings via the ABL. The Compliance Team monitors Georgia’s military and law enforcement facilities to ensure compliance with the Memoranda of Understanding signed between the mission and the Georgian ministries of defence and internal affairs. The Human Security team is the main point of contact with civil society groups and local communities as they monitor human security issues, such as safety and human rights, freedom of movement and access to services, including the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returned individuals.

EUMM attempts to build confidence with the parties through the so-called Incident Prevention and Reaction Mechanisms (IPRMs), approved at the Geneva International Discussions, a diplomatic forum to address the consequences of the 2008 conflict in Georgia co-chaired by the OSCE, the EU and the UN and in which Georgia, de facto

authorities of the breakaway regions, Russia and US participate. While IPRM meetings facilitated by EUMM and OSCE regularly take place with Georgian, Russian and South Ossetian representatives, the IPRM with the Abkhaz side was discontinued with the Abkhaz side in 2012. A 24-hour telephone hotline system has been established attached to the IPRM to quickly address specific incidents.

At its peak, EUMM had over 400 staff, including 274 international staff, coming from 23 EU member states. EU monitors have civilian, police and military backgrounds. The mission's budget exceeded €26 million in the 2013-2014 financial year. All Heads of Mission were civilians with diplomatic backgrounds coming from Germany, Estonia and Lithuania, with the exception of a Polish army general. The initial 12 months mandate of the mission was extended for another year in July 2009 until 14 September 2010, and subsequently prolonged in 2011, 2012 and 2013. Most recently, in December 2014, the Council extended the EUMM mandate for two years.

The mission is widely seen as a success for its quick deployment and contribution to ease tensions and prevent outbreaks of violence. For Georgia's government, EUMM is important as an international presence on the ground (Interview 146), Russia also appreciates the mission, though non-publicly, as it reinforces the status quo (Boonstra & Melvin 2011: 15). However, given the size of the mission and the lack of access to the breakaway regions, there have been discussions in Brussels to scale it down in order to save resources. As an EU diplomat unveils, the division is between the member states who want to maintain the mission on the same scale and amount of staff – the new member states are in this group – and those who want to reduce the mission, among them Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands (Interview 118). While the EU dropped the idea of resizing EUMM during the strategic review of 2014, as it would

send “a bad signal” to Russia amidst its intervention in Ukraine, certain scaling down is taking place on the ground. The mission’s budget was reduced to 18.3 million for the first year of its renewed mandate and there is a staff reduction up to 20%.

EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) and *EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)* have been deployed to enhance the EU’s contribution to state-building in Palestine within the logic of two state solution adopted by the EU (see more Bouris 2014: Chapter 3). Since the mid 1990s the EU has become the largest donor to Palestinian police counting for over one third of all aid and the EU northern member states were also high on the donor list (Lia 2007:147). After the Roadmap for Peace was adopted and Mahmud Abbas became the Palestinian Authority (PA) President after Yasser Arafat’s death, the EU seized the opportunity to upgrade its aid. Launched during the UK presidency in 2005, the CSDP missions aimed to enhance visibility of the EU in the international conflict resolution mitigating against the Union’s image of “the payer, not the player”.

EUPOL COPPS is a police and rule-of-law mission based in Ramallah with a satellite office in Jericho. The deployment of EUPOL COPPS was built on UK-led efforts to identify areas for support to Palestinian civil policing and on the establishment of a EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) in April 2005 at the Office of the EUSR for the MEPP (Bulut 2009b: 289).

The support to Palestinian police is based on the logic of “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, better known as the Roadmap for Peace, developed by the US, in cooperation with Russia, the EU, and the UN (the Quartet) in 2003. According to it, the fate of Palestinian statehood is dependent on the reform of its security forces. The Roadmap was an echo of the

Second Intifada erupted in 2000 in which the Israeli army fought not only against Palestinian militias and terrorists groups, but also the PA security organisations which were completely destroyed afterwards. Israel convinced the US that any progress in the MEPP should depend on the PA's ability to fight against terrorism and ensure the security of Israel, and this demand was subsequently endorsed by the Quartet (Bouris 2014: 104).

The EUPOL COPPS mandate initially consisted of three dimensions: (1) assisting the Palestinian Civilian Police (PCP) in the implementation of the PCP development programme by advising and closely mentoring PCP, and specifically senior officials at District, Headquarters and Ministerial level; (2) coordinating and facilitating EU and Member State assistance, and where requested, international assistance to PCP; and (3) advising on police-related Criminal Justice elements (Council 2005b). In 2008 the mission's mandate was expanded to include strengthened action in the area of rule of law (Council 2008d), which reflected emphasis on the continuum between policing and justice (Bulut 2009b: 292). Within the rule of law area, EUPOL COPPS provides advice to the Ministry of Justice, the Courts, the Prosecution, the Correction and Rehabilitations Centres Department as well as the Bar Association of lawyers and the Independent Commission on Human Rights (EEAS 2014).

The initial three-year mandate of the mission was extended for another two years in 2008, and for another year in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. Despite the fact that the EUPOL COPPS mandate covers all Palestinian territories, in reality it is limited to the West Bank, since the EU does not cooperate with Hamas government in Gaza. As of July 2014, the mission had 71 international staff and 41 local staff and its annual budget has boosted up to €9.8 million (EEAS 2014). EUPOL COPPS has two main operational

pillars: a Police Advisory and a Rule of Law Section (since 2008) which enlist police officers, magistrates and experts from 19 EU Member States and third countries contributing to the mission (Canada, Turkey and Norway) (*ibidem*). All six EUPOL COPPS HoMs were police officers: four from the UK with service experience in Northern Ireland, one from Sweden and one from France.

EUBAM Rafah is a border mission launched with the aim to provide a third party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point (RCP) linking Gaza with Egypt, to facilitate the opening of the border crossing point and to build up confidence between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The mission is a EU contribution to the implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Movement and Access of 15 November 2005 brokered by the US after Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in August-September 2005 (Asseburg 2009: 84).

The EUBAM Rafah mandate includes three dimensions: (1) actively monitoring, verifying and evaluating PA performance with regard to the implementation of agreements concluded between the parties; (2) contributing, through mentoring, to building up the Palestinian capacity in all aspects of border management at Rafah; (3) contributing to the liaison between the Palestinian, Israeli and Egyptian authorities regarding the management of the RCP. The mission does not have an executive role at the border and its enforcement powers are limited to baggage checking (Bulut 2009a; Pirozzi 2006).

However, EUBAM has worked for only seven months. After the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June 2006 the EUBAM operation was hindered as Israel's Government maintained the RCP frequently closed and after Hamas came to power in Gaza in June 2007, the mission was suspended. Nevertheless, the EU decided to keep

the mission on the ground, though of reduced size and budget, and reiterated its readiness to reactivate the mission ‘once political and security conditions allow’ (Bouris 2012: 263). As an EEAS official explained, each time there is a crisis in Gaza, EUBAM Rafah is “back on the table”, however, the return of the PA to Gaza and the agreement of Israel are necessary conditions for reactivation (Interview 136).

The number of EU staff at the mission was reduced from 57 in 2007 to 18 in 2008 and 13 in 2011. Initially 21 member states were contributing to this mission. Since 2012, EUBAM employs 4 EU staff plus 5 local (Bouris 2014: 117). The mission’s budget also dropped significantly from €7 million in 2005-2007 to an annual €940.000 in 2014. The EUBAM headquarters moved from Israeli resort town Ashkelon to the EU Delegation to Israel in Tel-Aviv. Three HoM of EUBAM were police officers from Italy, two from France and one from Germany.

The EUBAM operational stage was broadly viewed as effective until its suspension in 2007. The mission was deployed rapidly and allowed for the crossing of over 443.000 passengers through the RCP (Bouris 2012; Bulut 2009a). However, the EU authority was seen undermined when EUBAM could not operate for 81 per cent of time because Israel often kept the crossing closed in the period of June 2006-June 2007 (Faber & Kaldoser 2010: 108). Furthermore, there was lot of criticism, including by advocacy groups, about the necessity of maintaining this mission after 2007. Currently, the mission supports the work of EUPOL COPPS at technical level, while local staff in Gaza monitors the situation on the ground. A merge of EUBAM Rafah with EUPOL COPPS has been proposed by the PSC, but no formal decision has been taken by the Council (Bouris 2012: 264). The merger requires the agreement of Israel which from the very beginning was rather reluctant to support EUBAM Rafah (Bouris 2014: 114).

EUPOL COPPS has been recognised by the EU and member states, Israeli government and the PA as a success (Bouris 2014: 112-113). However, the EU is criticised by scholars and civil society groups for putting attention on technical training and infrastructure building, while missing the link with non-reformed political institutions that underpin security sector in Palestine and a broader political strategy of conflict resolution and support to building a viable Palestinian state (Kristoff 2012; Bouris 2014; Bouris 2012; Bulut 2009b). The danger of an overly technical approach to police reform is aggravated by the fact that Palestinian society largely distrusts security agencies, including police, and sees security sector reform (SSR) as an externally-owned process serving the occupier's interests, rather those of Palestinian society (author's interviews; Friedrich & Luethold 2008; Kristoff 2012). As one scholar summed up the EU progress in aiding SSR in Palestine through the two civilian missions, "[t]he pitfall has been that the overall EU approach is mainly technical while it should be fundamentally a political one" (Bouris 2012: 268).

The missions enjoy the broad support of all member states, with the main contributors being Germany, France, UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark (Bouris 2014). The new member states are hardly involved in terms of personnel. However, unlike in the case of EUMM, there was a wide agreement of the member states that the Palestinian missions should be kept. As an EU official revealed, some member states had doubts about EUBAM Rafah, but it has a small budget, while the political signal to be sent out by its closure will be "bad" (Interview 118).

1.2. Decision-makers and decision-making procedures

The CSDP is firmly in the hands of the EU member states. The Council plays the key decision making role adopting decisions upon the launch of CSDP operations and

missions by unanimity, while the EU states are responsible for implementing them. As Ginsberg and Penksa (2012: 61) write, “A CSDP operation is launched when member states calculate that it is in their political interest to have an EU-level, member-state controlled, CSDP operation where there is political visibility for the EU and a perceived need for a union-level response to insecurity”.

Being an integral part of the CFSP, the CSDP has a distinct institutional architecture. Under the responsibility of the Council and of the HR, the PSC at the level of the member state ambassadors exercises the political control and strategic direction of CSDP operations and missions. The Council may authorise the PSC to take the necessary decisions in the course of a crisis management operation, such as the re-appointment or replacement of the Head of Mission (HoM) (Koutrakos 2013: 65).

On civilian missions, the PSC is advised by the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), composed from member states officials coming from foreign affairs, interior and justice ministries (Cross 2010: 12). With the Lisbon Treaty, the Council committees dealing with crisis management have permanent chairs appointed by the HR. The role of CIVCOM is quite influential since in practice the PSC very rarely goes against the decisions approved by it (Cross 2010: 8). In general, the work of the Council committees working on the CSDP is characterized by the culture of negotiation and compromise (Juncos & Reynolds 2007; Howorth 2011; Cross 2010).

The Council Secretariat before the Lisbon Treaty and the EEAS afterwards is delegated with three major functions related to CSDP missions: agenda management, operational planning and management and external representation (Klein 2011: 74). The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) of the EEAS is responsible for political and strategic planning and review of civilian missions and military operations, while the

Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) is responsible for civilian crisis management (Koutrakos 2013: 66). The CPCC became operational in 2008, after reorganisation of the Council Secretariat DG E-IX (civilian crisis management). The CMPD integrated the former DG E-VIII (defence) and IX (civilian crisis management) along with the former Civilian and Military Planning Cell in 2009. The director of the CPCC is also EU Civilian Operations Commander. The CMPD and CPCC directors both report directly to the HR. As the number of CSDP civilian missions is growing, civilian planning capacities are under-resourced (Ginsberg & Penksa 2012: 77; Klein 2011:75).

Since the Lisbon Treaty, the HR has the right of initiative on the CSDP shared with the member states. However, even pre-Lisbon, it was not difficult for the HR Javier Solana (1999-2009) and his staff in the Council Secretariat to put issues on the EU agenda via the Council Presidency and like-minded states (Dijkstra 2013: 79). The EUBAM Rafah mission was “the result of intense entrepreneurship by Solana himself” (ibidem: 80).

When the Council decides to deploy a CSDP mission, the PSC agrees on a Crisis Management Concept, which is drafted by the CMPD on the basis of advice from CIVCOM and the EU Military Committee (EUMC) (Koutrakos 2013: 66; Dijkstra 2013: 83-84). This concept includes an analysis of the situation on the ground, the EU’s political objectives with the intervention, and a proposal for a course of action. The preparation of the Crisis Management Concept may be preceded by a fact-finding mission consisting of the EEAS officials (regional departments, Division for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation, crisis management structures) and member state representatives (Dijkstra 2013: 82-83).

On the basis of the Crisis Management Concept formally approved by the Council the

CPCC prepares civilian strategic options (general possibilities for engagement) to achieve the EU's objectives set out by the Council. Upon the comments of the CIVCOM (and the EUMC, if military strategic options are considered) the PSC drafts a decision outlining the various options, which is submitted to the Council (Koutrakos 2013: 66; Dijkstra 2013: 86).

Given that a civilian CSDP mission is financed from the EU CFSP budget, more in-depth planning takes place in order to calculate its costs before the Council Decision establishing the mission is adopted (Dijkstra 2013: 87). The CPCC drafts the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), a much more detailed plan of the mission outlining the manner in which the Ho M is expected to fulfil the mission's mandate. The CONOPS is to be approved by the PSC and the Council. In parallel, in consultation with the EEAS, the Commission prepares the mission budget which is then discussed by the member states in the RELEX group (Dijkstra 2013: 87). After this planning, the Council approves a formal decision on establishing the mission and its mandate, appointing the HoM and setting out functional (e.g. structure, participation of third states) and financial arrangements. The principle of 'constructive abstention' (a member state may abstain but not block a decision) allows the adoption of a decision to deploy a mission without strict unanimity (Ginsberg & Penksa 2012: 63). The member states are also free not to provide personnel (not to bear the costs of salaries of seconded national staff) for a civilian CDSP mission.

After the decision-making phase is concluded with the Council Decision, the operational planning starts in order to launch the mission on the ground. The CPCC develops the Operation Plan (OPLAN) together with the appointed Head of Mission and sends it for the approval of the member states (Koutrakos 2013: 67; Dijkstra 2013: 91).

Since 2014, as a result of the change of civilian crisis management procedures, there are two Council decisions adopted to launch civilian missions. This was done to allow for more space for planning and preparing the mission. As the CIVCOM member explained, after the adoption of the first Council decision creating the mission, it is deployed on the ground, staff are recruited and CONOPS and OPLAN are drafted on the ground and approved by the Council. Then the second Council decision formally launches the mission with the staff in the operational capability (Interview 107). In 2014, two civilian missions were deployed this way: the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform to Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) and EUCAP Sahel Mali.

The planning process does not follow a strict sequence or a specific deadline. Some missions took but a few weeks to establish, while others required several months (Koutrakos 2013: 67). In the case of Georgia, it took a few weeks from the decision of the extraordinary European Council of 1 September 2008 to dispatch a fact-finding mission to prepare EU's engagement under the then European Security and Defence Policy to the EU Council decision establishing EUMM on 15 September 2008 and to the launch of its operational phase on 1 October 2008 (Fischer 2009; Freire & Simão 2013). EUBAM Rafah also started its operations after just three weeks of preparation, on 25 November 2005, while the formal decision establishing it followed later on 12 December 2005 (Pirozzi 2006). In contrast, EUPOL COPPS outgrew EU COPPS, an initiative to coordinate European aid to Palestinian police under the EUSR's office. Since April 2005, EU COPPS worked closely with the PA to produce the Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme for 2005-2008. The success of EU COPPS was recognised by the Council which in July 2005 decided to turn it into a CSDP mission (Bouris 2014: 109-110), established on 14 November 2005.

At the implementation phase, the HoM is a key figure on the ground and gets considerable autonomy from the EEAS (Klein 2011: 79-81; Dijkstra 2013: 93). The mission regularly reports to the Brussels based structures. Brussels officials (EEAS, CIVCOM, PSC) also visit the mission to monitor the implementation, while the member states are additionally kept informed via their embassies on the ground (Dijkstra 2013: 94).

Other EU actors on the ground, such as the EU Delegations and EUSRs, play a role in coordinating various EU external relations tools, including CSDP missions. For example, the EUSR for MEPP “provided support to deal with highly political issues of the missions work, for example, on extensions of the mission or change of the mandate” (Interview 158). The EUSRs also participate in international conflict resolution forums: the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia represents the EU in the Geneva International Discussions, while the EUSR for the MEPP contributes to the Quartet Special Envoys meetings.

In the middle of the mandate of a CSDP mission, there is a strategic review with the aim of informing the Council before the decision whether to extend, amend or terminate the mission’s mandate. The strategic review is a political document drafted by EEAS structures and then discussed and approved by the member states (Dijkstra 2013: 96-97).

Since the Lisbon Treaty, the European Commission is no longer “associated with CFSP” and does not have a seat on the PSC without the right of initiative, as it used to have before. Nevertheless, the Commission provides humanitarian aid and civil protection through ECHO and development assistance, managed by DG DEVCO, and furthermore exercises financial powers (EU budget and procurement) through the Foreign Policy

Instruments Service, which reports directly to the High Representative (Ginsberg & Penksa 2012: 25). The Commission has its own crisis management tool – the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (before March 2014 – the Instrument for Stability, or IfS) which focuses on a broad range of issues, such as support to mediation, confidence building, rule of law, transitional justice, independent media, prevention and combating of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, pre- and post-crisis preparedness capacity building. This tool, along with EU development and humanitarian aid, has been employed in both conflict contexts. As many grants made by the Commission are managed locally by the EU Delegations, they are turned into potential advocacy targets, despite the fact they have no formal role in the CSDP.

The role of the European Parliament on CSDP issues is extremely limited. It has the right to be informed, which is put into practice via the Council's briefings, meetings with the High Representative and annual reports of CFSP/CSDP activities. Interaction between the EP and the Council and the EEAS has reportedly improved since the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty (Interview 122).

Though the EP has budgetary powers over the CFSP budget, through which civilian CSDP missions are funded, it has never used them. As an EP official explained, "For civilian missions, you can withdraw the money, but that bullet cannot be used twice, it is a nuclear weapon. It is much better to use pressure on the Head of Mission" (Interview 157). The Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) is a key committee to conduct parliamentary scrutiny of CSDP missions. The committee networks with officials from the CSDP structures in the Council and has an important role in information gathering and research on CSDP (Ginsberg & Penksa 2012: 26). Parliamentary scrutiny is also conducted through Joint Consultation Meetings, which

convene the EP representatives from the Budgetary Committee, AFET and SEDE and officials from the Commission, the Council and the EEAS (Interview 122). However, this tool only seems to be employed to a limited extent. As the EP official explains, political scrutiny in the committees is “much better, because it is public” and allows for the confrontation of officials with “a researcher’s opinion” (Interview 157).

The CSDP missions in Georgia and Palestine are routinely mentioned in the EP resolutions on the situation in Georgia or South Caucasus and on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, in the case of Georgia, two months before the August 2008 war, the EP issued a resolution on the situation in Georgia, calling the Council to consider sending a ESDP mission to bolster its presence (European Parliament 2008). MEPs also pose parliamentary questions to the EEAS and the Commission on CSDP missions and CFSP budget related issues.

The EU Court of Justice is not involved in the CSDP. It can merely rule on the inter-institutional disputes, which define the competences of EU institutions (such as the 2008 ruling in the case of the Commission vs. Council on the small arms and light weapons in West Africa) (Ginsberg & Penksa 2012: 26). An EU institution which has been paid almost no attention to in the academic literature on EU foreign policy or lobbying in the EU is the European Court of Auditors (ECA), the EU’s financial watchdog. In 2012, using its right conferred by the TFEU to submit observations in the form of special reports, the ECA produced a report on the EU Assistance to Kosovo. This concerned the rule of law, and examined the effectiveness of the EULEX and the Commission’s funding via the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (ECA 2012). It was the first time that a CSDP mission was scrutinised in the ECA report. As a result of the corruption scandal involving EULEX, which erupted in the autumn of 2014 (Borger

2014), the political role of the ECA in the evaluation of EU expenditures through the CSDP may increase, turning this institution into a potential lobbying target for groups working on transparency and the effectiveness of EU aid.

To sum up, the EU member states play a dominant role in CSDP agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making and implementation. However, Brussels-based EU bureaucracy – since 2010 in the form of the EEAS, and the Council Secretariat before – plays an important function in the agenda-setting, policy formulation and decision-making (the mission's planning) phases. In the case of civilian CSDP missions, the HoM and his staff on the ground and the EEAS officials play a key role in the implementation of the mission mandate and evaluation of its impact. As Dijkstra explains, the importance of Brussels-based bureaucracy is due to the scattered expertise of civilian crisis management in the capitals. EU resources enjoy a relative advantage in terms of resources for civilian missions, in comparison with those of the member states, not to mention the time factor – Brussels-based bureaucrats enjoy much earlier involvement in the early planning stages of CSDP missions, than the majority of their member state counterparts (Dijkstra 2013). Thus along with the Council, the EEAS is a potential lobbying target for the groups. Meanwhile, the traditional targets of interest groups – the Commission and the European Parliament, despite the fact that they possess budgetary powers, are excluded from the policymaking process.

1.3. Overview of groups which have engaged in advocacy

The number of interest groups involved in advocacy on civilian CSDP seems limited when compared to the previous two case studies. This conclusion comes from interviews with EU policymakers and groups themselves. Interviewed officials involved in decision-making and planning of the CSDP missions in Georgia and Palestine report

that their engagement with advocacy groups is not frequent and limited to certain kinds of groups, mostly think-tanks and NGOs. An EU official explains this by the institutional characteristics of the CSDP: “The CSDP is a weird instrument, intergovernmental, decisions are taken by consensus. The centre of gravity are the member states acting by consensus with EU institutions providing building blocks. It is a very Brussels-based process” (Interview 107).

The picture is slightly different for EU staff working in the CSDP missions on the ground. Though contacts with advocacy groups vary depending on a number of factors, as we will see below, the mission staff dealing with human rights, gender and humanitarian issues (where the EU has some competences and normative base) report more frequent interaction with local civil society and international NGOs present in these countries than Brussels-based interviewees in the crisis management structures.

The group most frequently mentioned by Brussels-based interviewees is the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO). EPLO is the platform of European NGOs, NGO networks, and think-tanks which are “committed to peace-building and the prevention of violent conflict”.¹⁷ Its mission is to “influence the EU to be more active at promoting peace and preventing violent conflict throughout the world”.¹⁸ As the group representative explained, EPLO has deliberately chosen to focus on civilian CSDP due to a number of factors: “First, due to the organisational factors: a number of our members are pacifist organisations. Second, the majority of the CSDP missions are civilian. Third, we are trying to provide a counterbalance in policy debate in which there are millions of research workers in Brussels who work on CSDP as a military policy and then come to defence issues. EPLO fills this gap” (Interview 125).

¹⁷ From EPLO leaflet.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

EPLO also runs the Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN), a mechanism for dialogue between EU policymakers and civil society on peace and conflict related issues. The EU provides funding for the CSDN network through the Instrument for Peace and Stability. Some EPLO members such as the International Crisis Group, Oxfam International, Crisis Management Initiative, International Alert, Saferworld, Conciliation Resources, Kvinna till Kvinna, Berghof Foundation have also been mentioned quite often by EU officials working on Georgia or Palestine.

As a CIVCOM member described: “We have regular contacts with EPLO. They have the best outreach in Brussels. They either come to us and we have working breakfasts, or we attend their meetings with their guests. For example, we attended a meeting at which the International Crisis Group was talking about Ukraine, or Amnesty was talking about Kosovo. These meetings are usually dedicated to specific topics or general discussion, for example, about SSR. Regular contacts with them is a normal practice” (Interview 118). An official from EEAS sees EPLO as “a one-stop shop for coordinating events where we can pass a single message instead of passing many to different audiences. It is a kind of clearing house: they do the job to get right people” (Interview 154).

While interests of technology and defence industry may be a factor explaining the growth and development of the CSDP (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 195), and especially the focus of the EU’s agenda on the military CSDP,¹⁹ they have been less visible in EU policymaking on civilian CSDP missions. Within the scope of this research, I could not identify any business group interested in the CSDP missions in

19 See EPLO (2013a). Moreover, Bechtel and Scheiner find out that defence industry profits from intensified CSDP as their data shows that financial markets react positively to the European Council’s decisions that consolidate EU military capabilities (Bechtel & Schneider 2010), while Mai’a K. Davis Cross shows the industry interests had a notable influence on the integration of security research in the EU (Cross 2011). See also Andersson (2013) for an overview of defence industry lobby in the EU.

question. Though private security companies reportedly approach policymakers working for the CSDP, their advocacy is less intense than that of public interest groups and seems to focus on the advertisement of their services (e.g. logistics, transport) which can be procured by the missions. As an EU official working in the CSDP structures stated: “[Private security providers] come to ask about needs in equipment, to understand better what we need, and they also come to sell their services. There are not so many security providers who approached us as compared with NGOs and other actors” (Interview 158). A similar account comes from the European Parliament: “The private security companies are less visible in terms of lobbying. It is more others who are concerned with the EU using private security companies who raise their voice. Obviously, more regulatory approach is dominant. The spotlight is more on whether there are money coming for technology and research in defence industry” (Interview 122).

Indeed, European associations representing the interests of private security industry such the European Organisation for Security (EOS), European Corporate Security Association (ECSA) and the Confederation of European Security Services (CESS) have primary focus on EU-level market regulation of their services, EU internal security issues and their external aspects (e.g. border control) and EU funding of security research rather than the civilian CSDP. This can be compared to Voltolini’s mapping of non-state actors lobbying on EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: less than 30% of them are business groups (Voltolini 2013: 105). Moreover, business lobbying is “almost exclusively on specific pieces of legislation or on the framework of EU policies that affect their sector of activity”, while “on most occasions, business groups tend to be ‘silent’” (ibidem: 106).

The conflict context also seems to affect to what extent advocacy groups engage with CSDP/CFSP structures and the missions. In the case of Palestine, while there are over two hundred groups lobbying on the EU's policy towards the conflict (Voltolini 2013; Voltolini 2012), few groups focus on the CSDP missions as a policy issue and as a target of their advocacy or the MEPP in which the EU is engaged. Instead, they focus on very different issues which do not always hit the core of the EU's engagement into conflict resolution and crisis management via the CFSP/CSDP.

Having approached some of those advocates which are defined as a 'core group' by Voltolini consisting mainly of Brussels-based NGOs and partly NGOs on the ground with constant contacts with policymakers (Voltolini 2013: 123), I have ascertained why CSDP missions do not feature on their lobbying agenda. As a representative of an international NGO coalition working in Brussels on the EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict put it, "The NGOs do not focus on the CSDP missions because it is a marginal issue on the ground" (Interview 139). Whereas the NGO advocated for international pressure to lift the blockade of Gaza, EUBAM Rafah did not feature among their priorities: "Lifting the blockade is a precondition for activation of the EUBAM Rafah. And we fear that the EU may want to step in in activation of the mission with Israel without really lifting the blockade. EUBAM Rafah reactivation debate happens during every crisis: 'What should we do? We should reactivate the mission'. This is not the answer. The mission can be a small chip. Once the blockade is lifted, then it is useful as the offer on the table is to reactivate the crossings, not just in Rafah. It is a tiny bit. The focus of the EU should be on politics, rather than on the small technical element. First, the EU should not be complicit in the international humanitarian law violations, which take place according to the reports of recognised

organisations such as ICRC. Second, the EU should stay out of perpetuating of unfair solutions. The EU should step in when the blockade is lifted” (ibidem). Similarly, NGOs also see the MEPP as of little relevance for their work as “it does not represent the realities on the ground” (Interview 105).

Instead, the bulk of advocacy by Palestinian, Israeli and international groups is about trying to influence EU policy towards Israel – to put pressure on Israel or to block EU attempts to mount such pressure. Many interviewed representatives of the ‘core group’ advocate for the EU to pressure Israel in order to prevent international human rights and humanitarian law violations in Israel and the OPTs and raise the costs of occupation for Israel. They want the EU to challenge Israel’s settlement policies and exclude illegally occupied enclaves from EU-Israel relations, to push Israel to lift the Gaza blockade and allow freedom of movement for Palestinians within Israel and the OPTs, as well as to bring Israel’s government to accountability for “gross human rights violations in Gaza”. State-building in Palestine, to which the EU seeks to contribute via the CSDP missions is a secondary question at best, as the vast majority of advocates see it as a ‘no-go’ in the context of Israel’s occupation.

In the case of EU policy towards the conflicts in Georgia, there is a limited number of groups active at the EU level, but their advocacy touches upon the core of the EU policy of conflict resolution and crisis management conducted via the CFSP/CSDP. In most cases, these are European and local NGOs who conduct projects in Georgia and the breakaway entities, and their work is very relevant to what the EU does on the ground. They work to build confidence between the parties at civil society and also semi-official levels, tackle the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and help communities to decrease tensions and prevent the re-escalation of violence. Moreover, some

international and local NGOs have been doing their job for two decades, so the EU officials highly value their work and engage with them regularly. Furthermore, the EU and member states often come as key donors to these groups. Just like in the case of EPLO, several international NGOs working in Georgia have been long-term receivers of EU funding. So in a way, they are also implementers of the EU conflict resolution and crisis management policy. As an interviewed policymaker put it, “These are the prolongation of the EU arms” (Interview 158). Thus, even though fewer groups are involved in EU policy towards the conflicts in Georgia in comparison with the case of Palestine, there is a tight network of policymakers and non-state actors working hand in hand.

Unlike in the case of CFSP sanctions in Chapter 4, where advocacy groups can be divided in two opposing camps, there is no such battlefield in the case of civilian CSDP missions. Most often groups compete for the attention of, and access to, policymakers. Their advocacy usually touches upon decisions or policy implementation which are hidden from the public agenda. In many cases, they work with one policymaker, unit or mission staff on a small issue of interest, or what Lowery calls “casework” – “a relatively quiet interaction between single or a few organizations and single or a few politicians” (Lowery 2007). Many interviewed groups do not even call it advocacy, but information sharing. In many cases, there would be CSDP missions themselves reaching out to groups for information, consultation or other services which groups can provide.

For this case study, representatives of 31 groups have been interviewed. Nearly half of the interviewed groups focus on the EU’s policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the half on the EU’s policy towards the conflicts in Georgia. Few groups work on both conflicts or deal with cross-cutting issues related to EU policy of conflict

resolution and crisis management. Not all the groups focus on the CSDP. All the interviewed are public interest groups – think-tanks, NGOs and associations of NGOs. Thirteen groups are international or European organisations, nine of which are either Brussels-based or have offices in Brussels. The majority of the interviewed groups are based in the third countries where CSDP missions are deployed and most interaction between policymakers and non-state actors related to the work of CSDP missions appears to take place. Since EUBAM Rafah has been in stand-by mode since 2007, it has been very difficult to collect evidence of interest group engagement in the case and some advocacy instances related to this mission may be missed by my research. Furthermore, I must also mention that few big international human rights NGOs who have been identified as extremely relevant for this study did not respond to the repeated interview requests (most likely due to limited resources as the Brussels-based staff of these organisations usually cover numerous EU foreign policy portfolios). Given the scarcity of groups engaged in advocacy on CSDP missions, this may have impact on research findings.

2. Advocacy strategies

2.1. Advocacy objectives

The advocacy objectives of the groups involved in the civilian CSDP vary greatly. Generally, it can be said that most of the groups, especially on the ground, strive simply to get access to CSDP structures and obtain more information on the work of the missions, as well as more participation in what they do. For EPLO, improving the access of civil society groups to policymakers in the CSDP is a cross-cutting goal and

the core part of what the group does via its projects supported by the EU, for example, through the CSDN. In other cases, access to the mission helps local or international groups to implement their key mandate (e.g. provide services to communities), to exert influence on their own governments (e.g. using the mission as an ally in pushing through domestic reforms or decisions) and to fundraise (part of their survival strategies).

The EU-based groups with interest in conflict prevention and resolution tend to have two kinds of objectives: they aim to draw the EU's attention to a crisis, conflict or thematic issue and push it to intervene or act (agenda-setting), or they would like the EU to improve its existing policies or structures (policy formulation, implementation and evaluation). In terms of the case of EU involvement in Georgia and Palestine through the CSDP, the interviewed groups mainly work within the second type of objective.

One of EPLO's broad advocacy objectives is "to ensure that conflict prevention and peace-building are prominent within the policies and structures of EU external affairs". As the EPLO representative explains, within this objective EPLO aims to "increase the effectiveness of the civilian CSDP missions, by which we understand the way the missions are planned, prepared, carried out and evaluated; and to increase the accountability. Under accountability we understand accountability to the member states and people in the member states, but primarily to populations of the countries in which CSDP missions operate" (Interview 125).

More specifically, EPLO aimed to contribute to the discussion on civilian CSDP during the preparation of the European Council meeting in December 2013 which, among other issues, focused on the effectiveness and impact of CSDP. EPLO produced a policy paper on the civilian CSDP of March 2013, in which the group outlined the main

reforms they would like to push for. The reforms envisaged integration of CSDP missions into overall EU country or regional strategies; revision of civilian CSDP concepts; integration of conflict analysis into mission planning; rigorous and participatory evaluation of CSDP missions; improvement of the relationship between CSDP missions and local populations (EPLO 2013a).

As the EPLO representative describes, “discussions on CSDP were overshadowed by defence issues. The military CSDP received most attention in the preparations to the Council – in the way that the baskets were put together and on what issues in the baskets they were looking at. The member states such as France were interested in it. EPLO did damage limitation. We were trying to support the member states on the civilian side, to encourage them to be active. We tried to do so and push the idea of deliverables” (Interview 125). While for the military CSDP, specific “deliverables” – i.e. decisions to be taken by the member states such as regarding pooling and sharing of resources and funding to the European defence industry were discussed in the course of the preparation to the European Council, EPLO suggested such deliverables for the civilian CSDP (EPLO 2013b).

Apart from the EPLO objective to reform civilian CSDP, the group also aims to “open up” CSDP structures to interaction with, and input from, civil society. Nearly everything done by the group in terms of advocacy – conveying meetings with CIVCOM members, organising roundtables on specific conflicts or cross-cutting issues and meetings with EU policymakers related to the planning or strategic review of CSDP missions – is guided by this overarching objective. As EPLO reveals: “With these meetings we have two objectives: to provide recommendations and to build trust, to show that working with civil society can be useful” (Interview 125).

In the case of the EU missions to Palestine, the key group advocating for policy change towards the two missions was the Brussels-based Quakers Council for European Affairs (QCEA), an EPLO member. QCEA seeks to influence the EU's approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the parties to this conflict based on the rights based approach rather than advocating for a specific solution of one or two separate states (QCEA 2013). The basis for the QCEA's advocacy on EU crisis management in Palestine was a briefing paper on the two EU missions published in 2011. QCEA lobbied the EU to close EUBAM Rafah "in light of the serious concerns regarding the legal basis of the mission since June 2007" and dedicate the money spent on the mission to a more effective means of bringing peace in Palestine and Israel (QCEA 2011). For EUPOL COPPS, QCEA advised the EU to keep the mission in place, but to enhance its visibility both locally and at the EU level (*ibidem*).

As a group representative explained, given the limited resources of the group, the focus of advocacy was on the EUBAM Rafah mission "because it was about what the EU was not doing" (Interview 140). As the interviewee continues, "I felt it was a strategic and tactical mistake that the EU is participating in a big pretence at someone's expense. That because of the Israel's position and that the EU cannot give a politically astute response to it. My position was the mission should be shut down until we can make a real difference. In terms of EUPOL COPPS, the situation was different, they were equipping Palestinian police. It is a common theme for all CSDP missions is that they are pretending to be more significant than they are, they are a part of the pretence" (*ibidem*).

Whereas many NGOs involved in peacebuilding are pacifist, advocacy for military CSDP solutions is rather rare. An example is advocacy by a member state-based think-

tank which, along with broadening the resources available for two civilian missions in Palestine, also argued for deployment of a Gaza-Israeli military border mission to “facilitate Israeli- Palestinian security coordination, and [to] also create the possibility for EUBAM Rafah to expand its civilian capacity to the other Gaza-Israel crossings as well as to the “safe passage” between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank” (CITpax 2006).

In the case of Georgia, advocacy groups have been generally very supportive of EUMM, thus focusing their advocacy on the implementation issues. One of the EU-based groups involved in advocacy with EUMM is the UK NGO Saferworld. In 2009, Saferworld advocated for the introduction of more effective monitoring techniques that would engage the local communities. The group tried to make EUMM aware of their impact on the local level conflict dynamics, whether positive, such as stimulating contacts across the conflict division line or negative such as contributing to local population’s sense of insecurity (Saferworld 2010: 19). As part of this work Saferworld conducted an assessment of the EUMM’s approach for engaging with communities, and has advised EUMM on how to implement its recommendations. Saferworld experts developed and delivered a training course on effective community monitoring to the EUMM monitors.

Moreover, together with its local partners, Saferworld advocated for cooperation between communities living on the ABL between Shida Kartli and South Ossetia, local police and EUMM on infrastructure or other development issues in order to improve safety and reinforce links between the communities and security providers (ibidem). Saferworld aimed to include the views of local communities to the EUMM work, including confidence building measures such the IPRM between Georgians, Russians

and South Ossetians facilitated by EUMM. Moreover, Saferworld and its local partners wanted the EU to push the Georgian government to take up this confidence building measure (Interview 104).

A number of Georgian NGOs working with IDP communities or population living along the ABL have been continuously working with EUMM in order to help solving human rights issues and improving economic and social welfare and the security of the conflict affected population. The issues they have advocated often concern funding to infrastructure projects or the solution of pressing needs of the population in the conflict-affected areas. The groups have lobbied the EU and other international organisations to increase monitoring of international funds to the Georgian government on the IDPs or to put pressure on the Georgian government regarding certain specific issues related to the Georgian policies. EUMM is seen by the Georgian NGOs as an ally for domestic advocacy of issues such as water supply along the ABL, safer return of IDPs to their houses, registration of property rights for returnees and so forth.

Whereas EUMM is not a donor to civil society groups, the EU through the EU Delegation in Tbilisi and the European Commission are. Engaging in information sharing with EUMM can help local organisations to improve their fundraising strategies. A representative of a Georgian NGO said that thanks to the advice of EUMM staff, they successfully applied for EU funding for their confidence-building project (Interview 161). Moreover, since EUMM has some small budget for public relations, some groups can even seek funding with EUMM directly. A representative of an NGO involved in confidence building work for journalists recounted that they lobbied EUMM to support some activities of their project bringing together journalists from the sides of the conflict (Interview 135).

2.2. Advocacy targets and levels of lobbying

When do groups engage in advocacy at the EU level?

The development of the CSDP, especially its civilian dimension, served as “the Europeanisation moment” for groups working on non-violent conflict and civilian crisis management to start lobbying in Brussels. EPLO, founded in 2001 by 17 organisations from EU member states, provides a good example. As its representative says, the establishment of EPLO “was a reflection of developments at the EU level with EU foreign policy coming towards a common policy of EU member states. The member state-based organisations wanted to work at the EU level too. It also coincided with the Swedish presidency and its programme [the Swedish presidency in the Council put a great emphasis on civilian CSDP and conflict prevention – author²⁰]. Then 9/11 happened” (Interview 125).

For QCEA, an active EPLO member, interest in the CSDP missions in Palestine grew out of their general interest in civilian crisis management and their work in Israel and Palestine. As the group representative explains the start of their advocacy on the issue, “We felt the necessity to engage with the Council rather than the Commission. CIVCOM was our entry point, though it was not easy to engage with. As a group we also had the necessary expertise on civilian crisis management. In 2009, QCEA started work on Israel/Palestine and on the EU’s role in the conflict and we were analysing what has been done and what issues were not covered by what others had been doing. We figured out that most people in Israel/Palestine do not know about the missions existence” (Interview 140).

In the case of Georgia, most of the advocacy organisations were working on the conflict

20 See more Jakobsen (2009).

long before EUMM was deployed. They worked with EU actors outside the CSDP: the European Commission and its delegation in Tbilisi, the EUSR for the South Caucasus and EU member states. Often EU policymakers turned to non-state actors for certain expertise. In some cases, non-state actors were provided with EU funding to advise both the EU and Georgian government (Interview 99). It is an example of how the EU machinery reaches out to NGOs to advance things which it cannot advance on its own (e.g the EU funded a project providing advice to the Georgian government on the strategy of engaging with breakaway entities; the EU supports international NGOs to engage with actors in Abkhazia to which the EU, apart from the EUSR, otherwise would not have access).

At which policy stages do they lobby?

Groups attempt to lobby at all stages of policymaking, however, the absolute majority of the interviewed groups were active at the implementation stage. This can seemingly be explained by the fact that the CSDP structures exclude outside actors during agenda-setting, planning and decision-making, and during the evaluation and strategic review of the missions. At the same time, CSDP missions reach out to non-state actors at the implementation stage. As we will see, this access varies depending on various factors, including the mission's mandate, the organisational culture of the mission, which is often dependent on the mission's leadership and staff, and the conflict context. As one EU official put it "At the implementation stage, interaction with non-state actors partly depends on the mission mandate and the people you have there"(Interview 107). But in general, there is more interaction with advocacy groups on the ground than in Brussels.

On the one hand, in Brussels, the EU limits its interaction with civil society actors by channelling it through 'one-stop shop' such as EPLO. On the other hand, unlike in

foreign policy areas analysed in the previous chapters, there are no formal mechanisms of consultation with non-state actors in the CSDP. Thus, much more than in other fields, in the CSDP, access depends on informal relations between groups and policymakers.

The interaction of CSDP structures with civil society is guided by the “Recommendations for Enhancing Co-operation with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the Framework of EU Civilian Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention” adopted by CIVCOM in November 2006. Such cooperation should be driven by the goal of operational efficiency (CIVCOM 2006). The three-page document proposes CSDP structures to engage NGOs and CSOs via informal exchanges at the PSC and CIVCOM in the Council; during fact-finding and pre-planning missions; in view of mission evaluation and lessons learnt process; via the establishment of NGO/CSO liaison officers in the missions and the Council Secretariat (EEAS) and defining modalities for routine information exchange with civil society in the field (*ibidem*). It appears from the interviews that these guidelines are implemented in a not very systematic way. A lot seems to depend on an EU official interpreting and applying them. For example, the EUMM personnel working with civil society say that the guidelines are vague, whereas their superiors in charge may not be open to information exchanges with civil society.

Still, there are instances of lobbying at the earlier stages of policy cycle. Few Brussels-based groups made efforts (in some cases, successfully) to put issues on the EU agenda by drawing attention to conflicts, asking for intervention or feeding their points into the Council discussions on the civilian CSDP. EPLO, for example, tried to push the idea of deliverables for the civilian CSDP ahead of a European Council meeting. Another Brussels-based group working on conflicts claims success for the EU intervention in

Congo in 2003.²¹ The group had worked on the conflict analysis and arguably knew more about the events on the ground than some EU member states. As the group representative says, “If there were no ICG in 2003, Africa would have had the biggest genocide in its history. A colleague prepared research on this conflict. Our president talked to Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary General. We had a two hour briefing with the UN Security Council. And then we also talked to the Africa advisor to President Chirac, we had maps open on the table, and ICG knew a lot more about what was going on on the ground than French intelligence and military intelligence. France decided to move. We later learnt that at that time Kofi Annan had also called Chirac. Nobody was looking at that part of the world at that time, it was the first month of the Iraq war” (Interview 96).²² In the case of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, NGO Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), played a crucial role in putting the issue on the Council’s agenda, decision-making and planning (Gourlay 2013; Gourlay 2006). However, these two examples are exceptional. Both groups – ICG and CMI – enjoyed a high level of access to the Council (in the case of ICG to the French president and in the case of CMI to the HR Javier Solana and UK presidency in the EU) due to the group leadership (former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari was a founder of CMI and chairman of ICG, while ICG president was former Australian foreign minister at that time). Moreover, in both cases groups possessed some knowledge or other resources (access to the peace talks as a mediator in case of the CMI) which the EU did not.

During the planning stage, the contact with non-state actors is extremely limited. As a CIVCOM member says, even EPLO is not involved in the planning process of a

21 On 12 June 2003, the Council adopted the Operation Plan and the Decision to launch a Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – Artemis, first military mission outside Europe and independent of NATO. The Operation ended officially on 1 September 2003.

22 France contributed 90% of troops to that military operation.

particular mission (Interview 107). The only time when the EEAS structures involved in the mission's planning reached out to EPLO was during the planning process of the EUAM Ukraine.²³ A two-hour meeting with civil society groups was organised in Brussels by EPLO and attended by the CPMD and CPCC staff as well as the EUAM staff. However, the large part of the meeting was dedicated to convincing the EU officials of the value of cooperating with civil society on the ground by bringing examples of civil society involvement in SSR in Ukraine and other transition and conflict contexts. Without having any access to the planning documents or even discussions, the NGOs found it difficult to make any substantial contribution to the EU debate.

There is no systematic involvement of non-state actors in the evaluation of the mission's impact or strategic review process. As a CIVCOM member stated:

“The real evaluation is done in the strategic review which done by the EEAS and CMPD. They do try to reach beyond the strict circle, but it is still limited. They could be coming to the country to do the review there, for a week or so, limits on amounts of contacts, mainly governmental and international actors, not much time for outside actors” (Interview 107).

An EPLO representative confirms this account:

“Together with OSI we thought that strategic review could be an opportunity for us to engage with crisis management bodies. We started information meetings with the crisis management structures of which no one would know that strategic planners meet civil society, we would go to the Cortenbergh building and then leave in secrecy, so the member states would not know. It started with DRC

23 Presentation by Catherine Woollard, EPLO Director, at the EPLO event “EUAM Ukraine and Effective Security Sector Reform: input from civil society”, 11 September 2014, Brussels.

mission [EUPOL Congo]. Now we have more established process. We also do it through the CSDN. It allows us to cover our time and also to bring civil society experts from outside Brussels. Before it was only people who were based here and there are not many, because we did not have funds to bring them” (Interview 125).

A staff member of an international organisation based in Ramallah shares their experience of being consulted for the EUPOL COPPS evaluation:

“This winter the EU commissioned an internal assessment of impact on the ground of EUPOL COPPS. There were very informal consultations. We did not provide much information to them because we thought that the way in which we were consulted was unprofessional. We were at another meeting and we were called from it to other room, and without any warning or explaining to us what was going on, we were just asked “What do you think of EUPOL COPPS?” (Interview 160).

EPLO and its members participated in the meeting with CSDP structures during the EUMM strategic review. However, an interviewed EEAS official found this meeting “superficial” (Interview 137). This may have to do with the fact that the groups do not have much information on those specific issues which the EEAS would like to discuss in order to provide a meaningful input.

Strategic planners may have contacts with local and international NGOs on the ground during their fact finding missions. In the preparation of the first strategic review preceding the extension of the EUPOL COPPS mandate to the rule of law, several NGOs were consulted; moreover, the assessment also included a mapping of local civil society actors relevant for the mission’s work (Irrera 2013: 109). An EEAS official who led the strategic review process admits that the Crisis Response Team met with “all kinds of CSOs and people” during their assessment in the field (Interview 143).

Another planner narrates a similar experience of interacting with non-state actors in the preparation of the strategic review for EUBAM Rafah:

“We are not allowed to meet with state actors – Hamas, so we drew on information from civil society, from Palestinian think-tanks, NGOs, business, few industry representatives to get a feeling of how Gaza looked at that moment. At my level, such contacts are annual. It was for the preparation for strategic review. What kind of information are we looking for? To have a genuine ground truth on the situation on the ground, to see the difficulties which they experience and what visions for future they have. I used this information for briefings here in Brussels” (Interview 154).

To sum up, Brussels-based CSDP structures remain largely closed for non-state advocates. There are no formal mechanisms for interaction between policymakers and outside groups. Furthermore, confidentiality of the policy documents starting from the planning documents to the mission’s reports further limits the potential input of advocacy groups. Most contacts happen on the ground as EU officials seek for information from local and international NGOs, business groups and other non-state actors, or the missions need to engage with civil society in order to implement their mandates in a more effective manner. In the next section, we will analyse in greater detail why the groups may find it easier to target the staff in the CSDP missions with their advocacy.

Advocacy targets

Nearly all groups I interviewed try to lobby at both EU level and member state level, which supports the H4 hypothesis outlined in Chapter 2. Given that the CSDP is a Brussels-based process led by the EU member states, Brussels-based groups working on

conflict prevention target the Council at the level of the PSC and CIVCOM. They also approach EEAS crisis management structures as well as geographic structures if a certain country or region are at stake.

In the case of Georgia, the EUSR is probably one of the most targeted actors by both EU-based and Georgia-based groups. The EUSR for the South Caucasus is based in Brussels, but it has an office in Tbilisi and its staff travels in the region. It is the only EU actor with access to Abkhazia. The group's reports mostly target the EUSR through its political advisers be they in Brussels or in Tbilisi. In the case of Palestine, at the time of conducting interviews, the EUSR for the MEPP was already abolished. However, Brussels-based groups working on EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict do not report targeting the EUSR for the MEPP in the past.

The Commission is reported as a lobbying target in cases when trade or aid issues are at stake, not on the CSDP, which is logical as it does not have any competences. The EP is not a target either. Among the interviewees, only one Brussels-based think-tank mentioned systematically targeting friendly MEPs from SEDE or AFET (Interview 109). As an interviewee from a Brussels-based NGO explained: "MEPs are not that key when it concerns a foreign policy issue. They are allies of ours, they took many of our reports: copy-paste from our reports on the South Caucasus in their resolutions" (Interview 121). In a similar vein, a representative of a Brussels-based group working on the EU's policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict argued: "The European Parliament is a big boat, huge cargo. Many MEPs do not have a clue about what they do. It is good to have a few friends in political groups, in the secretariats and few MEP assistants. Time is limited. Five MEPs and two political advisers is enough. We do not waste time influencing EP resolutions" (Interview 95).

Few other groups say that they may approach MEPs on occasion as a means of getting through to other institutions. For example, QCEA used a friendly MEP to pose parliamentary questions to the crisis management structures to get information on EUBAM and EUPOL COPPS (Interview 140).

Lobbying the national capitals is recognised as important by EU-based groups, however, their resources are scarce. Thus, groups either choose to focus on few key member states such as Germany, the UK, France and sometimes other countries key for their regions or issues, or to tackle the opponents, for example Czech Republic or the Netherlands in the case of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Membership-based associations try to use their members in the EU capitals to target MFAs and other policy actors, however, it is challenging, since member organisations are not always skilled in advocacy and able to understand intricacies of policy process and to follow the EU agenda closely. An EU-based NGO representative shares their experience which is also common for groups which do not have offices in Brussels, but carry out activities on the ground: “We target EU member states in Georgia, not so much in Brussels and not in the capitals” (Interview 127).

In Georgia and Palestine, local groups target the EU Delegation, in particular political section, including staff liaising with civil society and human rights groups, and operational section staff dealing with funding. Advocacy groups, both local and international, also lobby EU member states embassies which is also connected to their fund-raising strategies.

While in Georgia, EUMM is an advocacy target for nearly all groups I have interviewed – both local civil society organisations and international NGOs and think-tanks, which is not the case for Palestinian and international NGOs. While EUBAM Rafah is on

stand-by since 2007, only few groups in Ramallah say that they engage with EUPOL COPPS. Meetings with the mission representatives usually take place at roundtables and seminars on SSR and justice reform issues funded by donors. Four NGOs were selected as partners in the implementation of the UNDP- EUPOL COPPS Joint Programme “Strengthening Internal Police Accountability, National Anti-Corruption and Civilian Oversight” co-funded by the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Belgium. Through this programme EUPOL COPPS has sought to encourage internal and external accountability of the PCP, also in a reaction to the criticism of Palestinian and international NGOs of human rights violations by security agencies and corruption in the PA. External accountability is seen as important in the absence of the parliamentary oversight when the mandate of the Palestinian Legislative Council has expired. However, the Palestine police was reluctant to be placed under external oversight and EUPOL COPPS has worked to help set up mechanisms of internal accountability, while promoting the openness of the police to civil society actors and supporting awareness raising by selected NGOs on civilian-police cooperation and culture of complaints and monitoring activities (Interview 123).

Based on a mapping study on civilian oversight over the PCP and anti-corruption bodies commissioned by the UNDP and EUPOL COPPS (Buttu 2013), four NGOs were chosen, of which two work on security issues and two on the fight against corruption. During the first phase, between the end of 2012 and 2014, the grants were provided to the NGOs to conduct their activities. The EUPOL COPPS interactions with civil society were guided by the Joint Programme:

“At each milestone within this programme, we would have exposure to civil society. At joint events, police presented what they were doing and the CSO

community would give their opinions. Police does outreach in districts and they hold townhall meetings with local CSOs. These activities are supported by donors through the UNDP” (Interview 123).

In the case of Georgia, EUMM pro-actively seeks contacts with civil society groups. This is due to the fact that this is a monitoring mission, and so relies on different sources of information, including non-state actors. At the same time, NGOs also reach out to the mission as a “source of unbiased information” and to solve practical issues concerning safety and security of communities along the ABL or of IDPs by sharing information, liaising with international donors or raising the issue with Georgian authorities. The mission’s personnel in Gori and Zugdidi are an important element of local communities. In the field, EUMM is the only international actor on the ground. The mission staff not only are in frequent contact with NGOs, but also with schools who ask to come and speak with presentation on the EU, Europe or EUMM. In Ramallah, overcrowded with international organisations, EUPOL COPPS whose staff mainly works with government agencies is a far less visible actor. More importantly, unlike in the case of EUPOL COPPS, EUMM has a number of communication mechanisms with civil society groups in Georgia.

In EUMM, a number of staff in HQ and Field Offices (FO), such as political advisers, human rights advisers, gender advisers, analytical capability analysts, press and public information officers, human security staff in the FO and hotline coordinators have regularly (ranging between daily, weekly and monthly) contacts with civil society organisations to enable the exchange of information and views. In the case of EUPOL COPPS, contacts with civil society are concentrated in the Rule of Law section, mainly at the level of human rights and gender advisers who keep regular (on a weekly basis)

contact with civil society as a partner to mainstream gender and human rights within the official counterparts. There are also contacts at the level of press and public information officer.

Moreover, the EUMM HQ and FO officers have a number of institutionalised practices of communication with civil society. The FO in Zugdidi holds information sharing meetings with local civil society every four weeks. The FO in Gori runs monthly post-IPRM briefings by the Head of FO to which local NGOs are invited. At the time when the interviews were conducted, the FO in Mtskheta was planning to establish regular consultations with local civil society. EUMM ran the 16 days of activism campaign against gender based violence in which the EUMM gender advisers and monitors met police officers, and also with NGO and local communities representatives across the country. The mission's Press and Public Information Unit set up the EUMM Prize for Peace Journalism as a means "to reconnect with media" and to reach out to the South Ossetian, Abkhazian and ethnic Georgian journalists working on the conflict (Interview 98).

While EUMM and EUPOL COPPS differ in mandate and structures within the mission to engage with civil society, there is also a difference in perception of the role of the CSDP mission by local advocacy groups. Though neither in Georgia nor in Palestine the missions are seen as a part of a conflict resolution solution. In Georgia EUMM is widely viewed as a security provider, especially by the population living along the ABL, while in Palestine the EU's assistance to security sector, including EUPOL COPPS, though to a lesser extent than US assistance, is perceived to focus mostly on the security of Israel, not the security of Palestinian citizens. Both international and Georgian NGOs are generally positive about the role of EUMM and conduct projects which are relevant to

the EUMM activities. Palestinian and some international organisations work on the PA police reform, but there are other issues much higher on their international advocacy agenda. As a representative of a Ramallah-based NGO explains:

“We are working on various fronts: on the internal front we are talking to the international community about Palestinian violations, and on the external, we are talking about Israeli violations. But we cannot compare them: Israeli violations are much higher [in numbers and scale] as Israel is an occupier. With the violations by Palestinian security forces we do not go to the international organisations or international human rights organisations, we go directly to senior personnel in the Palestinian security forces, we make statements and talk to media. On Israeli violations, we go to international bodies such as the UN, EU, [we speak to the] international community” (Interview 150).

A director of a Palestinian NGO defending media freedoms adds another perspective underlining the fact that EUPOL COPPS mandate is narrow, focusing on the PCP, while the PCP is less involved in violations of journalists’ rights and access to information than other security agencies in Palestine (Interview 145).

In Georgia, international NGOs together with their local partners have been working for years on confidence building, IDPs and other conflict-related issues. In the case of Palestine, CSO oversight over the police force is “ad hoc” and “of limited nature”, despite significant attention paid by civil society to the performance of the security sector agencies (Buttu 2013). In the fight against corruption, CSO oversight of the Palestinian Anti-Corruption Commission and the Corruption Crimes Court is conducted largely by one NGO, AMAN – Coalition for Integrity and Accountability, the Palestinian chapter of Transparency International (*ibidem*).

2.3. Advocacy tactics

Inside lobbying prevails, with face-to-face meetings with policymakers being most

frequently reported. These can be individual meetings or meetings together with other groups such as briefings, working breakfasts or informal conversations at the margins of the other events. Most groups also report distributing policy briefs, research and position papers among policymakers and diplomats, inviting them to conferences and seminars, and attending events organised by other groups or convened by policymakers.

Brussels-based NGOs say that they do not organise events such as roundtables or conferences themselves. First, Brussels is already saturated with events. Few policymakers or group representatives can dedicate their time to a day or half a day long event. Second, organisation of events is seen as very time consuming exercise which does not necessarily generate satisfactory impact. So Brussels-based advocates prefer smaller one or two hour long meetings with targeted groups of policymakers and their partner organisations. In Georgia and Palestine, advocacy groups tend to rely more on public events or conferences. These meetings also provide opportunity to talk to European diplomats and to get to know recently arrived staff. More importantly, this also gives visibility to groups, which is important for fundraising work.

Groups working on the ground in Palestine and Georgia very often report participation in civil society consultations to promote their advocacy points. In Palestine, the majority of groups mentioned participation in the consultations run by the Office of the EU Representative in advance of the meetings of the EU-PA Subcommittee on Human Rights, Good Governance and the Rule of Law. In addition, the EU delegations run consultations on aid priorities. In Georgia, there are also consultations on thematic issues such as IDPs rights, run by UNHCR and attended by the EUMM representatives. In Georgia, groups attend consultations run by EUMM (information sharing meetings, post-IPRM briefings) and meetings with civil society with the EUSR during his visits.

NGOs in Georgia also mention that EUMM, EUSR and EU Delegation representatives come on visits to share information, learn about their activities and to gauge opinions on the developments.

Brussels-based advocacy groups are much more strategic in the way they lobby and apply different tactics compared to non-Brussels based groups. An advocate in Brussels explains their lobbying in the EU Council:

“We did a briefing to the EU member states: for a few who could convey the message and the most powerful ones. I tend to send things to people I know. I do not attribute papers, do not put our logo. First, I need an agreement of all my members for putting a logo. But without the logo the impact is the same. I do it with 3-4 most important members of the organisation and it is sent out. For the EU member states it is also good when they see not-attributed papers. It empowers them. It looks like the ideas come from them. It is the best way to make them believe that these are their ideas. No branding” (Interview 95).

Another Brussels-based advocate says that when they produce their policy reports, they try to come up with specific recommendations for different policy actors. Then they are able to meet with specific actors whom they target and discuss their recommendations with (Interview 121). A group representative lobbying on EU’s policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict explains that “blockers [of more conditionality-driven approach towards Israel among the EU member states] are better targeted by bringing Israeli NGOs talking to them rather than us or Palestinian groups” (Interview 139).

Approaching media is the only outside lobbying tactic applied by the interviewed groups. Most Brussels-based groups use media in parallel to inside lobbying to push some issues on the agenda. Press in the EU member states is mostly approached, while

the EU bubble media are targeted on very specific policy issues for experts. A group representative shares their approach to lobbying through media:

“When the member states do not want to do more, we try to make our point to the media. We mostly approach media through TV presence and op-eds in the newspapers. We do not cover that much on European press but rather on the press in the member states and Russia. Social media are a new tool, but in order to be a part of the debate, you have to have a full time job doing that.

Before the economic crisis, when you have a demonstration in Bratislava before the prime minister office against the Darfur atrocities, then we could write to media in the member states, for example, *Le Monde* in France, on this issue because there was public attention. With the economic crisis, the foreign policy issues are less picked up by media. The leverage of public opinion is less strong” (Interview 96).

None of the interviewed groups reported the usage of outside lobbying in the form of protests, street actions or demonstrations. As a representative of an NGO coalition lobbying in Brussels explains: “Public mobilisation is difficult. You saw the demonstrations on Gaza. First, it would be organised any way. Second, there are many people there with whom we do not want to be associated” (Interview 139).

This contrasts with the wave of public protests in Western European countries against Israeli air strikes on Gaza in the summer of 2014 or against European involvement in the US-led international operations in Iraq or Afghanistan in early 2000s. However, protests which are often organised by solidarity movements or diaspora groups seem to have little link with professional advocates focusing on EU’s policy of conflict resolution and crisis management (see also Voltolini 2013). However, a number of Brussels-based advocates mention the importance of grassroots movements and

solidarity groups in obtaining a change in the EU's policy towards the conflict. A representative of a Brussels-based NGO stressed that this is one of their objectives:

“We try to produce change in solidarity groups, in public opinion. There is new generation to come that will not accept the EU policy towards Israel. The pressure is too big, too costly for the EU to support Israel at any cost. We are small wheel in the bigger wheel. The change will come from the grassroots. I try to give them tools, information to feed in their campaigns, like to UK solidarity movement” (Interview 95).

Whereas public demonstrations protest against a military invasion or war, or demand a principled EU/EU member state position in the conflict, they are not about a specific course of action within EU civilian crisis management. Civilian crisis management, unlike military operations, do not provoke much of public attention and seems to be non-visible and non-controversial issue.

The EUMM press and public information officer reported a group of demonstrators gathering in front of the Gori office and demanding Georgian membership of the EU. While local grassroots groups may not be aware of the limitations of the CSDP mission's mandate, it seems more likely that they chose the EUMM office as the only place with an EU flag in town, as a representative body of the EU, not as an expression of EU crisis management policy.

2.4. Alliances

As conflict prevention and crisis management is a field where groups very frequently compete for the attention of policymakers to their issues or conflicts rather than between themselves, advocates often lobby in coalitions.

EPLO is an example of a coalition of groups united in a membership-based

organisation. The EPLO members constitute a wide mix of different NGOs and think-tanks: working on peace-building, conflict prevention and mediation, research-oriented organisations, peace forces and multi-mandate organisations with a development background, like Oxfam which works in conflict-affected areas. Despite the need to invest a lot of time in getting consensus on the EPLO positions and publications, the broad base of EPLO is “good for legitimacy” and it also benefits sustainability allowing reliance upon larger membership fees (Interview 125).

In the case of EU policy towards the conflict in Georgia, the three UK-based NGOs (International Alert, Conciliation Resources and Saferworld) are also lobbying in an alliance. They team up between themselves and their local partners. A representative of them explains: “We mutually support each other and have regular coordination meetings to discuss what we do and when we do it, as we also share the same partners. There has been an element of division of labour: we work with women, you work with youth” (Interview 127).

Advocating alone is a resource-consuming effort. A QCEA representative who lobbied on the CSDP missions in Palestine said that the group had to focus their advocacy on EUBAM Rafah partly because of scarce resources and a lack of interest from other Brussels-based groups on their issue: “The NGOs working on Israel/Palestine issues were not interested in the CSDP missions, they are coming from a development background and for them it a very technical issue to delve into” (Interview 140).

For groups coming from Palestine, Georgia or breakaway entities, partnership with European organisations is empowering. Firstly, EU-based groups often support them with resources and secondly, they help local organisations get access to policymakers in Brussels and the various member states.

In Georgia, the EUMM representatives stated that they often share information between local civil society groups, encouraging them to cooperate on the same or similar issues. This is often connected to the fact that it is easier and time saving for policymakers to deal with more organised civil society groups, which come as a common platform with a common message rather than deal with dozens of individual advocates.

On the ground, local groups also often team up around thematic issues: IDPs and the population living along the ABL in Georgia or monitoring of the security sector in Palestine. Such coalitions are often supported by EU policymakers and through EU funded projects. A representative of AMAN, a Palestinian organisation that initiated a coalition of 12 NGOs to monitor the security sector and serve as a bridge between civil society organisations and the security sector, said that when the EU heard about this initiative, they expressed interest in building the capacity of the network and supporting its plan (Interview 120).

3. Influence and its determinants

3.1. Measurement: degree and type

Among the groups which have advocated on the issues related to the civilian CSDP and the missions in Georgia and Palestine and been able to assess the degree of achievement of their objectives, answers vary between most and few reached objectives. However, types of objectives differ significantly.

In most cases, the issues at stake were about the implementation of the mission mandate: improvement of EUMM's monitoring practices, focus of accountability and oversight mechanism over the civil police and anti-corruption bodies in the EUPOL

COPPS assistance, securing the EUMM support in solving practical issues along the ABL or getting a partnership with EUMM on a project for journalists writing on the conflict. These issues are technical, they are not affecting the EU policies. In one case, a group has achieved a change in policy environment claiming the success in opening the CSDP structures up to outside actors, which is also confirmed by policymakers.

In the advocacy case on the closure of EUBAM Rafah, the group says that it achieved half of its objectives by getting the mission's staff and budget reduced, which at first sight may be a technical issue made at the political level but which can be interpreted as a political message to the third parties also. As a group representative put it:

“The mission did not close, but what it is now is not really a mission. Given that I did it almost on my own, as there was little interest among other civil society groups in the issue, it was a part of the success.

I went to see all possible actors in the Council Secretariat, in Germany's MFA, in other MFAs. They saw the point I was making. A political intention was to close down EUBAM Rafah, but it was about big fishes, Heads of Governments and so on who did not want to upset Israel. So I managed to take the issue at the operational level and effectively the mission was shut down, while political closure was not possible. While maybe I achieved half of my goals – the mission was not closed down, but at least it stopped wasting so much money” (Interview 140).

Through interviews with EU officials I could not trace the EU decision to scale down EUBAM Rafah in 2012 to the advocacy efforts of this group, it seems more likely that this group contributed to the internal discussion within the CSDP structures on the fate of EUBAM Rafah supporting the actors in favour of scaling down.

In several cases, influence on policy outcome by advocacy groups has been reported by policymakers. For example, an EU official reported the role of NGOs in Palestine in helping to determine better police equipment needs (Interview 158). In another instance civil society was named instrumental in expanding the EUPOL COPPS mandate to criminal justice. This is an example of a piecemeal influence on EU policies which cannot be attributed to any single group and seemingly is a result of long term efforts of civil society in Palestine and elsewhere to draw attention to the need for a comprehensive approach to SSR in EU aid. An EU official describes:

“Most of the information that we get from NGOs and CSOs does not end up in the strategic review as such. It serves to situate the mission – are we doing the right things? But it is absolutely essential be in touch with civil society on whether and how Palestinian Civil Police are reforming, how they perceive the justice side, not only the police side. What we heard from civil society influenced the mission’s mandate to be more extended to the justice side. Now it is a common pattern that not only police but the wide rule of law is included and particularly the link between police and prosecutors. The rule of law is a chain and if the link between police and prosecutors does not work, this chain has no meaning. Now much effort goes to ensure that this link works” (Interview 143).

It is noteworthy that influence is assessed differently by the EU policymakers and advocacy groups. The EU officials see a key success of Palestinian NGOs who complained about human rights violations and demanded more openness of the police towards the society in pushing the mission to focus on accountability and oversight mechanisms (Interviews 123, 128). In their turn, while Palestinian advocates acknowledge that the EU has become more attentive to the voice of civil society and the views of Palestinians about their security forces and consult the more on aid priorities,

they still see the EU as uneager to put more pressure on the Palestinian authorities to introduce more transparency, e.g. demand unrestricted access of human rights organisations to detention centres, or to make EU aid to Palestinian security sector conditional upon the respect of human rights (Interviews 120, 152). Whereas Palestinian human rights groups would like to see the EU more committed to their cause, the EU representatives on the ground care not to endanger relations with their key counterparts – Palestinian authorities. As an EU official put it:

“NGOs come with criticisms [of police] too. These are very political questions. We say them that we make reports, we take notes, we internally consider them in order to set priorities, however a lot of criticism goes beyond our scope of work: we work with civil police, and we do not have a monitoring mandate.

What we do is to raise issues with our counterparts – with police, with prosecutors, with Bar associations, courts, as even is someone is detained by Preventive Security Agency or other security agency out of our scope, there are still lawyers appointed and the case goes to courts. But we raise these issues in a non-confronting way. We cannot say that we know that someone is tortured as they would ask us for facts, how do we know. We cannot say that we have heard that someone is tortured as they would ask from whom have we heard it. Thus we say ‘Could we do something to prevent torture?’. But this information does not go to the outside world. Yes, EU member states can read about it in our reports, but not further” (Interview 123).

In a nutshell, group influence on policymaking appears very limited in the civilian CSDP. As in the previous cases, groups find it much easier to attribute the policy outcome to their advocacy efforts in the case of technical issues involving one policy actor. There have been many more instances when groups said that they were consulted or advocated on a certain issue, but it was difficult for them to see the result of their

work in policy or practice.

As in the previous chapters, only few groups – Brussels-based NGOs – reported conducting an assessment of their advocacy in a systematic manner. Most groups judged upon their success upon results – whether a change they sought has occurred or not.

Finally, a few lines on methodology. In the case of the CSDP, I found it difficult to triangulate the data, and, more than in other cases, I had to rely on the interviews and documents produced by interest groups because EU documents such as strategic reviews, OPLANS and the Mission Implementation Plans are classified and it is not possible to check how the EU modified its policies or approach towards implementation, what arguments were used in favour or against such modification and whether they resonated with the arguments made by the lobbies. While the interviews allow us to grasp the changes in EU policy, they often pose additional questions as policymakers sometimes present a brighter picture of how they take account of civil society views than it is viewed by civil society groups. Moreover, due to frequent staff rotation in the missions and in Brussels it has been difficult to verify information concerning advocacy instances dating years back (that is, during the early years of EUMM or EUPOL COPPS).

To sum up, this chapter demonstrates that the civilian CSDP does not attract many interest groups. Their engagement with EU policymakers is rather limited, partly as a result of the difficulty of getting access and information. In the instances in which the interviewed groups did engage in advocacy and reported some degree of goal achievement, it happened on the technical issues concerning the implementation of the mission mandate.

3.2. Factors explaining influence

One of the most frequently named factors that influence interest group engagement into CSDP is access to policymakers and transparency of the policymaking process. The importance of *institutional factors* is no surprise since as one EU diplomat put it, “the CSDP is an island itself. While the Commission and the EEAS are more open to outside actors, CSDP is very much member states oriented, turned inwards” (Interview 107). That’s why a number of groups see their advocacy objectives as increased transparency and the opening up of crisis management structures towards the input of civil society and local communities.

A group representative shares their experience of advocating on the CSDP:

“People are very sceptical of engaging with external actors, not only with civil society, but with other people working in the EEAS. There is a perception of a secretive environment in which they work and that they have to negotiate with the member states, so that they do not want to reach out to other actors. But then everybody says here that there is a poor planning of civilian CSDP missions, that there is a weak theory of change of the situation on the ground” (Interview 125).

Another group representative also emphasises that the lack of transparency and access is a major obstacle to successful advocacy on the CSDP missions: “It took me time to extract information from the Council on what they were doing in these two missions, financial information, before I could write the [advocacy] paper” (Interview 140). A Brussels-based think-tank member, while complaining about the secrecy of the CSDP, stresses the variation in openness to civil society among different institutions, bodies and member states:

“We do not get information from the CSDP structures in EEAS headquarters, they

see it secret, confidential information and they do not want to share. It goes to slowly. We get information, for example, on the personnel breakdown from the missions or the EU member state representations in Brussels, not from the EEAS. Sweden, Scandinavian countries and Germany are more open minded. But the Eastern member states do not want to say anything on what they do” (Interview 109).

An EU official also stresses the CSDP culture of secrecy as the reason for limited contacts with non-state actors:

“I can give you a very visual example. CSDP departments sit in the Cortenbergh building, this is an extra secure building with additional security checks. This gives you an idea of inaccessibility. When we were there, we would accept PhD students. But there is a lot more of culture of secrecy, as there are more sensitive issues, more information that may not be disclosed” (Interview 158).

The openness of CSDP missions to non-state actors seems to depend on the mandate. While EUMM is a monitoring mission tasked with collecting and analysing information, civil society groups are viewed as another source of information. Moreover, the mission also sees a value of engagement with civil society actors on the normalisation and confidence building aspects of its mandate. In the case of EUPOL COPPS, the engagement with non-state actors is more limited. The mission’s primary task is to assist the PA bodies. Though the mission’s personnel work with civil society says that communication with local NGOs provides a complementary vision of the police and justice sector in the absence of a monitoring mandate, in the absence of such a mandate there is no need to constantly gather information from local actors.

The mandate of the mission determines what kind of personnel is recruited to the

mission. While EUMM consists of people with military, police and civilian background, including people who used to work for or with civil society organisations (e.g. in the national ministry of education), the EUPOL COPPS staff mainly comes from a police, prosecution and judiciary background. This also influences the culture of the mission. An EU official shares his insight:

“EUPOL COPPS is a very inward looking mission. It is organisationally looking towards police, there is a police culture, a culture of not sharing information. We keep together even if we come from different countries. If you share too much information, you risk not having authority. They – police – need authority”
(Interview 123).

Moreover, the leadership of the mission has freedom to interpret the mission’s mandate and thus define the modalities of sharing information, reaching out to media and non-state actors. For example in the case of EUMM, both EU staff and advocates agree that NGOs’ ability to influence the mission’s work has varied over time depending on the HoM in place. The period when the mission was led by a person with a military background is characterised by the lack of access of NGOs who were seen as “Russian spies”, in the words of one interviewee. With the arrival of a civilian chief, the mission also became more open to civil society, mechanisms of consultations and outreach to civil society have been established, the concept paper on how to engage with civil society was drafted by the mission.

Given the lack of transparency and institutionalised channels of interaction with non-state actors, information exchange between groups and EU officials largely depends on the discretion of the latter and on the ability of the former to build relationship of trust. In such a situation, having allies among EU staff is the way for groups to circumvent the

lack of formal access and the culture of secrecy. Moreover, given the central role of the Council, it is also important to seek allies among member states to get insights in what is going on and push issues onto the Council agenda. No wonder that the majority of advocates report that having allies among policymakers is a key for their advocacy success and they spend a large portion (if not most) of their time on lobbying allies (which corroborates the H2 hypothesis).

A Brussels-based group representative said:

“Having allies among policymakers is absolutely key for the success. It is about supporting people, giving them ammunition, so they are not feeling themselves alone, it is about energising them, supporting them and also getting their strategic advice. We spend more time with allies than with the opponents. From Brussels it is difficult to get a change of the position of the opponent member states, they get their instructions from the capitals” (Interview 139).

Another advocate also underlined the importance of building alliances with policymakers:

“Allies is a key in advocacy. Who’s going to put your message? You need people in different institutions to support this. We come with ideas, suggestions, recommendations which can be taken by the member states and institutions. We provide them with ideas and recommendations and we encourage them to be more active. It is informal work with them.

[...] Some member states also put pressure on the crisis management bodies to be more open to us. Plus our allies (persons) within the crisis management bodies, they offer us this service – to have discussions with civil society” (Interview 125).

Among *resource-related* factors information, analysis and expertise are the most

frequently named by the groups and of the top value for policymakers. A Brussels-based advocate emphasises the importance of their analytical work for advocacy success:

“Analysis is important: thorough, comprehensive, from the field. High quality of our reports gives us firm ground for advocacy. Unlike other think-tanks that often produce opinion based pieces, based on experts views, our reports, though they also reflect our opinion, are well footnoted and based on interviews with all sides involved. And this gives us good credibility” (Interview 121).

Another group representative put it this way:

“You have to know your stuff, you have to know who is who in the decision-making world. I read a lot of legal texts, the legal basis documents, factsheets, financial information, I knew who the heads of missions were. So later when I talked to people in the Council Secretariat, I gave a correct impression that I knew the stuff I was talking about” (Interview 140).

A group doing advocacy with EUMM shares their formula of cooperation with the mission: “We have more information about perceptions. Maybe we have little factual information, but we know more about perceptions” (Interview 147). This is confirmed by an EUMM representative saying that they get a lot of information about Georgian society through meetings with NGOs and information that they cannot get through other monitoring tools (Interview 117).

In the conflict contexts, when access to some areas is limited for EU officials or where the party in the conflict is represented by ‘de facto authorities’ or ‘terrorist groups’ with which the EU does not have a formal relationship, information brought by non-state actors is often the only source of information for EU policymakers to learn about local views and developments. This stands for Abkhazia and South Ossetia to which the

EUMM does not have access, despite the fact that its mandate covers these regions, and for Gaza since 2007. In these cases EU officials are extremely interested in getting information from NGOs who have access to these territories, societies and political actors.

Resources such as funding, personnel and time dedicated to advocacy are also seen as important in conditioning interest group influence. In the case of the CSDP, presence in Brussels is key if one wants to influence early stages of the policy cycle. Groups also benefit from high-level leadership such as presidency and board of directors who may open doors to policymakers due to their reputation and contacts.

Finally, apart from information or analysis, there are other types of services which groups provide (see also Paffenholz 2010 on civil society functions in peacebuilding) and in exchange for which they get access to policymakers. Such resources can be, for example, confidence-building events organised by NGOs that bring together civil society representatives and, at times, officials, even though in their private capacity, representing the conflict parties in the case of Georgia. First, the EU officials benefit from the environment which is more conducive to a dialogue which such groups try to create. Second, they also participate in such meetings as observers to get a better sense of conflict dynamics or ideas for their interventions, including through funding.

Local media and information distribution networks are another resource of this kind. For example, EUMM cooperated with a local NGO which ran a radio station reaching out to the population in Abkhazia to disperse myths about the EUMM mandate and its activities. The mission supported an NGO working with journalists across the divide lines to promote confidence building. A Brussels official also see a potential role of civil society in the exit strategy which consists of taking some EUMM tasks in monitoring

across the ABL communities inspired by a civil society project (Interview 137).

In the case of Palestine, civil society monitoring of the security sector and cooperation with security agencies serves to “legitimise partner institutions” of EUPOL COPPS in the context of the absence of a legitimate parliament. The funding to support such activities often comes from the EU or other European donors, but non-state actors do the job which the EU policymakers cannot carry out themselves.

Among *strategy-related* factors, groups underline knowledge of the policy process which includes approaching ‘the right people’ at ‘the right time’ with ‘clear messages’ as well as persistence in their advocacy efforts. An extremely important factor of influence is a group’s ability to set realistic advocacy objectives. The interviewees among groups stress that the clearer and more concrete and achievable advocacy objectives are set, the more influence they tend to achieve. As one group put it, “we try to be low to the ground. We are part of the wider machine, we are a small wheel” (Interview 95). Groups see themselves as more influential when their objectives are “smaller” and when they lobby on rather *technical issues* on which the EU has competences and the EU’s leverage is strong, as opposed to broader objectives which require the agreement of the whole Council or where the EU’s action is conditioned by third parties. Groups underline the need to interact with policymakers, to be a part of “real world” policy and come with a perspective informed by policy in order to provide realistic recommendations that can be used by policymakers. This also implies that they have to be “more constructive in order to not be perceived as too critical” and achieve a middle ground between what they consider “an ideal world solution” and what is feasible from the EU policy perspective.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the case of lobbying on the civilian CSDP, focusing in particular on EU missions in Georgia and the Palestinian territories. In line with the theoretical assumption outlined in the Chapter 2, the CSDP is the ‘hard’ case for interest group influence as it involves intergovernmental decision-making with no role for the supranational institutions.

There has been limited engagement of non-state actors. The active advocates are mainly public interest groups such as NGOs and think-tanks. Critical perceptions of EU’s contribution to conflict resolution through the CSDP also led to that fact that many groups lobbying on EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are reluctant to engage on the CSDP missions seeing them as a too marginal and technical issue. In Georgia, perceptions of EUMM as a security provider by local communities makes the mission a relevant target and advocacy issue for Georgian and international groups.

Most groups have focused on the implementation stage, approaching the CSDP missions. Brussels-based groups engage in earlier stages of the policy cycle, however, interactions between EU policymakers and groups are less intense in Brussels than at the theatre level. Groups lobby both the EU and the EU member states (in line with H4). The EU-based advocates primarily target the Council and the EEAS, while groups based in Georgia and Palestine approach local EU Delegations, EU member state diplomatic representations and CSDP missions. Lobbying national capitals is usually carried out in a targeted way due to the limited resources which groups possess for multi-level lobbying.

Advocacy groups report achieving their objectives to some extent (varying from most to

few) and, as a rule, on rather technical issues which are often not really about EU policy, but related to the implementation of the mandate or promoting a more conducive environment for civil society involvement (H1). There were no groups mobilised to defend the status quo. Though this fact makes assessment of H3 difficult, it seems in line with the theoretical expectations that status quo is protected through the institutional design in which each member state has a veto power.

Institutional factors explain to a greater extent the limited lobbying and group influence on the CSDP. The confidential character of EU policy documents and the mission reports and the lack of institutionalised practices of consulting with civil society are significant obstacles for groups' engagement into the CSDP. While some groups have access to the Council due to contacts with member state officials, these relations are informal and depend on the good will of EU diplomats to share information. Access to the EEAS crisis management departments is also limited, especially if it is compared with geographical departments. The crisis management structures have inherited the culture of secrecy from the Council Secretariat. Much of the interaction between non-state actors and CSDP structures is channelled via "one stop shop", the CSOs coalition working on conflict prevention and peace-building supported by the EU.

At the level of the CSDP missions, contacts with non-state actors depend on the mission's mandate, which largely defines what kind of structures are in place in the mission to deal with civil society and what kind of personnel are recruited (whether staff come from military, police or civilian backgrounds). Openness of the missions to local civil society also depends on the leadership of the mission. Thus, intensity of contacts between groups and missions may vary over time and, given their largely informal character, such contacts are fragile and sensitive to rotation of the mission leadership

and key staff.

In order to circumvent the lack of access and transparency of the CSDP, advocates put a lot of efforts into building relationships of trust with their allies among policymakers and mission staff. Allies among policymakers is seen as a key factor of lobbying success by the interviewed groups (supporting H2). Such allies can be member states which are more forthcoming to cooperation with civil society in general (e.g. Northern EU members) or to the issues which groups advocate on, or individuals holding positions in the crisis management structures or the missions which often have previous experience of interacting with non-state actors.

Advocacy groups rely on inside lobbying tactics, mainly engaging in face-to-face meetings with policymakers. Outreach to media is used by some groups in parallel with access strategies. Other voice strategies have not been reported by the groups, though we know from mass media that protest actions take place in the EU capitals, for example, to call European leaders to “stop the war in Gaza”. However, it seems that professional advocacy and grassroots movements are the worlds apart. Though some Brussels groups recognise the importance of European public opinion and solidarity movements to change the EU foreign policy in a substantial way, there seem to be no links between them.

Groups do not report counter-lobbying on their issues by other groups, at least not that they are aware. Indeed, many issues on which they advocate are tiny in scope and of a technical nature. Moreover, getting attention of policymakers for their issues is the most difficult exercise. Thus, advocates quite easily merge in coalitions with other groups to make their voices louder and to share resources. Groups coming from the neighbouring countries seek alliances with EU-based groups which help them with both resources and

access to EU policymakers.

Among the factors defining their advocacy success, resources play an important role. Information and analysis are the most traded goods between EU staff and advocates in the civilian CSDP. This is also confirmed by policymakers: they need information and perspectives from non-state actors to do the reality check of what the missions do and their impact, to ‘access’ the other side of the conflict which EU policymakers cannot enter physically, and also because information gathering is an inherent part of what EU missions and Brussels bureaucrats do. Presence in, or ability to travel to, Brussels is also critical as it allows groups to follow the EU agenda closely, understand the intricacies of the EU policy process and build relationships with policymakers. Brussels-based groups tend to develop more sophisticated lobbying strategies, also learning from their past experiences. Advocates underline the ability to establish realistic advocacy objectives and come forward with “constructive”, EU policy-informed recommendations as a crucial factor defining their influence. This factor has also come forward in the previous chapters. Socialisation and learning seems to be an important determinant of group influence in EU policymaking to which little attention has been paid by the interest groups literature.

As in the previous chapters, groups found it difficult to answer the question concerning the degree of achievement of their advocacy objectives and attributing a policy outcome to their advocacy efforts. Cross-assessment of group influence based on interviewing policymakers has not been able to fully solve this difficulty. Policymakers and groups tend to assess group influence differently, as the example of EUPOL COPPS shows. In this case, the positive effect of the method triangulation was less visible due to the difficulties in triangulating the data. Given that EU policy documents on CSDP missions

are classified, I had to rely on interviews with policymakers more extensively than in other cases to trace the policy process.

This chapter has focused on advocacy and group influence in the intergovernmental case of the CSDP, thus contributing to the literature on lobbying by exploring a new area of European integration and furthermore to the literature on EU foreign policymaking by examining the involvement of non-state actors in the area of conflict resolution and crisis management. Its findings are consistent with those received by Mérand et al. (2011) through network analysis of the CSDP showing the strategic positions of Brussels-based EU member state actors as gatekeepers for domestic government arenas and marginal positions of interest groups and think-tanks. The research results also corroborate previous research on non-state actor participation in international intergovernmental organisations in the policy field of security (Mayer 2008; Steffek 2010) showing that access for outside actors in security policy is limited which can be explained by high sovereignty costs associated with this policy field (Tallberg et al. 2014). In the field of development, inputs from non-state actors are welcome during the implementation and evaluation stages, but outsiders are shielded off when strategic decisions are made (Steffek & Nanz 2008). At the same time, when non-state advocates are welcome it is mostly connected to institutions' demand for information and analysis which can help policymakers and implementers to understand the local context, impact and perceptions of the EU on the ground. Studying the engagement of local actors, including civil society groups and community organisations, helps us to better understand how the EU as a security actor is perceived by those societies in which the Union is actively trying to promote change and build peace.

Conclusions

This thesis has explored how and to what extent interest group influence EU foreign policy. Interest group involvement and influence in this policy area has received very little attention from researchers of EU lobbying. This may be partially explained by the fact that this policy area is relatively weakly integrated at the European level and dominated by intergovernmental arrangements, whereas multi-level lobbying is expected in the communitarised policy areas in which the Union produces legislation affecting organised interests across the Union and beyond its borders and in which supranational institutions exercise significant powers. Non-state actor involvement has also been devoid of the research interest of EU foreign policy scholars. Meanwhile, studying lobbying can help us to better understand the nature of European integration and policymaking in the foreign policy area. Non-state actor involvement at the EU level is one of the signs that policymaking in this area can be explained through a multi-level governance approach characterised by the multiplication of decision-making centres, Europeanisation of national foreign policies, the growing role of informal arrangements and common norms and values, and the increasingly visible identity of the Union in the international arena. By engaging in EU-level lobbying and calling for the EU to act externally, non-state advocates perceive the EU as a foreign policy actor.

Carrying out an empirical study of the strategies and influence of non-state advocates in EU foreign policy, I have examined the impact the EU institutional context on lobbying. This issue is central to the academic debate on determinants of advocacy strategies and interest group influence. At the beginning of this study I asked: Is intergovernmentalism an obstacle to interest group involvement and influence in the EU, or have they found

ways to (successfully) represent their interests at the EU level despite the apparent absence of a multi-level governance framework in some areas of EU foreign policy such as the CFSP and the CSDP? I have investigated the extent to which our knowledge about lobbying and interest group influence in the EU is valid for intergovernmental policymaking.

In order to address the main research question of this thesis, I conducted a comparative case study of the lobbying and influence of interest groups in the EU across three sub-policy areas. The sub-policy areas were chosen deliberately to represent variation in the policy regime: whereas EU visa liberalisation policy is close to the Community method of decision-making, CSFP and CSDP are situated on the intergovernmental extreme of EU policymaking. I have argued that the proximity of a foreign policy issue to one of these two extremes determines to what extent interest groups can access the policymaking process and, thus, their ability to influence.

In the next sections I will present the empirical findings of this study answering the key research questions of how and to what extent interest groups influence EU foreign policy and whether the institutional set-up matters. I then will discuss the theoretical implications of this study and its contribution to the relevant literatures. I will also share my thoughts on the methodology of measuring interest group influence. Finally, I will advance the broader implications of this study for EU foreign policy governance and charter areas for future research.

1. Empirical findings: how and to what extent interest groups influence EU foreign policy

Firstly, this study demonstrates that interest groups are not ‘alien actors’ in EU foreign policy. There are a variety of different groups engaged in EU foreign policy lobbying – NGOs and think-tanks, business interests, diaspora organisations, advocacy groups from EU member states, international non-state actors and groups from third countries affected by the Union’s policies.

Multi-level lobbying: reaching out to the ‘most’ and ‘least’ accessible institutions

In all three cases of EU foreign policy, advocacy groups have engaged in multi-level strategies lobbying both EU institutions and member state governments, as hypothesised in **H4**. Many groups started to lobby the EU in the wake of a particular ‘Europeanisation moment’: European integration in the policy area, accession of their country to the EU, or an EU decision which had an impact on the organisation. The groups targeted supranational actors if they had formal powers (as in the case of visa liberalisation) and when they did not (as in the case of CSFP sanctions or CSDP missions).

In the case of CFSP sanctions (Chapter 4), affected business groups litigated before the EUCJ which reflects the growing importance of the case law on EU policymaking on restrictive measures against physical and legal persons. Whereas one can see an inertia from other policy areas as many groups lobbying EU foreign policy come from a development or trade background, there are also some strategic reasons as to why groups lobby receptive but not powerful venues such the European Commission and the European Parliament in the CSFP/CSDP. The Commission’s DG International

Cooperation and Development is responsible for EU aid which many lobby groups working on CFSP/CSDP issues receive, while the office of the Commissioner in charge of the ENP is seen as a potential advocate of groups interests at other EU venues. The European Parliament is also seen by interest groups as an important arena for public political debate or as “the door opener” to other EU institutions. On CFSP and CSDP issues, interest groups also approach the EEAS, an institution that is irrelevant for lobbies outside EU foreign policy. This reflects the growing role of EU bureaucracy and diplomacy in agenda-setting, policy formulation, implementation and evaluation of EU foreign policy.

The study also shows that groups outside the EU lobby the Union because policies produced by it affect their interests. Groups active in the EU neighbouring countries most often lobby the most proximate venues – EU Delegations, member state diplomatic representations and CSDP missions. They also build partnerships with EU-based and international groups to target policymakers in Brussels and member state capitals.

The reputation of the Council as “the least accessible” EU institution has been confirmed, in line with the literature on EU lobbying. However, it is not unapproachable. Mostly Brussels-based groups lobby the Council and its thematic or geographic working groups and committees. It appears that in the absence of institutionalised mechanisms for consultations, lobbying the Council requires building up relationships of trust with diplomats from EU member states’ Permanent Representations in Brussels.

In the Council, advocacy groups tend to choose the most receptive member state delegates. This could be due to the fact that it is difficult to “change an EU member

state position from Brussels”. Thus, advocacy groups seek to empower their allies to be advocates of their issues among other member states and institutions. Moreover, an important part of lobbying in the Council is related to receiving information about the policy agenda, timing, proponents and opponents, the main arguments and lines of division.

Lobbying EU member state governments is seen as an important part of advocacy strategies in all three cases which is a reflection of the key role the member states play in EU foreign policy regardless of institutional arrangements. At the member state level, groups seek to target governments less receptive to their demands. However, most groups, even those more resourceful find it expensive to conduct advocacy in the EU member states. Thus they try to focus on key capitals and team up with groups from the member states in order to share advocacy costs.

Inside vs. outside lobbying

In terms of lobbying tactics, foreign policy is very similar to communitarised areas of EU governance in which outside lobbying is rare (Mahoney 2008). Inside lobbying prevails, with the dominance of face-to-face meetings with policymakers as the most frequently used tactic. Individual meetings with EU officials grow in importance when there are few opportunities to voice positions through institutionalised consultations. Among voice strategies media outreach has been most often reported in all three cases. Lobby groups target EU specialist media and press in EU member states. Moreover, groups use informational lobbying mainly to complement other tactics and they underline the importance of resources in conducting systematic work with the media.

Other voice strategies such as street actions or letter campaigns are rare in EU foreign policy. Whereas instances of outside lobbying have been reported in the case of visa

liberalisation and CFSP sanctions, groups which engage in EU-level lobbying on the CSDP and conflict related issues do not use voice strategies other than occasional exposure to media. Indeed, even when access to decision-makers is difficult to obtain, advocates do not employ voice strategies. Next to the low salience of foreign policy issues and the institutional context, group identity seems to define the choice of lobbying tactics (see also Uhlin & Kalm 2015). Outside tactics such as street actions or petition signing have been mostly reported by groups which rely on individual membership – for example, youth groups or diaspora organisations – and in combination with other advocacy tactics. Moreover, coalition-based groups find it more difficult to speak to the media on behalf of their members and leave this right to them. This finding is in line with the literature explaining advocacy not only through the logic of influence, but also the logic of support (Lowery 2007; Berkhout 2013).

Venue shopping strategies of groups also show that access to powerful decision-making actors varies across the three cases. It seems relatively easy in the case of EU visa liberalisation policy because the European Commission and the European Parliament – EU institutions traditionally open to interest groups – have formal powers. It is very difficult in the case of the CSDP in which member states in the Council set the agenda and take and implement decisions and where the EEAS crisis management structures seem to have inherited the organisational culture of the Council Secretariat (see Carta 2012; Duke 2012) and appear less accessible for non-state actors in comparison with those departments which have been transferred from the Commission. Importantly, without access to the Council, which is involved in intergovernmental policymaking from the early stages of the policy cycle, groups' ability to exert influence on EU foreign policy is significantly debilitated. Even though groups attempt to be active from

the earlier stages of the policy cycle and in some cases they are successful in putting and keeping issues on the EU agenda, they frequently find themselves involved at the implementation and evaluation stages – when the Commission, the EEAS, EU Delegations or CSDP missions use civil society groups in policy implementation (“prolongation of EU arms”) or seek information about on-the-ground developments in order to assess the effectiveness and impact of EU policies or to comprehend the wider context in which EU policies are implemented. Moreover, there is another aspect such as access to policy documents which significantly affects groups’ engagement with different institutions across sub-policy areas. In the extreme case of the CSDP missions, most policy documents are classified which means that non-state advocates dealing with conflict resolution and crisis management have limited knowledge of the CSDP agenda and struggle to develop advocacy strategies in this area.

Intergovernmentalism hinders influence, but can be surmounted

Whereas it was hypothesised in **H1** that the closer an issue was situated toward the intergovernmental extreme, the less likely it would be that interest groups would achieve high degrees of influence, the data provides a more nuanced picture. If one takes into account the degrees of influence based on self-assessment only, lobby groups mostly see themselves as partially influential with little variation across the three cases. This can be explained by the fact that groups adjust to the unfavourable institutional context when designing their advocacy strategies. Advocates tend to “maximise” their influence by setting “realistic” and “policy informed” advocacy objectives, or in other words, they seek a lesser degree of policy change. In practice, it means that groups expect less: they rather go for smaller steps which are often intermediate on the way to their overall goals or aim of improving the lobbying environment by increasing the

transparency of the policy process and promoting the EU culture of openness to civil society, rather than setting up ambitious objectives which are seen as difficult to achieve. Defining “realistic” advocacy objectives has been very frequently named by successful groups as a factor conditioning their goal achievement in the self-assessment responses.

The process tracing reveals that there is a variation of influence between the cases. The cases of visa liberalisation policy and sanctions are rather worlds together, whereas the CSDP case is an outlier. While we could have expected more similarities in terms of influence between the CSFP sanctions and CSDP mission cases due to the limited role of supranational institutions, the CSDP case clearly stands out, as both non-state actor engagement and influence in this policy area is limited mainly to the implementation stage and technical issues. At the same time, CFSP sanctions and visa liberalisation cases have similar patterns of access and influence, despite the important differences in institutional design between the two. One explanation may be that despite differences in formal rules, in practice EU member states are very zealous to keep control over visa policy and unanimity still rules in the Council just as in the case of sanctions. This seems to be a limiting condition for group influence during earlier stages of the policy cycle and decision-making in the Council. At the same time, despite the fact that there are less formal channels of consultations in the case of CFSP sanctions, policymakers provide informal access to interest groups because they are in need of information that they can provide. The CSDP appears as an institutional island within intergovernmental EU foreign policymaking to which outsider access is not welcome. Moreover, an explanation borrowed from the literature on non-state actor participation in international organisations stipulating that a policy field is also accountable for variation of access

can be used in the context of the CSDP: EU member states have higher sovereignty costs in the case of security policy. CSDP missions are also perceived as too ‘technical’ an issue for many groups who lobby on EU conflict resolution policy. Whereas EU visa liberalisation policy and sanctions seem to bring more immediate costs and benefits for organised interests, CSDP missions do not resonate in the same way with constituencies of many EU-based groups.

Furthermore, examining the issues upon which groups report advocacy success and validating their reports through cross-assessment by policymakers, we see that most issues on which groups achieve their goals are of a technical nature and not central for the policy. Political relevance is clearly the lowest in the case of the CSDP which is also reflected in the fact that groups are excluded from earlier stages of the policy process.

In the case of EU visa liberalisation policy (Chapter 3) groups have succeeded in increasing the transparency of the visa liberalisation process, getting their views reflected in the Commission’s assessments of the progress achieved by the EaP countries and contributing to facilitation of visa issuance practices. Moreover, if there was no continuous advocacy from pro-visa-free-Europe groups, member state governments would be more willing to postpone their commitments to visa liberalisation for the EU’s Eastern neighbours. However, groups are not powerful enough to resist the status quo defenders in the Council which have introduced many procedural measures to keep the process slow and under the firm control of the member states.

In the case of CSFP restrictive measures (Chapter 4), civil society groups have successfully promoted the issue of sanctions onto the EU agenda, pushing the Union to keep its normative stance towards Belarus. They have also influenced who is targeted

by EU sanctions through suggesting names of human rights violators and providing argumentation as to why they should be put on the list. A number of business groups have been effective in keeping certain business entities off the list by using the veto power of member states in the Council. However, for both civil society and business lobbies the goal achievement is seen as partial as both camps strove for more. The division among civil society groups on the issue of sanctions has also contributed to their assessment of influence as partial or very limited. In general, the case of CSFP sanctions shows that interest groups can be influential despite the fact that the policy area is ruled by intergovernmental arrangements.

In the case of CSDP missions (Chapter 5), groups are active mainly on the issues of implementation, on which they report partially achieving their advocacy objectives. Their involvement is very limited, or non-existent during the agenda-setting, planning, and decision making stages. Still, some groups claim being partially influential. The CSDP case provides a vivid example of how intergovernmentalism can limit participation of non-state actors in the EU policy process. Shielded from access to Brussels-based institutions and having little information about the CSDP missions, interest groups find it difficult to get engaged in lobbying, define their position and develop a lobbying strategy.

Significance of allies among key decision-makers

It was also hypothesised in **H2** that interest groups with allies among key decision-makers are likely to achieve a higher degree of influence. This expectation finds confirmation across all three cases. Having allies among key decision-makers is reported as a crucial factor of goal achievement, especially when the sub-policy area moves to the intergovernmental extreme. Groups need policymakers who not only

sympathise with them on policy substance, but who also pro-actively seek tactical support vis-a-vis internal opponents on the given issue. Allies in power allow groups to be informed about the policy process and bring their issues onto institutional agendas. The lack of institutionalised access and consultation mechanisms are substituted by informal arrangements which are based on personal relationships between group representatives and office holders. Advocates underline the importance of building “good relations” with EU officials and complain that a change of the office holder, for example, the head of a CSDP mission, can strip them of the limited access which they previously enjoyed.

Status quo defenders vs. promoters of policy change

There is no conclusive evidence in favour of or against **the H3** hypothesis, namely that the intergovernmental method of policymaking mostly favours groups that defend the status quo rather than promote change. Though given that in each of the three cases, most groups which have mobilised are those that desired a policy change or a change in policy implementation, one can infer that the status quo defenders have their interests better guarded in the intergovernmental arrangements and do not need to mobilise at the EU level. This is also reflected in the fact that many groups see ‘the other side’ as EU member states opposing a policy change. In the case of CSDP missions, all mobilised advocates tried to shift EU policy. In the case of visa liberalisation, though there were groups who defended the status quo as a temporary measure to insist on tougher conditionality, the main line of division seems to be between an advocacy coalition supporting swifter liberalisation to which most non-state advocates belong and an advocacy coalition consisting of mainly ‘old’ EU member states which try to make this process gradual and controllable. Only in the case of CFSP sanctions was the

division between organised interests which mobilised to defend the status quo – mostly business groups – and groups lobbying for a policy change – tougher sanctions – clearly visible, given the costs of sanctions to business. The status quo defenders were able to use the right of a member state veto in the Council to block unfavourable decisions. However, they did not win systematically. When the sanctions were imposed by the Council, many business groups affected by them turned to the EUCJ to appeal against the Council decisions. This case shows that the status quo protectors may have easier victories given the unanimity rule in the Council, but groups promoting a policy change have their goals achieved too.

Other determinants of influence: the importance of group-level characteristics

Apart from institutional characteristics, group resources appear as an important factor of advocacy success. Though there is a variation of access which may hinder interest group involvement as a policy dossier moves from the Community method to the intergovernmental method, access does not equal influence. The within-case analysis allowed us to see other factors and configurations of factors under which access translates into influence. Group-level characteristics play an important role in a group's ability to invest in getting access and building effective strategies for successful lobbying. Groups underline expertise and information, strength of advocacy coalition and partnership networks, presence in Brussels, understanding of the complex EU decision-making process and lobbying experience needed to design effective advocacy strategies as crucial determinants of their success. In this sense, there is an important difference between EU-based groups, especially those with offices in Brussels, and groups coming from the neighbouring countries. Whereas the latter are seen as those representing the interests of the societies which the EU tries to assist, they are less

knowledgeable about the intricacies of the EU political universe and less endowed with the resources needed to influence EU policies than groups from the EU. Just as the literature on Europeanisation of interest groups in the EU shows that richer domestic groups are better equipped to represent their interests at the EU level (Dür & Mateo 2014b; Eising 2004; Fairbass & Jordan 2002), this study also shows that resourceful groups are also better prepared to adapt to the complexity of intergovernmental policymaking.

2. Theoretical implications and contribution to the literature

Whereas in this thesis I have focused on three specific dossiers of EU foreign policy toward the neighbouring countries, the findings of this study are informative beyond the studied cases, especially given the fact that a broad variety of interest groups from Brussels, EU member states and third countries were interviewed. In many aspects my findings corroborate previous research results (Joachim & Dembinski 2011; Voltolini 2013). First of all, the study demonstrates that interest groups are not “foreign” to EU foreign policy. Second, they achieve their policy goals despite the difficulties of access to policymaking. Similar to the study by Joachim & Dembinski (2011) on NGOs involvement in the CSDP, I emphasise the lack of institutionalised consultation practices and information as a detriment to lobbying and the presence of allies as a key condition for advocacy success.

Despite a different theoretical framework, many of my findings are also similar to those of Voltolini in the case of EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Voltolini 2013). In her theoretical framework, groups lobbying the EU adopt consensual and

median rather than controversial roles and use technical and legal frames when engaging in interaction with EU policymakers. In contrast, at the member state level they more often play controversial roles and apply political frames. Indeed, successful interest groups are reliant on access rather than voice strategies, and they adopt “realistic” advocacy goals and “constructive” demands using technical expertise, hard evidence and detailed knowledge of legal and political realities in third countries in order to support their arguments. Controversial roles expressed through protest strategies are rare at the EU level. However, this thesis also underlines the strategic calculations of interest groups and policymakers. Whereas groups strategically adapt to different institutional environments, policymakers need interest groups to perform their functions. In such a way, the study highlights the power of rationalist based accounts in explaining lobbying and influence in the EU.

This thesis makes a distinct contribution to the literature on lobbying and interest groups in the EU by exploring institutional determinants of influence. Exploring lobbying in an intergovernmental area of EU policymaking, I have shown that interest groups achieve a certain degree of influence and it is not necessarily true that only status quo protectors win in EU foreign policymaking. Thus, intergovernmentalism is not an insurmountable obstacle to lobbying and influence at the EU level, though in combination with other factors, such as the type of policy field, it restrains access for interest groups to participate in the policy process and influence policy outcomes.

However, formal institutional arrangements of EU policy modes are not the only characteristics of political opportunity structures responsible for groups’ access to policymakers. Whereas access to powerful policy actors is limited in intergovernmental policymaking, access is not a fixed institutional characteristic. Access can be granted by

allies among policymakers (who share a common interest, hold similar policy preferences, or seek information or other services which groups can provide). Hence, even if access is a necessary pre-condition of influence, it can be obtained even in an institutional setting that is unfavourable to interest group involvement. One should therefore look at access not as fixed, but as a dynamic (constructed) characteristic of political opportunity structures.

The institutional context of lobbying also matters as it affects groups' strategies. Groups adjust their advocacy goals, tactics, and choice of lobbying targets to the institutional context. In a number of cases, they set intermediate goals aimed at improving the transparency of the policymaking process and inclusion of non-state actors, thus creating a more favourable lobbying environment (see also Uçarer 2009).

Advocacy groups adapt to complex decision-making, uncertainty, the prevalence of the status quo and the lack of access by setting up more "realistic" objectives, building transnational advocacy coalitions, investing in informal channels of access and teaming up with policy actors on "their side". In other words, they are learning. Exposure to lobbying in Brussels and previous experience of EU-level engagement seems to be an important factor of advocacy success. Knowledge about the EU policy process allows non-state advocates to devise more effective lobbying strategies. In line with the constructivist view on lobbying (Voldolini 2013; Voldolini forthcoming), I find that there is a value in paying more attention to the role of socialisation and learning in the design of lobbying strategies and influence. These aspects have been largely omitted by the interest group literature. Groups learn to adapt to the unfavourable institutional environment, gain or keep their access to policymakers and showcase their advocacy success to their members and supporters. However, I could not find any evidence that

EU lobbying changes group preferences and identities, as the “thick” constructivist account posits (Votoloni 2013). On the contrary, the case studies analysed in the thesis show that groups try to preserve their identities even if this raises the costs of advocacy. What’s more, group identity affects their decisions in terms of what kind of advocacy strategy to choose.

Groups do not change their preferences, even if they are against the EU mainstream. For example, the groups that lobbied for harsh economic sanctions for Belarus did not drop their demands even when they knew that there was no support for them in the EU Council; neither did the groups that were against any sanctions. Both camps merely revised their arguments and tactics. In the case of EU visa liberalisation policy, groups experienced in EU lobbying still voiced ‘unrealistic’ and difficult-to-achieve goals despite the way that they were perceived by the EU. Whereas lobby groups do not like to “lose” and want to appear successful, it does not mean that they alter their interests under the EU’s influence, unless the EU is key to their organisational survival.

If we look at the policymakers side, we observe the power of functional accounts adopted in the literature on NSA access to intergovernmental organisations (Tallberg 2010; Tallberg et al. 2014) and also EU lobbying (Bouwen 2004a) in explaining why and under what conditions access is granted to outside groups and to what kind of groups. The Parliament uses groups to boost their own role in policymaking, especially in the areas in which it lacks formal powers. The Commission, the EEAS and the EU Delegations need technical information and expertise related to policy formulation, implementation or evaluation of the impact of EU policies. Access for groups and their influence rises when policymakers lack their own eyes on the ground (such as in a conflict zone with restricted access or in a post-crisis situation), when they are under-

resourced to get information on legislative or other political developments in targeted countries themselves, or when they consider that non-state actors are better positioned to execute certain tasks in the implementation of EU policies.

The CSDP provides a good example: whereas Brussels-based crisis management structures provide limited access to non-state advocates, CSDP missions need local civil society groups to assist in performing their tasks. However, even at this level there is a variation based on functional needs, organisational culture and individual members of staff. Whereas a bigger mission with a monitoring mandate relies more on civil society as another source of information, a smaller police training mission is more closed to non-state actors. The mission mandate also has an impact on what kind of personnel is recruited (police/military vs. civilian) and professional background seems to affect the personal culture of engaging with civil society. In this regard, this study adds to the literature on NSA participation in international organisations by pointing to the importance of organisational cultures and the role of individuals as additional factors conditioning the access of non-state actors to institutions within the organisations.

One of the most distinct features of EU foreign policy is that groups tend to rely on informal channels of interaction with policymakers. Whilst there is a growing number of institutionalised consultations undertaken by the Commission and the EU Delegations, the EEAS has only recently started to introduce such a practice and the Council is overtly secretive. In the case of CSDP missions, decision-making actors are prescribed to talk to NGOs and civil society, but not much is put into practice. So groups need to make their way forward by pushing the boundaries, finding allies, engaging in informal talks and creating their own space where they can exchange views with policymakers.

While these tactics allow groups to circumvent the lack of formal access or consultation mechanisms, informal practice seems to be fragile as it depends too much on personal relations. With the change of leadership in the office or the CSDP mission, or the change of personnel, policy towards outside groups may change and advocates can find themselves on building access from scratch. The CSDP case shows that in EU bodies which have not incorporated consulting with non-state actors in their policy practices, organisational cultures of exposure to outside groups are in flux and the politics of informality plays an important role.

This thesis also points to the importance of paying attention to a broader organisational environment context which should also be taken into account (see Lowery & Gray 2004). Interest organisations rarely live off lobbying. They also compete for funds, members and supporters, political attention and other goods (e.g. physical security in the case of Belarusian dissidents). Organisational survival and maintenance may explain the design of their advocacy strategies, including formulation of advocacy objectives, choice of tactics, allies, and utilisation of resources. Lobbying has a signalling function for group's constituencies or sponsors and rationalist-driven explanations attempt to account for different logics of lobbying (Lowery 2007; Berkhout 2013).

3. Methodological reflections

This study reveals once again the methodological difficulties of measuring interest group influence. The methodological triangulation has proven useful as it allows the presentation of a more nuanced picture of influence and lobbying success. Self-assessment helps to understand better the nature of interest group influence as defined

by groups themselves and strategies to seek it: experienced groups tend to reach “a higher degree of influence” by establishing more “realistic” advocacy goals, or in other words, seek a lesser degree of policy change taking into account the policy framework. This highlights a difference in conceptualisation of goal achievement and influence as control over policy outcome. Groups may achieve their advocacy goals but still have little influence in the policy process. By establishing “realistic” advocacy objectives, they tend to focus on small steps and technical issues, leaving controversial political issues aside.

The main problem with measuring influence through self-assessment is that groups often do not know whether their advocacy efforts have led to a desired policy outcome. Or in other words, they face similar difficulties of attribution which most researchers do. This is especially true in the case of complex issues involving a multitude of policy actors and decision-making in the Council. However, it is also the case on more technical issues. Furthermore, while groups report on individual goal-achievement, they are often unaware of the results of collective action (‘lobbying sides’).

Speaking to policymakers and expert observers can help to improve the picture. Using process tracing, researchers can also try to take into account a counterfactual analysis. They can do it by asking stakeholders – groups, policymakers and observers – whether the policy outcome would be the same if not for lobbying. It is also about perceived influence, but it helps to distinguish between “the luck factor” and lobbying influence.

An additional challenge of studying interest group influence in EU foreign policy is that policy documents (especially in the case of CSDP) and political debate in the key decision-making body – the Council of the EU – are hidden from the public eye. Thus, it is often difficult to cross-validate the data on perceived influence that come from

interviews or media reports against some ‘harder’ evidence. Thus, while methodological triangulation improved the measurement, it cannot eliminate all the difficulties.

The main advantage of studying lobbying during a longer time period and across the entire policy cycle as has been the case in this thesis is that it allows us not to limit the study of influence to a particular moment and trace the changes in policy in time controlling for other possible factors. However, a longer timeframe also makes it more difficult to gather all the necessary information to trace the policy process, especially given the prevalence of interviews as a key method of data collection. First, policymakers tend to be rotated frequently and it is more difficult to find and arrange an interview with a policymaker who used to work on the given dossier in the past. Second, groups may not remember all the details of what occurred in the past and prefer to speak about newer instances of lobbying.

In general, potential interviewees were responsive to interview requests and willing to discuss the issues raised in this study. However, it was difficult to get access to some types of groups and policymakers. Access to bigger NGOs and business associations in Brussels and higher levels of decision-makers was the most challenging to obtain. Many group representatives and policymakers seem not to have time to deal with research requests coming from outside. Such difficulties were reported in previous studies (e.g. Voltolini 2013). The way of circumventing this obstacle is investing more time and effort in building gateways to important actors needed to be interviewed.

The studied cases do not represent the most lobbied cases in the EU’s policy towards neighbours. Interest group influence may differ on more controversial and lobbied foreign policy issues. Ideally, one would also need to examine the relationship between interest group influence and institutional conditions looking at the EU’s policy towards

the same country across a variety of policy dossiers. However, in practice, the selection of such cases proves difficult due to the limited universe of cases.

4. Implications for governance in EU foreign policy

This study has not tried to tackle the question of the role of interest groups in EU democratic governance in the foreign policy area. Nonetheless, it can give us some food for thought. The study of lobbying shows that EU foreign policy seems very distant from European citizens – only professionalised groups are engaged in direct lobbying at the EU level and, in order to increase their chances for success, groups have to establish representation in Brussels. While one can say that national governments are the main channels of representation and participation of domestic civil society groups in the intergovernmental EU foreign policy, we also see that EU foreign policy, including the CSDP, is increasingly made by Brussels-based officials which have little contact with groups from the member states. Moreover, the policy process is hidden from the public eye, and there is little transparency and public debate on where the EU sends state-building or post-conflict stabilisation missions to, or how effectively it supports human rights in a neighbouring country. In this sense, the role of the European Parliament is important: the case of EU sanctions policy towards Belarus shows that this institution has turned into an arena for public political debate.

Furthermore, EU foreign policy seems very distant from citizens of those countries which it strives to assist in building democracy and state institutions, peace and security, and developing a more open and prosperous society. It is distant from the societies which it tries to change through its interventions. Whereas the EU bureaucracy provides

support for civil society groups from third countries and increasingly includes them in consultation processes, local groups are still poorly endowed in terms of resources to understand the complex process of EU decision-making, to have access to key actors, to build partnerships with stronger EU-based groups and thus influence EU decisions which have direct impact on them. Instead, local civil society groups are given the role of implementers of EU policies on the ground or helpers of the EU bureaucracy to understand the complexities of the local context. At the same time, local NGOs and business associations are voices of their societies and they can bring information to the EU that can potentially help to develop more effective policies. Moreover, as this study shows, they are frequent allies of the EU in promoting changes in the neighbouring countries. The EU should be more aware of the fact that state actors are not the only counterparts of the Union abroad.

The question this thesis also raises is whether funding which the EU provides to civil society groups has an impact on their advocacy objectives. In several instances, the link between financial support which groups received from the EU and their lobbying position or tactics was revealed. This issue deserves further investigation.

Moreover, whereas the EU supports the development of advocacy skills among civil society groups in the neighbouring countries (for example, through the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility and other aid instruments), EU policymakers should be aware that advocacy capacity is a function of organisational development. Those groups that are more resourceful, better organised, more experienced and more integrated into the policy universe tend to be better equipped to design effective advocacy strategies, however, the balance between the group professionalisation and the link with domestic constituencies is not always easy to strike when civil society groups largely depend on

EU or other international donor funding.

5. Future research agendas

This thesis contributes to the literature on interest groups and lobbying in the EU by focusing on a policy area which has received little scholarly attention and by examining the relationship between influence and institutional factors. It also adds to the literature on participation of non-state actors in international organisations by making a step further and exploring whether access translates into influence. Examining the interaction of non-state actors with decision-makers also advances our understanding of how EU foreign policy is made. However, this study also leaves many issues unexplored and points to many important areas for future research.

First, this study did not aim to examine how member state preferences in the Council are formulated and what influence lobby groups have on them. This is an area of potential research inquiry. One can also compare lobbying strategies and influence at the EU level and at the member state level in terms of tactics, venues, issue framing, and the impact of such factors as public opinion, media interest and electoral politics which are less visible at the EU level.

In addition, in order to explore the lobbying context and the role of institutional factors, one can compare interest group involvement in foreign policymaking in the EU and the US on the same issues (e.g. sanctions, military intervention). Lobbying strategies and group influence on such issues as peacekeeping or international sanctions can also be studied by comparing intergovernmental policymaking within the EU with that of other international organisations such as the UN.

Furthermore, across different policy domains (not only in EU foreign policy), we still know very little about lobbying the Council of the European Union and Permanent Delegations of the EU member states in Brussels and how it is linked to lobbying in the EU capitals.

In this context, there is also potential to explore the role of interest groups across different stages of the policy cycle in greater detail. For example, what is the impact of non-state actors in EU foreign policy agenda-setting? How does non-state actor involvement at the implementation and evaluation stages (often through EU funding) translate into influence on these policies? Analysing these aspects, constructivist approaches can complement rationalist-based accounts. For example, constructivist approaches can help in understanding the role of interest groups in the emergence of ideas, their dissemination, legitimation and influence on policy outcomes (see Saurugger 2013).

Second, to advance our understanding of lobbying and group influence in intergovernmental areas of EU governance, one can look into other policy fields, for example economic and monetary governance or employment and social protection and other areas covered by the Open Method of Coordination. One can test and further develop hypotheses explored by the literature on the institutional access of non-state actors in international organisations in the case of the EU, for example, on the role of normative and material incentives (functional needs) of policymakers to engage with outside groups.

Third, interest group scholars could enquire into the impact of socialisation and learning and organisational environment on lobbying strategies and influence. There is a need to improve our understanding of how groups design their strategies, set advocacy

objectives, utilise their resources, and how they understand and define what constitutes advocacy success and political influence. For interest organisations, defining their advocacy objectives and assessing advocacy success can be an important part of organisational maintenance as they need to show their members or sponsors how they spend their organisational resources. Such a research inquiry also implies changing our analytical lens to view interest groups as organisations (see Halpin 2014).

Finally, we witness that groups from the neighbouring countries, but also EU-based and international groups are often involved in lobbying in multiple arenas – the EU, third country governments and other international organisations. For interest groups coming from neighbouring countries, their governments are the main advocacy venue, but due to the lack of access or receptivity to groups' demands, they turn to the EU as an ally to boost their leverage. On the one hand, this is the boomerang effect of which Keck & Sikkink (1998) speak in their seminal work on norm diffusion through transnational advocacy networks. On the other hand, domestic advocacy groups serve as a factor explaining EU-promoted policy change in the neighbourhood countries as they can act as veto players in the domestic political process (see Gawrich et al. 2010; Langbein & Börzel 2013) and diffuse European norms through participation in cross-border networks and organisational learning (see Turkina & Postnikov 2012). The literature on Europeanisation in the neighbourhood and EU external governance can benefit from paying greater attention to the role of non-state actors and their transnational networks in explaining and understanding policy outcomes and drivers of norms export outside the EU.

Annex. List of interviews

1. Group representative, Brussels, 6 June 2013
2. Group representative, Skype interview, 10 October 2013
3. Group representative, Vilnius, 30 April 2014
4. Group representative, Chisinau, 4 October 2013
5. Group representative, Berlin, 16 May 2014
6. Group representative, Skype interview, 15 October 2013
7. International organisation representatives, Chisinau, 1 October 2013
8. Group representative, Brussels, 6 November 2013
9. EU official, Brussels, 25 October 2013
10. EU official, Brussels, 28 November 2013
11. Group representative, Madrid, 13 November 2013
12. Moldovan diplomat, Chisinau, 1 October 2013
13. EU member state diplomat, Warsaw, 26 June 2013
14. EU agency representative, Warsaw, 28 June 2013
15. EU official, Brussels, 22 October 2013
16. Group representative, Kyiv, 14 January 2014
17. EU official, Kyiv, 10 January 2014
18. Group representative, Kyiv, 3 May 2013
19. Moldovan diplomat, Chisinau, 1 October 2013
20. Group representative, Skype interview, 12 May 2013
21. EU member state diplomat, Kyiv, 13 January 2014
22. Group representative, Brussels, 12 June 2013

23. Group representatives, Warsaw, 2 July 2013
24. EU official, Kyiv, 23 April 2014
25. EP official, Brussels, 17 May 2013
26. EU member state official, Warsaw, 17 July 2013
27. Group representative, Kyiv, 10 September 2013
28. Group representative, Brussels, 2 September 2013
29. Group representatives, Brussels, 17 June 2014
30. Expert, Warsaw, 24 July 2013
31. Group representative, Phone interview, 17 December 2013
32. Group representative, Brussels, 29 July 2013
33. Group representative, Kyiv, 14 January 2014
34. Group representative, Kyiv, 23 April 2014
35. Group representative, Brussels, 4 June 2013
36. Group representative, Kyiv, 15 January 2014
37. Group representative, Warsaw, 25 June 2013
38. EU official, Brussels, 24 October 2013
39. MEP, Brussels, 5 November 2013
40. EU member state diplomat, Brussels, 3 April 2014
41. Group representative, Tbilisi, 15 January 2015
42. Group representative, Chisinau, 2 October 2013
43. Group representative, Brussels, 27 May 2013 and 24 October 2013
44. Ukrainian diplomat, Brussels, 29 July 2013
45. Group representative, Minsk, 26 September 2013
46. Group representative, Minsk, 25 September 2013

47. Group representative, Warsaw, 27 June 2013
48. Group representative, Warsaw, 25 June 2013
49. Group representative, Vilnius, 28 April 2014
50. Group representative, Warsaw, 27 June 2013
51. Group representative, Minsk, 25 September 2013
52. Expert, Minsk, 25 September 2013
53. Group representative, Minsk, 27 September 2013
54. Group representative, Vilnius, 29 April 2014
55. Expert, Berlin, 12 May 2014
56. EU member state diplomat, Vilnius, 29 April 2014
57. Group representative, Minsk, 27 September 2013
58. EU member state diplomat, Brussels, 13 June 2014
59. EU official, Brussels, 18 June 2014
60. Advisor to MEP, Brussels, 4 December 2013
61. Group representative, Berlin, 14 May 2014
62. EU officials, Minsk, 24 September 2013
63. Expert/Group representative, Brussels, 18 June 2014
64. Group representative, Skype interview, 11 July 2014
65. EU official, Brussels, 8 September 2014
66. Group representative, Brussels, 11 September 2014
67. Group representative, Berlin, 13 May 2014
68. Assistant to MEP, Brussels, 7 November 2013
69. Expert, Warsaw, 26 June 2013
70. EP official, Brussels, 7 November 2013

71. Experts, Vilnius, 29 April 2014
72. EP officials, Brussels, 23 October 2013
73. Group representative, Warsaw, 17 July 2013
74. Group representatives, Berlin, 16 May 2014
75. Assistant to MEP, Brussels, 18 October 2013
76. Group representative, Vilnius, 28 April 2014
77. Group representative, Brussels, 8 May 2014
78. Expert, Warsaw, 17 July 2013
79. Expert, Berlin, 13 May 2014
80. EU official, Minsk, 24 September 2013
81. Group representative, Minsk, 26 September 2013
82. Assistant to MEP, Brussels, 25 October 2013
83. Assistant to MEP, Brussels, 5 November 2013
84. EU member state diplomat, Brussels, 9 June 2014
85. Group representative, Warsaw, 24 June 2013
86. Group representative, Minsk, 25 September 2013
87. Expert, Minsk, 24 September 2013
88. Group representative, Minsk, 26 September 2013
89. Group representative, Warsaw, 29 June 2013
90. Expert, Vilnius, 30 April 2014
91. Group representative, Berlin, 14 May 2014
92. Group representative Warsaw, 25 June 2013
93. Group representative, Brussels, 5 June 2014
94. Group representative, Vilnius, 28 April 2014

95. Group representative, Brussels, 7 October 2014
96. Group representative, Brussels, 5 June 2013
97. EUMM official, Tbilisi, 22 January 2015
98. EUMM officials, Tbilisi, 13 January 2015
99. Group representative, Brussels, 16 December 2014
100. EU official, Brussels, 30 October 2014
101. EU officials, Tbilisi, 21 January 2015
102. Group representative, Brussels, 12 October 2014
103. EU officials, Brussels, 14 October 2015
104. Group representatives, London, 7 November 2014
105. Group representative, Brussels, 20 October 2014
106. EP official, Brussels, 30 September 2014
107. EU member state diplomat, Brussels, 21 October 2014
108. EP official, Brussels, 8 October 2014
109. Group representative, Brussels, 12 October 2014
110. Group representative, Ramallah, 26 November 2014
111. EUMM officials, Mtskheta, 22 January 2015
112. EP official, Brussels, 20 October 2014
113. Group representatives, Zugdidi, 17 January 2015
114. Group representative, Tbilisi, 20 January 2015
115. Expert, Tbilisi, 22 January 2015
116. Group representative, Tbilisi, 15 January 2015
117. EUMM officials, Gori, 21 January 2015
118. EU member state diplomat, Brussels, 10 October 2014

119. Group representative, Tbilisi, 15 January 2015
120. Group representative, Ramallah, 26 November 2014
121. Group representative, Brussels, 22 May 2013
122. Group representative, Ramallah, 24 November 2014
123. EUPOL COPPS officials, Jerusalem, 26 November 2013
124. EU official, Jerusalem, 27 November 2014
125. Group representative, Brussels, 22 October 2014
126. Group representative, Tbilisi, 22 January 2015
127. Group representative, London, 7 November 2014
128. Former EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS official, Jerusalem, 23 November 2014
129. Group representative, Gori, 21 January 2015
130. Group representative, Ramallah, 24 November 2014
131. EU official, Brussels, 17 December 2014
132. Group representative, Jerusalem, 27 November 2014
133. Group representative, Tbilisi, 23 January 2015
134. International organisation representative, Ramallah, 30 November 2014
135. Group representative, Tbilisi, 23 January 2015
136. EU official, Brussels, 8 October 2014
137. EU official, Brussels, 17 December 2014
138. EP official, Brussels, 9 October 2014
139. Group representative, Brussels, 9 October 2014
140. Group representative, Skype interview, 6 October 2014
141. EUMM official, Gori, 21 January 2015

142. EUMM officials, Zugdidi, 16 January 2015
143. EU official, Brussels, 28 October 2014
144. Group representative, Tbilisi, 15 January 2015
145. Group representative, Ramallah, 25 November 2014
146. Georgian diplomat, Brussels, 30 October 2014
147. Group representative, Gori, 23 January 2015
148. Expert, Jericho, 29 November 2014
149. EP official, Brussels, 15 October 2014
150. Group representative, Ramallah, 25 November 2014
151. EP official, Brussels, 21 October 2014
152. Expert, Ramallah, 1 December 2014
153. EUMM official, Tbilisi, 12 January 2015
154. EU official, Brussels, 6 October 2014, Brussels
155. Group representative, Brussels, 23 October 2014
156. Group representatives, Tbilisi, 21 January 2015
157. EP official, Brussels, 8 and 16 October 2014
158. EU official, Brussels, 1 October 2014
159. EU member state diplomat, Brussels, 29 October 2014
160. Group representatives, Ramallah, 26 November 2014
161. Group representative, Tbilisi, 15 January 2015

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